

Franco-British Diplomatic Relations Transformed?
The Socio-Political Impact of the Émigrés' Presence in Britain

by

Salam Guenette
B.A., University of Jordan, 1996
B.A., University of Victoria, 2010

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

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Abstract

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Throughout early-modern history, France and Britain had been enemies on opposite sides of the so-called Second Hundred Years' War. Nevertheless, during the Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815), Britain became a haven for almost 40,000 French emigrants, and by 1814 France's restored monarchy no longer viewed Britain as the enemy. The émigrés' experience in Britain, its impact on long-term diplomatic ties between the two countries, and its wider repercussions for European history is the focus of my research. Did émigré diplomats knowingly follow a policy intended to foster a lasting alliance with Britain? Scholars who view the émigrés as politically impotent ignore the powerful impact French presence had on Britain's elite. Even as early as 1793, the émigrés' plight was an asset used by the British government in its negotiations with other European powers. My thesis will answer the aforementioned question by exploring a neglected aspect of the French experience in Great Britain: the émigrés' social and political interactions with the British public and government and how this may have affected Franco-British diplomacy during the nineteenth century.

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Dedication

For Darin and Devlin

Introduction

We never saw a scene of such real joy as this day has presented; every body seemed to anticipate the restoration of better days, and welcomed the journey of the legitimate King to his dominions, as the best guarantee of a lasting and affectionate union between the two nations.¹

In his book *Natural and Necessary Enemies: Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century* (1986), Jeremy Black concludes that the relationship between France and Britain during the eighteenth century suffered a weakness of “personal links at senior levels.”² This weakness was marked by the absence of reciprocal confidential channels through which foreign policy could either be influenced or explained. Mutual mistrust between the governments intensified this weakness even though ministries on either side sought closer relations at various points following the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.³ Yet, on the eve of his departure from Britain after a twenty-three year exile, Louis XVIII thanked the Prince Regent for his country’s support and declared: “It is to your Royal Highness’s Councils, to this great country, and to the constancy of its people that I shall always ascribe, under Providence, the restoration of our House to the Throne of our Ancestors.”⁴ Such a declaration suggests a ‘revolution’ of sentiment between two traditional enemies who had been on opposite sides of the so-called Second Hundred Years’ War.⁵ To what degree did the French presence in Britain influence this change?

Paul Schroeder has pondered how European diplomats so desirous of peace at the end of the Seven Years’ War failed to achieve their goal, and why they succeeded a generation later. The answer to his question rests on the transformation of old systems of alliances which governed European diplomacy, whereby the rules of compensation, indemnification, prestige and *raison d’état* were shifted to accommodate the interests of

other states for the sake of peace and equilibrium.⁶ The French Revolution and its ensuing disruption of Europe occupy a great part of this narrative, wherein Schroeder gives the counter-revolutionary activities of French émigrés' a place of importance for sowing the seeds of revolutionary wars. According to Schroeder, the provocation and antagonism of early émigrés, who enjoyed little sympathy abroad, helped radicalize the situation in France and made war possible.⁷ While it is difficult to refute this statement, the years of exile also altered the emigration experience, and despite the enduring intransigence of ultra-royalism, the official diplomacy of the restored Bourbons, at least during the reign of Louis XVIII, was more in line with the wishes and interests of their European neighbours, particularly Britain. This change, I would argue, was due in great part to the close social contact between the French exiles and their British hosts. For the latter, the French Revolution was a dramatic and decisive event and the wars it caused dominated British politics and economy for more than twenty years.⁸

Historically, the émigrés were a creation of the French Revolution and they remain, for better or worse, tied to the Counter-revolution.⁹ As a collective entity, the émigrés present an unsympathetic image of a group that has been little studied in the massive literature of Revolutionary historiography. The emigration, a phenomenon that was supposedly overwhelmingly from society's upper tiers, is often presented in Manichean terms: the black of the clergy and the white Bourbon cockade. The eventual Bourbon restoration and return of the émigrés helped cement the image that they were reactionary ultra-royalists and fervently dedicated to reinstating the ancien régime, while the politicized history of the Revolution means that even today, studying the émigrés

“smacks” of conservatism.¹⁰ Such a presentation however neither encompasses the diversity of political opinions and attitudes among the exiles nor accounts for any achievements that culminated in the Bourbon restoration.

As most studies of the émigrés have focused on their support of counter-revolution, the influence of the French presence in Britain on the traditional rivals’ diplomacy requires a deeper investigation. Indeed, not only was Britain the main stop en route to America, it also welcomed between twenty and forty thousand émigrés, among whom were France’s next three kings, several future prime ministers and many literary figures.¹¹ This presence, and its impact on both sides, is at the heart of my thesis: an investigation of the influence of the various émigré groups on Franco-British relations from 1789 to the early years of the Second Restoration. Did leading émigré figures knowingly follow a policy intended to foster a lasting alliance with Britain? Did they change British attitudes towards France? Finally, to what extent did “personal links at senior levels” affect diplomatic relations?

My research aims to answer these questions by exploring the émigrés’ social and political interactions with the British public and government. The relationship that developed, I will demonstrate, set patterns for future Franco-British interaction. To begin the analysis, my introduction will provide a brief overview of Franco-British relations in the period preceding the Revolution, present a general background for the emigration, and then situate it within major works of Revolutionary historiography.

After the Seven Years’ War and the War of American Independence, Franco-British relations were marked by prevailing animosity and occasional admiration.¹² Throughout the 1780s, even during the Regency Crisis of 1788-89, Britain under William

Pitt the Younger and Lord Carmarthen – future duke of Leeds – followed a policy of vigorous hostility towards France.¹³ Nonetheless, while the French believed Britain responsible for their troubles during the 1780s, whether for the Affair of the Necklace in 1785 or grain shortages in 1789-90, Britain's interest was generally confined to colonial rivalry and French naval development. Following the conclusion of the War of American Independence, official instructions to the British Ambassador in Paris, the Duke of Dorset, were to discover any French plans for the East Indies and to ascertain if foreign ships of war were in French ports. The agents employed to gather such information were neither numerous nor very effective and, as far as Britain was concerned, any possible French naval threat ceased with the Revolution.¹⁴ However, by 1789 French royalists and revolutionaries alike believed that Britain was spending money on a large scale with the sole purpose of fomenting troubles in the already beleaguered kingdom.¹⁵ Such suspicions were increased by royalist fear that Britain favoured the anglophile Philippe duc d'Orléans as a replacement to Louis XVI.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the turmoil of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars made Britain a haven for almost 40,000 émigrés who sought refuge there once advancing Revolutionary armies rendered remaining on the continent deadly.¹⁷ On the islands, émigré leaders portrayed their cause as European-wide; the success of revolutionary policies was detrimental to all concerned parties in Europe and not just a small number of French emigrants. This expansion of scope reflects to a large extent a change in diplomacy towards inclusion and cooperation rather than exclusion and confrontation. The result of this shift was that by 1814 Britain had replaced Austria and other continental monarchies as the leading French ally.¹⁸

Little did those who left during that fateful summer of 1789 know that what started as a vogue was to turn into a lengthy exile for approximately 130,000 French men, women and children. For more than two decades, those who either chose, or were forced, to leave the country became known to history as the émigrés.¹⁹ The word itself entered the English language in 1792; by then the Revolution, anti-noble almost from the beginning, had turned anti-clerical, anti-monarchic and, following the September massacres, ‘terroristic.’ The emigrants, of whom a third had left before the attack on the Tuileries in August 1792, did not leave France solely out of loyalty to the deposed monarchy, as did the Jacobite exiles of the previous century. They were also unlike their French predecessors, the Huguenots, who were expelled *en masse* for religious reasons. As William Doyle explains, the reasons to emigrate evolved with the Revolution itself; however, whether they left by choice or were compelled to leave, they constituted a group of people no longer able to live within the France created by Revolution.²⁰

In France, fears of émigré conspirators trying to overturn the Revolution were well founded, although “the belief that their tentacles reached into the heart of government was perhaps exaggerated.”²¹ As the war advanced, those who inhabited “storm centers”²² were forced to flee and become émigrés. Much like other refugees, no one conspired to ostracize them any more than they planned to emigrate: “They were the victims not of a Jacobin plot, not of their own actions, but of a cyclonic disturbance in the life of their nation.”²³ Meanwhile, increased emigration, fear of prosecution, and fear of conspiracy fed off each other, which made anti-émigré laws more punitive. With their political views defeated by a triumphant National Assembly, their only option was to

leave. This is the story of emigration, a powerful myth that, throughout the nineteenth century, Republican tradition had no interest in changing. Popular images of emigration continue to portray the émigrés as deluded aristocrats who left France in tatters and disguise. It is an image of an enemy rushing to join the princes' army near Coblenz or sailing across the stormy British channel under the cover of darkness.²⁴

Following Thermidor, the apathy of republican officials opened the door for some émigrés to re-enter France, even though the Directory reconfirmed anti-émigré laws following the Quiberon expedition of July 1795. Officially, the harsh anti-émigré laws of 1795 remained in effect until Napoleon ordered the closure of émigré lists in March 1800, an act which was followed by general amnesty in 1802.²⁵ The first partial amnesty in 1800 allowed the legal repatriation of approximately 53,000 émigrés, many of whom had been given dispensation to live in France or had already secured the removal of their names from émigré lists. Nonetheless, the amnesty also allowed the return of workers and peasants who had fled during the Terror, as well as those who had been listed collectively instead of individually.²⁶ By 1797, Britain's master spy, William Wickham, reported that Condé's army was disbanding by hundreds and that "no less than 300 had asked for their *congés* in one day, and [were] gone into France."²⁷

While the majority of the émigrés chose passivity, those who remained politically active can be divided into a variety of groups.²⁸ Among the émigrés were men who even accepted the First Republic, but were repelled by the Terror, including Louis Philippe duc de Chartres – duc d'Orléans after his father's execution – and General Dumouriez. But the main doctrinal distinctions among counter-revolutionaries were four-fold:

constitutionalists,* *monarchiens*,† monarchists and ultra-royalists. Constitutionalists were partisans of the 1791 Constitution. The *monarchiens*, including men like Mounier, Montlosier and Lally-Tolendal, were politicians or writers who advocated a government model similar to that of Britain. “Monarchist” refers to men, such as the ministers of Louis XVI the Baron de Breteuil and Loménie de Brienne, who wanted to reform the regime within the bounds of enlightened despotism. Ultra-royalists, or *purs*, were the ancien régime’s staunch defenders; men such as Louis-Emmanuel de Launay, comte d’Antraigues, worked to reestablish France’s ‘mythical past,’ wherein the monarchy was absolute and the primacy of the social order belonged to feudal nobles.²⁹ Ultra-royalists attached themselves to the king’s younger brother, the Comte d’Artois, and later to Louis XVIII. For them, imposing a return to the ancien régime was more important than the turmoil their actions caused France, including the persecution of the royal family and the fall of the monarchy. Among such *ad hoc* groupings, the émigré princes, Artois and Provence, presented themselves as “leaders of a crusade to save Europe,” and justified their independence from the French Crown on the grounds that they were its legitimate voice while the King was held captive in Paris.³⁰

Nevertheless, the early Revolution was not as much a mortal threat to those who chose to leave, as it was a challenge. By rejecting the Revolution, the early émigrés played a fateful part in radicalising French politics. Their noisy denunciations and machinations from beyond the borders played into the hands of radical revolutionaries, intensifying paranoia and undermining all efforts to create a stable constitutional

* The term constitutionalists will be used interchangeably with *constitutionnels*.

† The term *monarchiens* was originally applied in a pejorative sense by Jean Paul Marat. From Paul H. Beik, “The French Revolution Seen from the Right: Social Theories in Motion, 1789-1799,” *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, New Series, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1956), 59.

regime.³¹ Moreover, émigrés' early departures created an impasse between revolutionaries and royalists on the one hand, and between the nobles who believed they served the king by remaining in France and those who believed they served him by leaving on the other.³² Liberal nobles, who saw themselves as the leaders of a 'new' France, felt defeated as the Revolution rejected their position and they became caught "in a movement increasingly dominated by democratic aspirations. From 1789 to 1792, their identity degenerated from liberal nobles to 'aristocrats,' and from enlightened leaders to agents of despotism."³³ They quickly faced the choice of emigration or trying to survive as quietly as possible amidst escalating attacks.

Correspondingly, British views of the Revolution underwent a dramatic change due to rising anxiety about increased radicalism in Britain and the image of misery that accompanied émigré arrivals. After the declaration of war in 1793, the question of British neutrality towards the situation in France and support for the counterrevolution had to be addressed. Evidence suggests that Pitt supported the ultra-royalists, while *les monarchiens* Mounier and Pierre Victor Malouet pressed Lord Grenville to back constitutional options. However, British conviction that monarchy was essential for France did not presuppose a Bourbon one; not even George III was committed as to whom the next French monarch ought to be.³⁴ The prospect of peace and stability on the continent was more important for the British government, particularly as Orléans remained a viable option.³⁵ Ultras' apprehension that the British government was in contact with 'rival' groups was not imaginary, since *monarchiens* such as Malouet had frequent communication with Pitt's cabinet.³⁶

Few Britons identified with the most extreme views of the Revolution; even at his most reactionary moments Lord Grenville regarded France and its politicians with a “detached superiority.”³⁷ As far as the British government was concerned, the Revolution was an annoying experience and the result of “an inferior” political system. It was nonetheless a ‘mischief’ that had to be dealt with to ensure European tranquility and to curb the spread of democratic ideas. The diplomatic connection with France or with the émigrés was thus pragmatic rather than dependent on political abstractions such as human rights or ancient constitutions.³⁸ That the *constitutionnels* were believed to be in contact with Paris with the purpose of establishing a conservative, monarchist regime made the prospect for peace seem more tenable. Hence, Britain believed that negotiation with the Thermidorian leadership was feasible because, unlike the leaders of the Terror, they were men for whom survival was more important than principle.³⁹

In his introduction to *The Making of the English Working Class* (1964), E.P. Thompson wrote that “only the successful (in the sense of those whose aspirations anticipated subsequent evolution) are remembered. The blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers themselves are forgotten by historians.”⁴⁰ In more ways than one, this is also the verdict given to the history of the émigrés during the French Revolution and Napoleonic eras. While the émigrés failed in their most radical aspiration of reversing the revolutionary achievements of the 1790s, the success of émigré diplomacy in ensuring that Bourbon France remained a vital and viable participant in European history has been given little attention.

There is a surprising dearth of writings about the diplomatic dimension of Revolutionary history; most works focus on domestic issues. In the literature that does exist, the émigré contribution has been largely discounted because, as Black says, diplomatic history has often been studied from a “nationalistic perspective and adopting a determinist approach predicated on the inevitability of the development of particular nation states.”⁴¹ Émigré diplomacy was neglected then because it did not fit within the French republican vision. However, in the shadows of this diplomacy lie the efforts of French émigrés to remain connected to other European powers despite the apparent triumph of the Revolution.⁴²

The early histories of the Revolution were hostile towards developments in France. Writing in exile, men such as Joseph de Maistre and the Abbé Barruel had the time and the incentive to draw up their charges against revolutionary ‘crimes’.⁴³ In works such as De Maistre’s *Considérations sur la France* (1796), and Barruel’s *Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism* (1797) the main attack was aimed at revolutionaries and the ‘weak’ nobles who failed to protect the established order. For attacking this order, the Revolution became an anathema that had to be defeated by guarding tradition and the Catholic Church. It was possible, according to de Maistre, that God used this ‘satanic’ revolution to punish the French and bring about a period of moral regeneration throughout the continent.⁴⁴ He also believed that, other than inciting foreign rulers to wage war on the Revolution, the émigrés’ duty was to maintain order in exile. That being said, de Maistre did not defend the émigrés as much as condemn the nobility’s degeneration, which caused the Revolution by opposing the king and then abandoning him. This notion was emphasized in the failure of all the counter-revolutionary efforts.

French nobles were not morally strong enough to restore the monarchy, especially as the small numbers of the émigrés “counted for ‘nothing’ and could do nothing.”⁴⁵

Nonetheless, even as early as 1794, as an emigrant from his native Savoy due to French aggression, de Maistre maintained a level-headed attitude in international politics and refused to accept the partitioning of France for indemnification. He argued that France’s territorial integrity was essential to the future balance of power and that there was to be no benefit to Europe if Austria and Prussia were made to benefit from French defeat.⁴⁶

Similarly, in his *Memoirs*, Abbé Augustin Barruel attacked conspiratorial *philosophes* and freemasons at all political levels, from liberal monarchists, such as the Lameth brothers, to Philippe d’Orléans and rebellious courtiers. Barruel’s argument helped perpetuate the idea that France’s problems could have been easily addressed had it not been for the treachery of liberals and nobles whose actions had caused the Revolution. This line of thought was reflected in the rigid intransigence of ultra-royalists who believed that any change in France, whether sanctioned by the king or not, was due to a ‘real’ conspiracy that aimed at destroying French hierarchy, religion and order.⁴⁷ In Barruel’s estimation, even Louis XVI was to be blamed for accepting the ‘perfidious’ councils of men like Necker.⁴⁸

Another polemicist attacking the Revolution was Louis de Bonald, who emigrated in 1791. A theocrat like de Maistre, Bonald advocated the emigration as a necessity for some, a duty for others and right for all.⁴⁹ In his view, the emigration, which intended to bring back France’s ‘just’ society, was an act of honour and generosity. The émigrés could not be accused of fighting against France when their intention was to re-establish

her ancient constitution. The émigrés were thus to ‘deliver’ France and avenge royalty, religion and desecrated humanity.⁵⁰

In such reactionary works, the writers defended absolutism, religion and the old social structure. The king, according to such belief, embodied of the will of his people.⁵¹ In 1797 Chateaubriand, who did not have much faith in government at the time, argued in *Essai historique* that all government was ‘a yoke,’ but that it was “better to obey one of our rich and enlightened compatriots than an ignorant multitude which heaps every possible evil upon us.”⁵² Like de Maistre and Bonald, Chateaubriand linked the Revolution to the low moral standard of all French society and found everyone responsible for France’s trouble. The kings, even if well-meaning, were weak and misled by intrigue; the ministers were either corrupt or inept; the government contained a mix of force and weakness and neither was properly applied; the clergy was debauched in Paris and prejudiced in the provinces, while the *philosophes* spent their time undermining either religion or the state.⁵³ Reactionary and ultra-royalist attitudes were a reflection of these writings.

Following the Restorations of 1814-15, historical writing went in an opposite direction. For liberal writers from Mme de Stael onwards, writing histories of the Revolution became the means of arguing against conservative accusations that the Revolution destroyed tradition and the ‘mythical’ peace and prosperity which supposedly existed during the ancien régime.⁵⁴

Memoirs revealed a marked division between rejection of ultra-royalist actions to overturn the Revolution and tacit acceptance of the need to escape as the Revolution became more radical. In her *Considerations on the Principal Events of the French*

Revolution (1817), Madame de Staël, a liberal thinker who had supported the early stages of the Revolution and had left Paris only following the fall of the monarchy, found it important to distinguish between voluntary and forced emigration. She wanted to ensure that not all émigrés be grouped together as enemies of the Revolution and insisted that “after the overthrow of the throne in 1792...we all emigrated to escape the dangers with which we were threatened.”⁵⁵ In her view, accusing those who escaped fearing for their lives was as criminal an act as fighting against one’s country. In contrast, those who left out of a misguided sense of honour had abandoned their king to the mercy of revolution and by their actions helped destroy the monarchy. De Staël regarded royalist leaders in the Vendée as more worthy of respect than the émigrés who incited foreign powers to attack France.⁵⁶

Louis Philippe, Duc d’Orléans, the king’s first cousin and France’s future monarch, was more nuanced in his criticism. Although he respected the motivations behind the emigration, he still regarded it as a ‘false step,’ one that was driven by emotion instead of reason and which blinded the nobility to their own best interest: working for a constitutional settlement in France. Orléans understood that the attacks on chateaux, riots and lack of law enforcement forced many people to seek refuge in other countries and that their actions hurt France and left the King at the mercy of his enemies. Likewise, he believed the émigré elite, by treating disdainfully any emigrants who arrived later, was responsible for the divisions plaguing their exile.⁵⁷ Like de Staël, Orléans differentiated between the émigrés who chose to follow the princes in exile and *refugees* who left fearing for their lives.⁵⁸ For his part, France’s inveterate diplomat Talleyrand-

Périgord, was eager to dispel the notion that he had emigrated, even while acknowledging that his prolonged and unauthorized stay outside France made him an emigrant.⁵⁹

Thus Royalists and constitutional monarchists alike defended parts of the emigration as a ‘necessary evil’ against persecution during the Terror, while condemning the abandonment of the king to revolutionary forces. Baron Malouet had not condemned those who had left out of fear but had urged them – at least in 1792 – to return and support the monarchy. Yet he too had left France following the fall of the monarchy and had not returned until after Napoleon’s coup of *Brumaire* in 1799.⁶⁰

The argument that most émigrés had been forced by the Revolution to escape was articulated during the emigration itself by Gérard de Lally-Tollendal in his *Défense Des émigrés françaises adressée Au Peuple française* (1797). Thereafter, it permeated memoirs of the emigration, from Chateaubriand’s *Mémoires d’Outre Tombe* (1848) to the Marquise de La Tour du Pin’s *Memoirs: Laughing and Dancing Our Way to the Precipice* (1906). Remaining in exile, even after the Restoration, General Dumouriez condemned the Revolution, not for its destruction of the ancien régime, but for its inability to live up to its declared principles. For him, “*si les chefs avaient eu la sagesse de s'en tenir aux principes de leur révolution, elle [France] serait devenue la nation la plus libre et la plus estimée du monde entier.*”⁶¹ Instead, for Dumouriez, France became a monstrous, bloodthirsty nation.⁶²

During the nineteenth century, notable histories of the Revolution began to appear as French intellectuals sought to understand and account for the complexity of events. Historians tried to separate the moderate Revolution from the Terror by blaming the latter on the intransigence of the ancien régime. Liberal historians blamed the nobility for

starting the Revolution and then abandoning the king by emigrating. They were the regicides.⁶³ Defending their stance against ultra-royalist assault, historians and regicides alike argued that as Louis XVI had pardoned France, the restored monarchy should do the same.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the ultra-royalist attack on the Revolution only succeeded in splitting the royalist Right.⁶⁵

In the liberal effort to reconcile the Revolution to its aftermath, the conventional image of the émigrés as treacherous and cowardly was cemented. Writing about the Revolution in 1824, François-Auguste Mignet accused the emigration of radicalizing French politics. What he termed “*La France extérieure*”⁶⁶ devastated the constitutional monarchy. For Mignet, “but for the emigration which induced the war, but for the schism which induced the disturbances, the king would probably have agreed to the constitution, and the revolutionaries would not have dreamed of the Republic.”⁶⁷

In his *History of the French Revolution* (1837), Adolph Thiers accused the émigrés of providing a *fatal* example of defection; every time they opposed the Revolution, they weakened the monarchy.⁶⁸ Like Mignet, Thiers focused on the ultra-royalist element of emigration. For him, they were a group of aristocrats who wished to usurp the power of Louis XVI and were disdainful of both the Revolution and the foreign courts welcoming it. At Coblenz they were as haughty, incapable and frivolous as they had been at Versailles.⁶⁹ Jules Michelet’s opinion of the émigrés was even more extreme: the émigrés were worse than France’s enemies because invading armies in 1792 were pushed and trained by émigrés. After all, “what else did the foreigner, the émigré, the priest trust in, if not treason?”⁷⁰ In these histories, the émigrés consisted only of the high nobility who wanted nothing more than a return to the ancien régime; this group was

even rejected by provincial nobles, who knew how dangerous and useless the emigration was.⁷¹ Focusing on the émigrés as ‘traitors’ ignored, by default, their lives in exile. In *The French Revolution: A History* (1857), the first major English-language history of the Revolution, Thomas Carlyle provided a similar judgment to that of Michelet: the émigrés deserved their punishment. He argued that the emigration was started by French seigneurs who abandoned the country out of arrogance, snobbery and fear. They were connected only to intrigue whether in France or around Europe: “unhappy Emigrants... They are ignorant of much they should know... A Political Party that knows not when it’s beaten.”⁷²

Not until Hippolyte Taine’s *The French Revolution* (1878) do we see a change in attitude towards the émigrés in the general historiography of the Revolution. Like Lally-Tolendal, Taine expanded on the reasons forcing them to escape. Taine likened the émigrés to the Huguenots; the Revolution turned them into an oppressed class and made France uninhabitable. They were punished whether they stayed or left, and could not remain in a country where, while respecting the law, they lacked its protection.⁷³ More so than previous historians, Taine provided examples of persecuted nobles who were forced through intimidation and fear to flee.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, Taine still did not discuss the variety of groups within the emigration or what impact they had outside France.

In the ensuing histories of Jean Jaurès, François Aulard and Albert Mathiez, the émigrés were once more treated as a collective group of higher aristocracy, whose actions towards France were treasonous to say the least. Jaurès, echoing Michelet’s sentiment, wrote “*tous les biens des nobles fussent mis sous la main de la Nation pour répondre des dépenses de guerre que la trahison des émigrés imposait à la France.*”⁷⁵ In Fernand

Baldensperger's *Le Mouvement des Idées dans l'Émigration Française, 1789-1815* (1924), one of few books dedicated to the emigration, the phenomenon is discussed as the result of two opposing political theories. The émigrés were not necessarily 'traitors,' since they never lost their passion for France, but the latter was no longer that of the Revolution.

Given the experience of the Second World War and the collaboration of the Vichy regime with Nazi Germany, it is perhaps not surprising that in *La Révolution Française* (1957) Georges Lefebvre's discussion of Louis XVI and his association with the émigrés centered on the monarchy's concessions of French territory to guarantee foreign intervention against the Revolution. Lefebvre denounced both the monarch and the émigrés without discriminating among the various groups or their policies. For him, both parties were guilty of contemplating ceding territory to ensure Austrian cooperation and British neutrality.⁷⁶

Condemnation of the émigrés' *treasonous* activities continued, and it is not until Donald Greer's *The Incidence of the Emigration during the French Revolution* (1951) that we find a statistically driven investigation of the emigration. Using archived lists, Greer sought to answer the questions: who left France? Why? And when did they return? Although his study did not change the general historiographical opinion of émigrés' actions, it created a fissure in the argument that *all* who fled rejected the Revolution, defended ultra-royalism and conspired with foreign enemies to reinstall the ancien régime. It also dispelled the notion that the emigration was confined to "lily-white aristocrats and black-gowned priests."⁷⁷

This fissure and its connection to Britain were further explored in Jacques Godechot's *The Counter-Revolution: Doctrine & Action 1789-1804* (1961), which offers a valuable description of the emigration and the counter-revolutionary activities of leading émigrés. Divided into two parts, the section focused on doctrine is pertinent to understanding the various reactionary theories that influenced counter-revolutionary thought. However, the part focused on action is limited both chronologically to the Empire and structurally to the interaction – or lack thereof – between émigré doctrine and popular French classes; the discussion of émigré influence on Franco-British diplomacy is not fully developed.

Harvey Mitchell explores the British connection with the emigrants in *The underground War against Revolutionary France: the Missions of William Wickham, 1794-1800* (1965). While paying particular attention to moderate royalists, Mitchell's work focused mostly on the counter-revolutionary mission of British agent William Wickham and his relations with various émigré groups, Directory politicians and neighbouring states, especially Austria and Switzerland. More recently, Elizabeth Sparrow's intensive archival research in *Secret Service: British agents in France, 1792-1815* (1999) has expanded Mitchell's work to cover British agents during the Revolution and First Empire, with the aim of tracing the roots of the British secret service and the émigrés' connection to the Alien Office.⁷⁸

Also focused on the Counter-Revolution, Maurice Hutt's study of the Chouannerie analyses the conflict between the royalist armies in France's west and the Revolutionary ones. Hutt's work is important because it looks at international politics, wherein the Chouannerie was part of the Bourbon attack on the French Republic and the

“(not identical) British assault on republican France.”⁷⁹ The link between the two was the commander of the royalist army Joseph de Puisaye. The narrative of *Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution: Puisaye, the Princes, and the British Government in the 1790s* (1983) follows, albeit all too briefly, Puisaye and the émigrés until roughly 1809, with the main focus being on the ebb and flow of British support for the royalist and military activities in western France. With the exception of the relation between the émigré princes and their appointed and (later disgraced military) commander, a further study of émigré activities in Britain is not provided.

Since the cultural turn, histories which include consideration of the emigration, have increased. Of practical interest to this study is Patrice Higonnet’s *Class, Ideology, and the Rights of Nobles during the French Revolution* (1981), which discusses anti-émigré legislation within the context of failed noble-bourgeois cooperation and analyzes how various political factions used the emigration to advance their political position. Higonnet argues that, despite persecution, most nobles tried to withdraw from politics. As well, among those who eventually entered into counter-revolution, almost half initially were supporters of the Revolution. Yet by 1793-4 the nobility was disliked everywhere. It was often assumed that *all* nobles must have been against the Revolution, and the fact that this may not have been the case was ignored in a historiography that often treats the émigrés *en mass* as counter-revolutionary nobility. According to Higonnet, “if all nobles had been against the Revolution, the curtailment of their rights would be easy to explain. But that has not been the case [implying] again that the background for their exclusion is more complex than has been allowed.”⁸⁰

Edited by Philip Mansel and Kirsty Carpenter, *The French Émigrés in Europe and the Struggle Against Revolution, 1789-1814* (1999) supplies various articles on the social, political and military activities of French emigrants around Europe. Although chapters such as Simon Burrows' "The Image of the Republic in the Press of the London Émigrés, 1792-1802," and Mansel's "From Coblenz to Hartwell: the *Émigré* Government and the European Powers, 1791 -1814" offer valuable information, the collection's wide focus does not allow for an in depth investigation of each subject offered. Meanwhile, Carpenter's *Refugees of the French Revolution: Émigrés in London, 1789-1802* (1999) is a social and cultural study of emigration conditions, though her investigation of the emigration's political ramifications and impact on Franco-British diplomacy is minimal.

In contrast to studies of the counter-revolution or attacks on privilege, Jennifer Ngairé Heuer's *Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789-1830* (2005) offers a *longue durée* study of nationality, gender and citizenship in France. Her discussion of the creation of non-citizens by stripping the émigrés of their citizenship is particularly insightful, as it provides a succinct narrative of the increasingly expanding anti-émigré laws and the process by which the émigrés came to be considered *civilly dead*. Moreover, in her article "Liberty and Death: The French Revolution," Heuer notes that the definition of what was revolutionary or counter-revolutionary was in constant flux. Yet, the term *émigrés* continually expanded to include more groups than just the nobility. Thus, the Revolution created 'an other' identity for the émigrés, one that existed outside the body politic and the newly established boundaries of nation and citizenship. Such labelling was far from being an innocent process; identifying the

enemies as traitors, aristocrats or émigrés served only to dehumanize them, thus making reconciliation of revolutionary promises of human rights with abject violence possible.⁸¹

Most recently, William Doyle's *Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution* (2009) discusses relations between the nobility and the Third Estate during the eighteenth century. Doyle argues that the emigration was a result of the presumed attack on aristocracy during the early stages of the Revolution and the later concerted attack on privilege during the more radical stages.⁸² Although Doyle discusses the vital role of the emigration in weakening the prospects of constitutional monarchy, his study remains focused on France and does not examine the émigrés' diplomatic efforts. Finally, one should also at least mention Vincent Beach's *Charles X of France* (1971) and Philip Mansel's *Louis XVIII* (1981). Although biographical, both works provide a detailed discussion of the Bourbons' time in exile.

Thus, since Greer's book in 1951, efforts have been made to reclaim the emigration as part of Revolutionary history. Yet, investigation of the émigrés' influence, or lack thereof, on Franco-British relations leading up to the Restoration remains largely unexplored. Moreover, general surveys tend to revert to conventional historiography of the émigrés. Donald M.G. Sutherland's *France 1789-1815: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (1985) presents the emigration in counter-revolutionary terms, wherein its failures seem to have been personified in the prince Condé and "his column of gentlemen."⁸³ This view was also reflected by Paul Schroeder in his *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (1994). Schroeder discusses the émigrés only as a political force working to achieve foreign intervention in France and a return of the ancien regime.⁸⁴ Once more, the émigrés are presented as a single, cohesive group, and a

deeper discussion of their role in transforming French diplomacy is wanting. Lastly, Robert and Isabelle Tombs, in *That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King to the Present* (2006), provide only a small sociocultural account of the émigrés' presence in Britain.

Whether or not they saw themselves as counter-revolutionaries, the émigrés had a strong impact that radicalized politics in France on the one hand, and that allied Europe – eventually – in support of the deposed Bourbons, on the other. Historiography for the past two centuries has viewed the émigrés as a single political faction and in a less than flattering light. However, this historiography is not only antipathetic, it also suffers from a lack of academic focus. Carpenter attributes the latter problem to two reasons: the difficulty of using sources spread across Europe; and the sidelining of the émigrés by nineteenth-century republican historians. From a republican point of view, the émigrés were ‘non-people’ because the Revolution stripped them of their citizenship and legal existence. Equally, historians of the counter-revolution dismiss the émigrés given the failure of their military efforts. Since the most vocal among them were committed counter-revolutionaries who wished to overturn the Revolution, they inspired neither confidence nor sympathy.⁸⁵

Whether contemporary or recent, historical opinion has tended to disregard the fact that the majority of the émigrés accepted the early achievements of the Revolution; some were even willing to acknowledge the benefits of a republican government. What they all rejected was the Terror's harsh persecution, and they fled fearing for their lives. Interpretation has also tended to ignore the fact that, in exile, most had to accept a harder

royalist line or risk ostracism and the loss of financial aid.⁸⁶ Consequently, while the émigrés' connection to the Counter-revolution is undeniable, one must avoid assuming an active correspondence between internal and external counter-revolutionary activities or casting *all émigrés* as enemies of the Revolution.⁸⁷

In 1828, the royalist historian A. Antoine de Saint-Gervais wrote, "Great Britain was a hospitable land for our great men of state, for our most celebrated men of literature, and our most intrepid ... writers."⁸⁸ How do we reconcile this notion with the statement that Pitt's doors as far as the émigrés were concerned were the "gates of hell?"⁸⁹

The following chapters will explore the change in relations between France and Britain along the following lines. Initially, I will examine divisions among the French *émigrés* and their efforts to cultivate foreign support. Then, through the use of memoirs and archival documents at both the Home and Foreign Offices in the British archives, I will investigate the interaction of the British political elite with their *émigré* counterparts and consider the efforts of the British government to draw clear distinctions as to whom to support among the émigrés. Finally, I will examine the ousted Bourbons' efforts to remain active on the European scene and regain international prestige after 1815.

¹ *The Times*, Monday, April 25, 1814, pg. 3; Issue 9204; col D.

² Jeremy Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies: Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century*, (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1986), 208.

³ Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 208.

⁴ Philip Mansel, *Louis XVIII* (London: Blond & Briggs, 1981), 168.

⁵ Robert and Isabelle Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King to the Present* (London: William Heinemann, 2006), 208.

⁶ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Oxford: University Press, 1994), 5-8.

⁷ Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, 69.

⁸ George Woodcock "The Meaning of Revolution in Britain," in Ceri Crossley and Ian Small, eds., *The French Revolution and British culture* (Oxford: University Press, 1989), 1.

⁹ William Doyle, Introduction to Philip Mansel and Kirsty Carpenter, eds., *The French Émigrés in Europe and the Struggle Against Revolution, 1789-1814* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), xv-xxii.

- ¹⁰ Maya Jasanoff, "Revolutionary Exiles: The American Loyalists and French Émigré Diasporas," in eds., David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam *The age of revolutions in global context, c. 1760-1840*, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009): 40.
- ¹¹ Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 216.
- ¹² Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 66.
- ¹³ Michael Duffy, "Pitt, Grenville and the Control of British Foreign Policy in the 1790s," in Jeremy Black, ed. *Knights Errant and True Englishmen: British Foreign Policy, 1660-1800* (Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1989), 152. On the Regency Crisis and its impact on foreign policy see T.C.W. Blanning and Carl Haase, "George III, Hanover and the Regency Crisis," in *Ibid.*, 135-150.
- ¹⁴ Alfred Cobban, "British Secret Service in France, 1784-1792," *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 69, No. 271 (Apr., 1954): 238-41.
- ¹⁵ Cobban, "British Secret Service in France," 226.
- ¹⁶ Although fears of British backing of Orleans were dispelled by 1790, suspicion of a strong Orleans faction bent on changing the ruling dynasty persisted throughout the revolution and was rekindled during the Restoration. See Cobban, "British Secret Service in France," 259-60.
- ¹⁷ In accordance with revolutionary laws, the republican armies were ordered to kill émigrés found in conquered territories. Kirsty Carpenter, *Refugees of the French Revolution: Émigrés in London, 1789-1802* (New York: Macmillan, 1999), 2-3.
- ¹⁸ Philip Mansel, "From Coblenz to Hartwell: the Émigré Government and the European Powers, 1791 - 1814," in Mansel and Carpenter, eds., *The French Émigrés in Europe and the Struggle Against Revolution, 1789-1814*, 20.
- ¹⁹ Émigrés numbers vary; some place them at 60,000-80,000, but general agreement has them around 130,000-200,000, including about 25,000 nobles (of approximately 200,000-350,000 nobles who were in France prior to the Revolution). See Donald Greer, *The Incidence of the Emigration during the French Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1951), 21. See also Patrice L. R. Higonnet, *Class, Ideology, and the Rights of Nobles during the French Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 284, and Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 216.
- ²⁰ Doyle, Introduction to *The French Émigrés*, xv.
- ²¹ Simon Burrows, "The Émigrés and Conspiracy in the French Revolution, 1789-99," in Peter R. Campbell, Thomas E. Kaiser and Marisa Linton, eds., *Conspiracy in the French Revolution* (Manchester: University Press, 2007), 166.
- ²² Greer, *Emigration*, 62.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 62.
- ²⁴ Carpenter, *Refugees*, xiv.
- ²⁵ Greer, *Emigration*, 100-5.
- ²⁶ Article Five of the amnesty was especially concerned with women and it granted the return of all émigré women who had left to join their spouses. Within the year following the partial amnesty, some 13,000 women made their way back to France, roughly a quarter of all who took advantage of it and more than any other group signalled for reprieve. In Jennifer Ngairé Heuer, *The Family And The Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789-1830*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 117.
- ²⁷ Foreign Office (FO) 74/20, Vol. I, f.187, Wickham to Grenville 27 April 1797.
- ²⁸ Doyle, Introduction to *The French Émigrés*, xvi.
- ²⁹ Harvey Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality and popular revolution: two case studies," in John F. Boshier, ed., *French Government and Society 1500-1850: Essays in Memory of Alfred Cobban* (London, Athlone Press, 1973), 236 and 238.
- ³⁰ Mansel, "From Coblenz to Hartwell," 1.
- ³¹ Doyle, Introduction to *The French Émigrés*, xx-xxi.
- ³² Margery Weiner, *The French Exiles, 1789-1815* (John Murray, 1960), 21.
- ³³ Doina Pasca Harsanyi, *Lessons from America: Liberal French Nobles in Exile, 1793-1798* (University Park: Penn State University), 20.
- ³⁴ Elizabeth Sparrow, "Secret Service under Pitt's Administration," *History*, 83 (1998): 284-5.
- ³⁵ Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 220.
- ³⁶ Robert Howell Griffiths, "Pierre-Victor Malouet and the 'monarchiens' in the French Revolution and Counter-Revolution" (Ph. D. diss., University of British Columbia, 1975), 308.
- ³⁷ Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality", 252.

- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 252.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 243-4.
- ⁴⁰ Edward P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1964), 12.
- ⁴¹ Jeremy Black and Karl Schweizer, "The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 17 Issue 3 (Sept. 2006): 620.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, 621.
- ⁴³ Stanley Mellon, *The Political Uses of History: a Study of Historians in the French Restoration* (Stanford, CA: University Press, 1958), 6.
- ⁴⁴ Born in Savoy, de Maistre was and remained until his death in 1822 a loyal subject of the king of Sardinia, but by many accounts was a Frenchman at heart. Paul H. Beik, "The French Revolution Seen from the Right: Social Theories in Motion, 1789-1799," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, New Series, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1956): 63-67.
- ⁴⁵ Joseph De Maistre, *Considerations on France*, translated and edited by Richard A. Lebrun, introduction by Isaiah Berlin (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 99-100.
- ⁴⁶ Beik, "The French Revolution," 65-66.
- ⁴⁷ Abbé Barruel, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du Jacobinisme* (Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism) [electronic resource], Vol. 4, (London: T. Burton and Co., 1797-8), 380-400.
- ⁴⁸ Barruel, *Mémoires*, 394-5.
- ⁴⁹ Louis Gabriel Ambroise, vicomte de Bonald, *Considérations sur la Révolution française: L'émigration - L'aristocratie et la noblesse - Le gouvernement représentatif - La traité de Westphalie - L'équilibre européen - La fin de la Pologne - Notice sur Louis XVI - La question du divorce - La société et ses développements - Pensées*, préface par Léon de Montesquiou. (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale 1907), 107.
- ⁵⁰ Bonald, *Considérations sur la Révolution française*, 111-12.
- ⁵¹ Beik, "The French Revolution," 83.
- ⁵² Quoted from *Essai historique: politique et moral, sur les révolutions anciennes et modernes considérées dans leurs rapports avec la révolution française, Dédiée a tous les Partis. 3 Vols* (London, 1797), 224-229.) In Beik, "The French Revolution," 90.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, 87.
- ⁵⁴ Mellon, *The Political Uses of History*, 3-7.
- ⁵⁵ Anne Louise Germaine Staël-Holstein, *Considerations on the Principal Events of the French Revolution*. Ed. Aurelian Craiutu (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008), Part III, 285.
- ⁵⁶ Staël, *Considerations*, 285-86.
- ⁵⁷ Louis Philippe, King of the French. *Mémoires De Louis Philippe, Duc d'Orléans*, (Paris: Plon, 1973), 104-6. The future king himself served both revolutionary and republican governments and did not leave France until after the king's trial. "Disgusted with everything [he] saw and, perhaps even more, by everything [he] foresaw," Louis Philippe tried to convince his father to leave the country, but Philippe Egalité refused fearing the worsening of his financial situation, and that European doors were closed to his family because of his political actions. *Ibid.*, 351.
- ⁵⁸ Louis Philippe, *Mémoires*, 430.
- ⁵⁹ He was in England all of 1793 and a portion of 1794. During his stay with the Marquess of Lansdowne, he made the acquaintance of George Canning, Jeremy Bentham and Charles James Fox. *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand*. Edited, with a pref. and notes, by the duc de Broglie. Translated by Raphaël Ledos de Beaufort (New York: AMS Press, 1973), I, 170-73
- ⁶⁰ Victor Pierre Malouet, "To Messers. N—and D—, Emigrants, 22 march 1792" in *Interesting letters on the French Revolution, extracted from the celebrated works of Mr. Malouet, member of the Constituent Assembly of 1789* [electronic resource], translated by William Clarke, (London, 1795), 41.
- ⁶¹ Charles François Du Périer Dumouriez, *Mémoires et Correspondance Inédits du Général Dumouriez Publiés sur les Manuscrits Autographes Déposés Chez L'éditeur, et Précédés d'un Fac-Simile*. [electronic resource] : (Paris: Eugène Renduel, 1834), 285-6.
- ⁶² Dumouriez, *Mémoires*, 286
- ⁶³ Mellon, *The Political Uses of History*, 20-23.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 32 and 42.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 79-81 and 91.
- ⁶⁶ François Mignet, *The French Revolution from 1789 to 1815* (Philadelphia: J. D. Morris and company, 1906), 131.

- ⁶⁷ Mignet, *The French Revolution*, 185.
- ⁶⁸ Adolph Thiers, *History of the French Revolution*, translated by Frederick Shoberl. (New York: Appleton, 1871), I, 72.
- ⁶⁹ Thiers, *French Revolution*, I, 169.
- ⁷⁰ Jules Michelet, *Histoire de la Révolution française*, 1847. (*History of the French Revolution*), trans. by Keith Botsford; notes by Gérald Walter (Wynnewood, Pa.: Livingston Pub. Co., 1972), IV, 76 and 80.
- ⁷¹ Michelet, *Histoire*, IV, 243.
- ⁷² Thomas Carlyle, *The French Revolution: A History*, revised edition of 1857. Reprint edition with introduction by Richard Cobb (London, UK: the Folio Society, 1989), 216-19.
- ⁷³ Hippolyte Taine, *The French Revolution*, 1878 (1931 edition), Book Second, 187.
- ⁷⁴ Taine, *French Revolution* Book Third, 364-85.
- ⁷⁵ Jaurès, Jean. *Histoire socialiste de la révolution française*. Paris : Éditions de la Librairie de l'humanité 1922-1924. III, 373. See also Alphonse Aulard, *The French Revolution: a political history, 1789-1804*. Translated from the French of the 3d ed. (New York: Scribner, 1910) and Albert Mathiez, *The French Revolution* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962).
- ⁷⁶ Georges Lefebvre, *La Révolution Française* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1957), 203-5.
- ⁷⁷ A sampling that included three-quarters of Greer's compiled lists, indicate that 51% of the émigrés were members of the Third Estate, 25% of the Clergy and only 17% nobles. Greer, *Emigration*, 63-5.
- ⁷⁸ Godechot provided a similar analysis to that of Greer although understandably it was more focused on the counter-revolution. He also shared the former's view that leaving France was not as simple as a desire to attack the Revolution. In his view, the emigration was a contagious wave of fear; one that was treated with the attitude of "so much the better" until the émigrés began to be considered as a tangible threat. In Jacques Godechot, *La Contre-révolution: Doctrine et Action, 1789-1804* (The Counter-Revolution: Doctrine & Action 1789-1804) translated by Salvator Attanasio (New York: H. Fertig, 1971), 142-4.
- ⁷⁹ Maurice Hutt, *Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution: Puisaye, the Princes, and the British Government in the 1790s* (Cambridge: University Press, 1983), viii.
- ⁸⁰ Patrice L. R. Higonnet, *Class, Ideology, and the Rights of Nobles during the French Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 143.
- ⁸¹ Jennifer Heuer, "Liberty and Death: The French Revolution," *History Compass*, 5: (2007), 183. See also, Jennifer Ngairé Heuer's *Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789-1830* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005)
- ⁸² William Doyle, *Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution* (Oxford: University Press, 2009), Chapters 7-10.
- ⁸³ Donald Sutherland, *France 1789-1814, Revolution and Counterrevolution*, (London: Fontana, 1985), 108.
- ⁸⁴ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 69 and 90-3.
- ⁸⁵ Kirsty Carpenter, *Refugees of the French Revolution: Émigrés in London, 1789-1802* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 128. See also, Donald M. G. Sutherland, *The French Revolution and Empire: the Quest for a Civic Order*, (Oxford: 2003), 99. The term monolithic comes from Mitchell's "Counter-revolutionary mentality," 231.
- ⁸⁶ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 131.
- ⁸⁷ Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality", 236.
- ⁸⁸ Quoted from A. Antoine (de Saint-Gervais), *Histoire des émigrés français depuis 1789 jusqu' en 1828*, II (Paris: L.F. Hivert, 1828), 13. In Charles David Rice, "The Political Career of Jacques Antoine Marie de Cazalès" (Ph. D. diss., Emory University, 1973), 335
- ⁸⁹ Harvey Mitchell, *The Underground War Against Revolutionary France: the Missions of William Wickham, 1794-1800* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 24.

Chapter I:
Diplomacy on the Road

In the introduction to *The French Émigrés in Europe and the Struggle Against Revolution, 1789-1814* (1999) William Doyle writes that the word *émigré* describes all who left France following the fall of the Bastille in 1789 and who were, for a multitude of reasons, unable to remain in the France formed by the Revolution.¹ Then and today, they remain synonymous with the counter-revolution. Yet, as there were significant differences among the *émigré* groups, a ‘monolithic’ counterrevolution did not exist.² Such differences inevitably affected relations with the British, and so the purpose of this chapter is to identify divisions among the *émigrés* in terms of experience, motivation, objectives and activities.

With reactionary political views defeated by a triumphant National Assembly, many among France’s ruling elite thought their only option was to leave the country.³ For most emigrants, this option was not assumed to be permanent. Indeed, the most reactionary among them believed in a quick and ‘victorious’ return; the more moderate ones hoped for a peaceful accommodation within the new regime, while the apolitical majority awaited an end to their ordeal.

In France, after the declaration of war on Austria and Prussia in 1792, the fall of the monarchy and the rising threat of civil war, *émigré-noble* “conspiracy” became a godsend for the leading revolutionary factions.⁴ Prevailing conviction declared *all* *émigrés* traitors and servants of the enemies instead of adversaries in French domestic issues. Meanwhile, feeble reactionary plots rapidly morphed into the all-encompassing “Foreign Plot,” which excited alarm, fierce retaliation and political purging during the Terror.⁵

Outside France, the émigré world was often one of intrigue, alienation and hardship. It was also a world where one had to qualify what one meant by being a ‘royalist.’ As the term ultra-royalist[‡] was applied to those who fully rejected any encroachment on the ancien régime, and as they were the first group to leave France, the groupings of other émigrés usually reflected their degree of acceptance of the changes in France, and therefore the degree to which they were separate from ultras. Indeed, many of those who turned to the extreme right after 1789 and became ultras were nobles who had opposed the radical reforms proposed by the Crown in 1788. Among them were members of the French *parlements* and those who lost court favour in a measure of reducing expenditure, including the Polignac family, the Duc de Coigny, the Maréchale de Broglie and the cardinal de Rohan.⁶

During the Revolution’s early stages, ‘sullied’ royalists – such as the king’s envoy the Baron de Breteuil – were among the first to be despised, for their royalist sentiments did not absolve them from wishing to influence the regime. As control of political events shifted from the Crown to the National Assembly, monarchists who supported reforming the monarchy were also scornfully lumped in with *monarchiens* and *constitutionnels*, whether they supported the 1791 constitution or simply favoured some form of representative government. Indeed, sent to gather information, agents of émigrés were often instructed to ask their sources which king they served, the one of the old French monarchy or the one of the 1791 constitution.⁷ Although in Revolutionary discourse ‘all’ the émigrés opposed the Revolution, they were rarely united on how to oppose or reverse what took place after 1789.

[‡] Throughout this work, the term ultra-royalists, or ultras, will be used interchangeably with *les purs*.

The most notorious group among the émigrés was the ultra-royalists. By the convocation of the Estates General, French courtiers who accepted, willingly or not, the fact that France was being transformed into a constitutional monarchy used the word ‘counter-revolution’ to designate those who refused to acknowledge the “need for reform, let alone the reality of revolution.”⁸ Even before May of 1789, the Comte d’Artois, the king’s brother, had opposed all measures to create a centralized ‘ministerial’ monarchy.⁹ His ‘irresponsible’ conduct, extravagant habits, selfish indulgence and leadership of an obstructionist party that opposed reform in the years leading to 1789 were important factors contributing to the animosity levelled against the royal family and making the Revolution possible.¹⁰

Within hours of the fall of the Bastille, Artois, his family, the Princes of Condé and Conti, and the Polignac family left Versailles and began an exile that lasted a quarter of a century. Impatient of the king’s “inglorious acquiescence in what he was unable to prevent,”¹¹ Artois left confident of his imminent return. This first group, the émigrés of disdain, left not in secrecy but with great ostentation, and their disavowal of French developments was very clear.¹² In what was called *l’émigration joyeuse*, many families followed, believing their time abroad to be an excursion; they projected a carefree attitude and portrayed France’s domestic troubles as temporary.¹³ As the marquise de La Tour du Pin later noted, France was a “country much given to fashions, and just then [the summer of 1789] emigration became all the vogue.”¹⁴ With the Great Fear, the scenes of violence in the provinces, the attack on Versailles on 5-6 October 1789, and the belief the Crown and the Assembly were prisoners, *l’émigration de sûreté*, or *de nécessité*, soon followed.¹⁵ From then on, French subjects, often with entire households, flocked to the

borders as each major reform or minor panic sent people scurrying; the waves of emigration did not abate until the fall of Robespierre.¹⁶

Thus, as 1790 came to an end, the volume of noble emigration was large enough that calls were made for organized resistance to the Revolution under the banner of Artois and Condé.¹⁷ Yet, with the exception of its initial period, the emigration was not solely composed of conservative aristocracy. Of those who left, noble émigrés constituted just over a tenth of the French nobility, although this small group claimed to represent *all* France. Their letters home sought to shame those remaining to join their cause as the only honourable action, and there is little doubt that their ranks were swelled by the conviction that Louis XVI was too weak to affect change.¹⁸ Louis's lack of veto against the abolition of the nobility alienated and outraged many nobles and émigrés alike. Those undecided were urged to join the counter-revolution on the premise that they were standing for the monarchy, not Louis XVI personally.¹⁹

The decree to abolish the nobility in June 1790 had an adverse impact on the attitude of noble deputies who had supported the Revolution. In addition, the final closure of the *parlements* began another wave, with the latter ensuring that 872 discontented members, more than a third of the two thousand judicial *parlement* officials, joined the émigré groups.²⁰ For conservative nobility, as well as the clergy, that period marked a 'parting of ways.' Between then and the end of the Constituent Assembly, almost one-fifth of the nobles, including André-Boniface-Louis, vicomte de Mirabeau[§] and Jacques Antoine Marie de Cazalès, abandoned the Assembly and chose emigration.²¹ Whereas many among the elite felt it was better to be beggars abroad than be treated like outcasts at home, in France their departures were initially treated with apathy. One citizen

[§] The younger brother of the revolutionary orator.

commented, “*Tant mieux, la France se purge!*” while another added that the emigration was “*la transpiration naturelle de la terre de la liberté.*”²² Such apathy would have continued had not each political event that placed further limitations on the monarchy and the nobility produced new categories of emigrants.²³

By 1791 it became increasingly difficult for the deputies who supported the constitutional monarchy to resist the pull to emigrate on the one hand, and to speak a language of moderation without being denounced at the Assembly or scorned by the reactionary émigrés on the other. As the situation turned more radical, two Frances were beginning to form. Then, as demand at the Constituent Assembly arose to put a stop to the emigration, “the king himself appeared...to be running from one to the other.”²⁴ Any ‘exaggerated’ fears of émigré activities became a reality when Louis XVI and his family, along with his brother, the Comte de Provence, fled Paris on 21 June 1791. The royal family was captured at Varennes; while disguised as an Englishman, Provence successfully made his way to Brussels.²⁵

Varennes was pivotal in Revolutionary history. It destroyed the remnants of the King’s image in France, gave rise to republican notions, and gave licence for ex-nobles to leave in large numbers. For whether he intended to leave France or not, Louis’s subjects believed that he had aligned his cause with that of the émigrés.²⁶ Under these conditions, *l’émigration d’honneur* played its part in increasing their threat, as many noblemen were pressed to prove their loyalty to the monarchy by joining the gathering forces at Coblenz.²⁷ There, ties of personal service played a strong role among court officials who emigrated to join *l’armée des princes*. For them, the ‘horrors’ of the Revolution transformed devotion to the Bourbon cause into passion.²⁸

Upon Louis's acceptance of the constitution in 1791, the émigrés felt betrayed by a monarch for whom they had left home and country. Facing the choice of a general amnesty or a stay abroad, only a small number returned. On the contrary, fearing anti-noble polemic in the new Legislative Assembly and the fact that very few *ci-divants* were elected as members, the number of those who returned was far surpassed by those who continued to leave. By the end of 1791, no fewer than 6,000 army officers, between half and three-quarters of the officer corps, had left to join Condé, while the emigration of many navy officers was facilitated by none other than the minister of the navy himself, Bertrand de Molleville.²⁹

Although many émigrés belonged to the elite of pre-1789 France and were actively involved in efforts to overthrow the Revolution, after the fall of the monarchy émigré ranks swelled with a variety of backgrounds and political persuasions; some may not even have been considered enemies had they remained in France. Indeed the majority of those who left after 1793, especially women, can be identified as members of the Third Estate. Such diversity of backgrounds and motivations complicated the task of dealing with the émigrés abroad, on the one hand, and of instituting laws against them on the other, particularly when revolutionaries often imagined the émigrés as aristocrats who were socially, politically and legally separate from the nation.³⁰ As those wishing to leave the country became a threat, their right to do so was severely curtailed; escape was made more difficult, more dangerous, and infinitely more 'desirable.'³¹

Any threat the émigrés actually posed could easily have been dismissed had the King and the Assembly shown a united front, but that was not the case. It was not that Louis XVI supported his brothers' actions but quite the opposite, as both he and Marie

Antoinette regarded them “as traitors [and] as rats who had deserted the sinking ship.”³² However, one must keep in mind that the émigrés were not the sole reason for the radicalization of events in France. Louis XVI’s reluctance to accept the transformations of his country as either legitimate or permanent played an important role, as did the National Assembly, who treated the King and his ministers with rising suspicion, which in turn deepened the Crown’s dislike of the Revolution.³³

In Paris, the émigrés officially became “criminals,”³⁴ and the King’s unwillingness to embrace his role as a constitutional monarch aggravated the deputies’ hostility.³⁵ Louis XVI however was caught between an antagonistic Assembly and disdainful emigrants. The Crown’s appeal “Return! This is the wish of all citizens and the will of your king... who sees your return as loyalty,”³⁶ remained unheeded. Artois and his group ignored the King’s orders on the grounds that he was not free. Furthermore, they insulted him even while pleading to foreign powers in his name.³⁷ Both royal brothers repudiated Louis’s acceptance of the 1791 constitution and insisted that, even as king, he had no right to destroy France’s ancient constitution.³⁸

At the Assembly, exaggerating the émigré threat, various factions reported inflated émigré numbers of 50,000 to 100,000 gathering on French borders. This overstatement was contrary to informed opinions, which estimated the number of known émigrés at the time to be around 20,000. Moreover, even though information showed that the emigration was cross-class, as far as the revolutionary leaders were concerned, all émigrés were nobles. In this light, they became “every bit as useful”³⁹ to the political factions’ bid for power between 1791 and 1794. The émigrés’ real, or imagined, threat

allowed leading deputies to connect war abroad with politics at home and make their war plans more acceptable.⁴⁰

That the émigré princes were leaders of the counterrevolution is undeniable. Those who left France in the early stages of the Revolution and cut themselves off completely from its course count among its most ‘ardent’ and obvious opponents.⁴¹ Yet, even for those early emigrants, their first impetus to leave was fear, even if it was fear of losing their privileges. Fear, according to Patrice Higonnet, was the single most important factor in emigration. Once abroad, they tried to justify escape by citing other causes: honour, throne, and altar.⁴² Likewise, because until 1789 the idea of ‘*patrie*’ was different; loyalty to France for the émigrés was synonymous with showing loyalty to the king. Once the king was seen as a prisoner of Paris after the October Days, fidelity was expressed to his closest relative, Artois. For many of the early émigrés, “where the *fleur de lis* [were], there [was] the *patrie*.”⁴³

Outside the country, those who left protesting the events of 1789 set up headquarters and began to plot against the Revolution. At first, Artois and his *clique* sought refuge in Brussels, believing that the Vice-regent, and sister of Marie-Antoinette, would welcome them. To his consternation, Marie-Christine followed the orders of her brother Joseph II and asked Artois either to leave or remain incognito until he found another asylum. Unable to stay in Brussels, Artois applied to Victor Amadeus III. The King of Sardinia and Artois’s father-in-law feared that an influx of reactionaries might spread revolutionary fervour to his kingdom and withheld his approval until Louis XVI sanctioned the request.⁴⁴

In Turin, this first group was confident that the events in France were the result of conspiracies to destroy the two institutions binding France together, the church and the monarchy.⁴⁵ Émigré leaders were lulled into thinking that they would be welcomed back as liberators; after all, revolts had already been quashed elsewhere in Europe.⁴⁶ Artois followed the council of Louis's ousted minister Charles Alexandre de Calonne** and appealed to foreign powers to place pressure on revolutionary forces in Paris in order to 'liberate' the Royal family. Trusting the willingness of Austrian and Prussian diplomats to interfere in French affairs, the émigrés entertained high hopes of quick success.⁴⁷ However, the desired intervention did not materialize. Although European states had a history of foreign intervention, military action was generally reserved for smaller states.⁴⁸

Continental powers subsequently showed disinterest in interfering in French domestic affairs. Indeed nothing was more evident than the negative response to the appeals made by émigré Princes to counter the revolution by an allied military force. The Austrian Emperor Joseph II dismissed Condé's request and instructed his minister in Belgium to ignore similar ones. Privately he told him "It is in my interest to be perfectly neutral in all this business, no matter what happens to the King and Queen."⁴⁹ Personally, he severely admonished Artois for requesting military intervention, informing him that as a prince, he was a private citizen and had no authority to defy the combined sovereignty of king and nation. In his view, it was better for the émigrés to stop their agitation, return to France, salvage their public image and try to work with the king and assembly instead of against them. Other European monarchs tacitly followed Joseph's line and were happy to watch events unfold while refusing to support the émigré group.⁵⁰

** Calonne was France's first émigré. He had moved to London after his dismissal following the failure of the Assembly of Notables in 1787.

Following Joseph's death, his brother Leopold II proved just as willing to let events in France take their course. Leopold II greeted the Revolution with sympathy and enthusiasm, replying to the Prussian envoy, when queried about expressing solidarity with the French Crown, that developments in France provided a "welcome and much needed lesson for the other European monarchs, who in the future would be obliged to behave with more consideration towards their subjects. The real enemies of the French monarchy, [Leopold II] argued, were not the revolutionaries but the émigrés."⁵¹ Yet despite foreign reluctance to aid the counter-revolution, Artois and his followers persisted in their opposition.

Artois's disregard of Louis's wishes was well established during the Revolution's first year: "the king my brother is completely apathetic. The victim of a terror campaign on the one hand and false council on the other, he has been reduced to such a state... that I expect nothing from waiting except new embarrassments."⁵² More so, believing that "*Une heure de courage sauverait le royaume, et mettrait le Roi et la Reine en sûreté*,"⁵³ he persisted in hatching plans to 'free' the royal family. Artois and his followers made no secret of their plans to invade France, over-turn the Revolution, and punish its perpetrators.⁵⁴ One only has to look at the lists of punishment that the ultras devised early in the Revolution to realize how much they rejected any cooperation with revolutionaries. Among the thirty-five selected for quartering was Sieyès; Lafayette, de Noailles and Talleyrand^{††} were among the 103 sentenced for breaking at the wheel; 192 deputies were destined for the noose, and nearly two hundred sentenced to the galleys.⁵⁵

^{††} Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, known as the abbé Sieyès, was despised by the ultras for his famous pamphlet *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?* (1789). Lafayette was blamed for his failure to protect the royal family during the October Days. Louis-Marie, vicomte de Noailles and Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord were among the liberal nobles whose actions had destroyed the privileges of the First and Second Estates.

Such declarations demonstrate the degree to which ultras lived in a world created by their own illusions, as no European ruler seriously intended to supply them with troops to enable their return as conquerors; Prussia even indicated that any such effort would be turned to its advantage.⁵⁶ Hence, failing to secure foreign intervention, Calonne advised Artois to form a military body; the émigré army was born. Among its ranks, this army included many future Restoration officials, such as the duc de Richelieu, Duc de Blacas, the Comte de Chateaubriand, and the Comte de Serre.⁵⁷

By 1790 the émigrés arriving in Turin furnished exaggerated stories of royalist strength, and reports were so favourable that the émigrés were ordered to ready their horses and arms for immediate return. Opposing Artois's activity, Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette were horrified at his agitation, and Louis asked Victor Amadeus III to block their enterprises by force if necessary. This request caused a sharp falling out between Artois and his father-in-law, the result of which was the relocation of the émigré court to Coblenz in June 1791.⁵⁸ There, although the émigré Princes, as Blanning says, were spurned by the great, the "not-so-great" proved initially to be eager and welcome hosts, and the ego of Friedrich Karl of Mainz was greatly boosted by having a French royal prince seek his help.⁵⁹

The position of the émigrés was enhanced by the successful escape of Louis's second brother. For Provence, the fate of Louis XVI, whom he disliked especially after the king adopted a "self-sacrificing" attitude towards the Revolution, was less connected with family than the fate of the monarchy.⁶⁰ Thus, upon his arrival in Brussels in June of 1791, he embraced the ultras' intransigence and became the head of a rather independent émigré government. In its council, this government included former ministers such as

Calonne and the Maréchaux de Broglie and de Castries, and by 1792 it had established its own representatives in twelve capitals, including Vienna, London and Saint Petersburg, where they remained until the Restoration.

This government had its own court, diplomatic archives, army – despite the larger force being disbanded after Valmy – and subjects. The more than one hundred thousand French on the move formed their own public opinion, culture and style.⁶¹ On the road, Provence and Artois worked to convince the émigrés that, by openly disobeying the king, they were acting not only for the monarchy’s long-term benefit but also, believing that triumph was imminent, in the king’s short-term interest.⁶² Likewise, neither had any qualms about fighting France; for them the revolutionaries were “dangerous [and] bloodthirsty lunatics...the real France was with [Provence] and his brother on the banks of the Rhine.”⁶³

From beyond the borders, the émigré leaders relied on fomenting insurrection and conspiracies. Reliance on such methods stemmed from the widespread belief that the Revolution itself was a result of treacheries, including the belief it was the result of Necker’s vengeful nature, was instigated by the duc d’Orléans to usurp the crown, or that it was due to the destructive efforts of the *philosophes* and freemasonry, as famously described later in Barruel’s *Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du Jacobinisme*.⁶⁴ In this context, the Revolution was a plot within a plot, whose first criminals, men like Mirabeau, Sieyès and Lafayette, were later joined by the ‘profound villains’ of Brissot, Marat and Robespierre. In this view, conspirators succeeded in turning nobles against each other, in turning the king against the nobles, and finally in turning the nation against both the monarch and the nobility.⁶⁵

That this émigré France was beyond the French frontiers did not mean that it was a united force, and in either world, that of the Revolution or that of its antagonists, Louis XVI's royal authority paled in comparison to the realization of one's political ideals. Moreover, both worlds were, as far as many émigrés believed, "hysterical, violent and more than a little mad."⁶⁶ Even the royal brothers' outward unity hid a complex relationship that was often divided, especially as their time in exile grew longer.

While prior to the monarchy's fall Artois and Provence claimed to speak for Louis XVI (ignoring the fact that the king had appointed the Baron de Breteuil as his spokesman), afterwards they followed conflicting policies. To Provence's consternation, Artois often was the recognized leader. Provence told the British envoy Lord Malmesbury^{††} in May 1792 that he was often 'overruled' by his younger brother. Additionally, when the Elector of Trier grew anxious about the threat the émigrés' military presence might cause, he wrote to Artois, and it was Artois who conducted most of the correspondence with their cousin the king of Spain.⁶⁷ Adding to this disappointment was the knowledge that even by 1795, and in spite of the death of the proclaimed Louis XVII in prison, Provence found himself no closer to being recognized as Regent for the minor Louis XVII or proclaimed king by the allies after the former's death.⁶⁸

As Pretender to the French Crown, Provence often found the actions of Artois and his agents to be a source of embarrassment, particularly when, in the name of ultra-

^{††} James Harris, 1st Earl of Malmesbury, was a British diplomat and Britain's ambassador to The Hague until 1788. Between 1793-7 Pitt sent him on various missions to the continent, the last of which was for the purpose of negotiating a peace settlement with the French Republic in 1796-7. Scott, H. M., "Harris, James, first earl of Malmesbury (1746-1820)," in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison eds., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed. Ed. Lawrence Goldman. May 2009. 26 June 2013 <<http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/view/article/12394>>.

royalism, they refused to follow the Pretender's directives. Provence chose the duc d'Orléans, not Artois, to negotiate his relocation to England in 1807. As for the junior Bourbon branch, Provence's relations with the Condé princes were tenuous, especially after they asked him to leave the Condé Army in 1794 and refused his command to go to the Vendée in 1796.⁶⁹ That the Pretender could not command subordination from this divided group was well known both in France and around Europe.⁷⁰

Despite the reputation Coblenz holds in Revolutionary history, the city was not synonymous with the emigration, and most émigrés, the majority of whom left after 1792, never went near it. Likewise, since many among the avid counter-revolutionaries, such as Breteuil, preferred to stay away from the princes, Coblenz was neither a simple Counter-revolution in arms, nor - since a large number of the court officials embraced their role in the Revolutionary system - a miniature ancien régime. For example, out of fifty-one hereditary dukes, only twenty emigrated and served the princes. Coblenz was thus essentially a particular group that reacted to the Revolution in a particular way: one that was "active, enterprising and, above all, military."⁷¹

Military preparations at Coblenz increased the political unity of the émigré group, who believed that the personal and material sacrifices created by the anti-émigré laws ensured that their cause was noble and just.⁷² Yet despite the number of officers joining its ranks, *l'armée des princes* did not inspire confidence. While the princes revived old parade regiments in a bid to show their determination to fight the Revolution, snobbery, intrigues and 'stupidities' abounded.⁷³ The assembling émigrés were 'little liked,' as their free spending caused inflation while they refused to settle their debts. Even before Louis

XVI asked the Elector of Trier to eject them from his domain on 14 December 1792, Leopold II had ordered them out of the Austrian Netherlands on 22 October.⁷⁴

By the winter of 1791-2, provisioning for the army had stopped, and once it became clear that it could not be fully equipped, parts of it were dispersed, even before the war started. The lack of food led some émigrés to commit suicide, while roughly two hundred others, mostly nobles, were expelled or imprisoned for looting. Despite the poor conditions, the princes remained confident that the moment they entered France, the revolutionary armies would scatter in fear.⁷⁵ In France, the seed sown by the émigrés bore fruit. Their irresponsible actions “culminating in the attempted invasion, contributed to the chain of events which led to the suspension of the king and the bringing of treason charges against him.”⁷⁶ Prosecutors firmly believed that Louis XVI had been an active participant in the émigré conspiracy.

For those away from the danger of prosecution, the conviction that the Revolution was a conspiracy by the few absolved the ancien régime of any ills and exonerated the early émigrés from any role they had played in radicalizing events in France. Moreover, such belief convinced them that France’s former system had few problems and thus did not require any major change. Such attitude was apparent in all émigré declarations until 1804 and in part explains why ultras vilified the moderates.⁷⁷ Hence, instead of trying to bridge the divide, and encouraged by the prospects of military success, the “*parti des Princes* became even more “exclusive” and pugnacious.”⁷⁸ Such attitudes ensured that the more moderate were excluded once they were forced to emigrate.

New arrivals at any émigré centre, instead of being welcomed, were often questioned as to their reasons for departure, their choice of timing and the views they had

held from 1789 onwards. Showing any preference for the early Revolution assured one of being treated with contempt. The *monarchiens*, who left in late 1789, were scarcely forgiven for wishing to alter the regime, and nobles who remained in the Constituent Assembly were not at all. Cazalès, one of the Assembly's staunchest defenders of the nobility, was shunned upon arriving in Coblenz in July 1791. He returned to France, where he remained until the fall of the monarchy, before leaving again for Switzerland.⁷⁹ Similarly, many among the liberal deputies in France began to be seen as the 'enemy' once the Revolution turned more democratic.⁸⁰ Men such as the vicomte de Noailles, the duc de La Rochefoucauld and Talleyrand became the subject of arrest warrants; caught between execution and emigration, they chose the latter.⁸¹ Pro-Revolution émigrés, particularly the latecomers, deeply resented the accusations of treason heaped on them from both right and left. They tried to justify their positions by clinging to their views on liberty and the importance of reform.⁸² However, finding a deaf ear among the ultras, they turned to other governments and were eventually among the first to return to France.

Arguably, this disdain for later émigrés, particularly those who had been part of the National Assembly, was in part due to the ultras' inability to strike against actual revolutionaries in France. It was the latecomers, especially moderate émigrés and monarchists, who suffered the brunt of everyone's ire instead.⁸³ This rejection, however, adversely affected émigré prospects. In general, supporters of constitutional monarchy avoided socializing with ultra-royalists. Approximately one-fifth of old courtiers broke their ties with the émigré court. Duc de Richelieu, for example, offered his service to the Russian Tsar and became governor of Odessa, while Louis Marie, comte de Narbonne-

Lara, continued to support revolutionary principles even though he narrowly avoided the guillotine by having Mme de Staël smuggle him out of France.⁸⁴

Deputies such as Cazalès and Malouet, who had served the Assembly during the early stage of the Revolution, found the émigré gatherings disheartening, particularly the military one at Coblenz. In a letter to Edmund Burke, Cazalès' low opinion of the Coblenz group was made evident. He wrote that it was impossible among European governments to be more discredited than this 'caricature of Versailles' was, thanks to its reputation of "indiscretion and foolhardiness."⁸⁵ Another reluctant arrival at Coblenz was René de Chateaubriand, who made his way there in 1792. After spending a year in America, he had already told his friends that the monarchy was finished in France, that counter-revolution was useless, and that people should leave the old world for the new.⁸⁶ Just as their attitudes towards the Revolution were different, so was their approach to the monarchy and the possibility of restoration.

Alongside the ultras was a group of moderate royalists who wanted to modify the old order by limiting royal power with a national body composed of the three estates. To the left of the royalist 'spectrum' were the *monarchiens*, who desired 'public liberty without the degradation of monarchy' and believed their political views to be between those of royalists and constitutionalists. Finally, we have the constitutionalists, who were partisans of the 1791 constitution, accepted by Louis XVI.⁸⁷ In contrast to the ultras, who regarded Louis as a dupe of the Revolution, the execution of Louis XVI was a "greater blow" to the monarchists, who remained devoted to his person until the end.⁸⁸ While moderate monarchists and constitutionalists did not lack counter-revolutionary passion, their enemies were the Jacobins, whereas for the ultras, the enemy was the whole

Revolution. In Switzerland, Jacques Mallet du Pan informed the British attaché William Wickham that there was no future in working with ultras since the constitutionals “feared a return to the ancien régime more than republicanism.”⁸⁹

In Mallet’s effort to harness Wickham’s support, his memorandum to the Foreign Office also indicated his conviction that the larger numbers of émigrés were ultra-royalists, while the greater number of constitutionally-minded supporters were in France. Moreover, Mallet opined that the *monarchiens* and constitutionals were the group least committed to the passions of their time. They were more interested in the public good than in “personal aggrandizement and subjective prejudices.”⁹⁰ The difficulty for the *monarchiens* in strengthening this belief was that no plea for cooperation came from Paris. They were thus helpless observers who had no effect on French politics; yet they kept alive a strong note of dissent among émigré ranks. Failing to create a constitutional monarchy prior to 1814, their contribution to revolutionary history was made through recommendations to the Pretender’s exiled court and – after failing to influence court policy - in publishing their controversial yet widely-read political pamphlets.⁹¹

After the victory of revolutionary France at Valmy, the Elector of Mainz ordered the émigrés to disperse from his territory, while Fredrick Wilhelm II of Prussia allowed passage only to unarmed refugees in groups no larger than ten. By the end of 1792, the émigrés’ military cause was already losing momentum.⁹² Following the Terror, the hardship of exile and hardening feelings about the Revolution affected moderate royalists and increased the number of those hoping for the return of absolute monarchy. Provence, who early in the Revolution displayed political ‘cool-headedness,’ altered his attitude. His reactionary stance towards the revolutionaries was a reflection of his need to remain

king of the emigration lest he find himself without allies. Evidence suggests that he was, for example, willing to ignore the fate of the regicides but took a harsh stand to avoid accusations that, in his eagerness for the throne, he forgave his brother's killers.⁹³

As for the ultras, they held on to their bitter animosity towards revolutionary leaders, many of whom had already emigrated. Those associated with the princes the longest were firm believers that the 'demeaning' constitution of 1791 was even worse for France than Jacobinism. For them, men like Malouet, Mounier and even Cazalès inspired suspicion and fear; they were to be avoided as 'disgusting' compromisers.⁹⁴ It would not be until 1814 that the leaders of ultra-royalism accepted, albeit begrudgingly, that the route to a Bourbon restoration had to "promise peace without reaction."⁹⁵

However, the émigré leaders were disillusioned with their 'allies' on the continent. After the murder of Sweden's Gustav III in 1792, the princes believed that the only real ally they had left was Spain. Bound still by the Family Compact, they believed that it was in Spain's interest to restore the French monarchy, despite the latter's failure to reciprocate during the Nootka Sound dispute with Britain. However Spain, other than sending some money, said and did nothing to encourage the princes. Likewise, Russia did very little, and Prussia refused to do anything without Britain's involvement. That left Britain and Austria. Whereas Vienna was more interested in territorial gains on the continent, London favoured acquiring French colonies. Britain, as Maurice Hutt says, certainly benefitted from the ongoing war to increase her possessions; however her main interest was in the re-establishment of a stable balance in Europe. This required the defeat of a regime that persisted in "subverting all public order on the continent."⁹⁶ Thus, as the situation on the continent turned dire, the émigrés sought support in unlikely corners.

Harvey Mitchell says that the counter-revolution could never have reached the heights it achieved were it not for British involvement. Similarly, the counter-revolution “studied without reference to its most powerful protector – and surely its most sympathetic – would be a study of a movement in vacuum.”⁹⁷ Yet because of differences in religion and language, and the historic Franco-British political animosity, Britain was not the émigrés’ first choice early in the Revolution. Those leaving France and her troubles behind first gathered in Turin, Brussels, Switzerland and the Rhineland.⁹⁸ Neither Artois nor his group had any desire to go to London, believing that the cultivation of allies was only required on the continent. Along with Calonne, only occasional figures made their way to the United Kingdom.⁹⁹

Early émigrés aroused neither interest nor concern; assuming that a constitutional government was soon to be established, British sympathy during the summer of 1789 was with the Revolution. Regarding the Revolution as *a fait accompli*, Britain welcomed the change in France as a means of bringing both countries closer. By the end of July 1789, the *Gentleman’s Magazine* was referring to the “late Revolution in France.”¹⁰⁰ Developments in France soon reversed this opinion, especially as the Revolution that was supposed to weaken the country made her stronger.¹⁰¹

Consequently, the emigration’s real deluge and impact began after the fall of the French monarchy in 1792 and the successful spread of republican armies through continental Europe.¹⁰² That many among the émigrés chose to go to Britain was an indication of their fear and desire to put as great a distance as possible between themselves and the spreading violence in Europe.¹⁰³ Yet, as war was declared between Revolutionary France and Georgian Britain in February 1793, the British government

remained suspicious of all French policies, including those of the émigrés. It is one of the Revolution's interesting twists that, for a country where "it was national pastime to dislike the French [as] a shady lot who lived on onions and could not be trusted,"¹⁰⁴ the émigrés were welcomed with a sense of duty, honour and obligation.¹⁰⁵

As we have seen, revolution and conflict in France produced various groups of émigrés. In exile, those who opposed French developments held widely divergent attitudes and eventually were to include a variety of political persuasions from republicans to ultra-royalists. As they sought an alliance with Britain, each group presented the British with unique challenges and opportunities. Initially, émigré France and Britain had to overcome obstacles facing them, namely division, suspicion and animosity. Nonetheless, whether as reluctant or active participants in the counter-revolution, Britain and the émigrés became partners in an effort to defeat the Revolution and restore a semblance of balance to European politics. The result was that London became a haven for the émigrés, a bastion for counter-revolutionary activities, and the place where new connections were forged, thus altering the nature of the countries' relations after 1814. Before examining this evolving relation, we should however first look at Britain's reaction to the events that were taking place in France and Europe.

¹ Doyle, Introduction to *The French Émigrés*, xv.

² Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality," 231.

³ Carpenter, *Refugees*, xiv.

⁴ Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 309.

⁵ Burrows, "The Émigrés and Conspiracy," 156-7.

⁶ Upon his election to the Constituent Assembly, Rohan was hailed as a victim of despotism. Yet he tried to foment counter-revolution before emigrating in 1791. In Munro Price, "The Court Nobility and the Origins of the French Revolution," in Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms eds., *Cultures of Power in Europe During the Long Eighteenth Century*, (Cambridge: University Press, 2007): 274.

⁷ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 112.

⁸ Clarke Garrett, "The Myth of the Counterrevolution in 1789," *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Spring, 1994): 791.

⁹ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 100.

¹⁰ Vincent W. Beach, *Charles X of France*, (Boulder, CO: Pruett Publishing Co., 1971), 50.

- ¹¹ Norman Hampson, *The First European Revolution, 1776-1815* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1969), 96.
- ¹² Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 142.
- ¹³ Weiner, *The French Exiles*, 8.
- ¹⁴ Henriette Lucie Dillon, marquise de La Tour du Pin Gouvernet, and Felice Harcourt, *Memoirs: Laughing and Dancing Our Way to the Precipice* (London: Harvill Press, 1999), 116.
- ¹⁵ E. M. Wilkinson, "French Émigrés in England 1789–1802: Their Reception and Impact on English Life" (Unpublished Oxford B. Lit dissertation, 1952), 4. See also, T.C.W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 46.
- ¹⁶ With the disappearance of the struggle that fed it, emigration diminished to nothing. In Greer, *Emigration*, 21-3 and 37.
- ¹⁷ Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 251.
- ¹⁸ Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 256. Percentage of those who left did not exceed more than 12% of the French Nobility. Of this number, officers constituted about 35%, civilians were about 45% and women comprised about 15% of class total. See Greer, *Emigration*, 85.
- ¹⁹ They believed that the more absurd reforms Louis XVI let go through, the more his position as prisoner of Paris appeared bleaker. In William Doyle, "The French Revolution and the Abolition of Nobility," in Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms eds., *Cultures of Power in Europe During the Long Eighteenth Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 300-301.
- ²⁰ Jean Vidalenc, *Les Émigrés Français, 1789-1825* (Caen: Association des publications de la Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l'Université de Caen, 1963), 67. See also Greer, *Emigration*, 85.
- ²¹ Timothy Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789 - 1790)* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 295.
- ²² Wilkinson, "French Émigrés," 17. Quoted from L. Madelin *La Révolution*, 9th ed, (Paris, 1924), 196.
- ²³ Harsanyi, *Lessons from America*, 50.
- ²⁴ Beik, "The French Revolution," 25-6.
- ²⁵ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 54.
- ²⁶ Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 255.
- ²⁷ Weiner, *The French Exiles*, 28.
- ²⁸ Philip Mansel, *The Court of France, 1789-1830* (Cambridge: University Press, 1988), 41.
- ²⁹ Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 259-262. See also. Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 143.
- ³⁰ Heuer, *The Family and the Nation*, 30.
- ³¹ Anti-émigré laws date from that time; by the Terror they amounted to about two hundred. In Wilkinson, "French Émigrés," 19 and 21.
- ³² Blanning, *Revolutionary Wars*, 53.
- ³³ Hampson, *The First European Revolution*, 96.
- ³⁴ The Legislative Assembly addressed the king that it "had no sooner turned its gaze toward the state of the kingdom, than it noticed that the continuing troubles have their source in the criminal preparations of French émigrés." See J.M. Roberts, *French Revolution Documents*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), 446-47. From <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/422>
- ³⁵ Blanning, *Revolutionary Wars*, 53.
- ³⁶ Anonymous, *French Revolution. Émigrés*, I, 1789- 93, "Proclamation du Roi du 12 Novembre 1791," 7.
- ³⁷ Beik, "The French Revolution," 52.
- ³⁸ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 63.
- ³⁹ Higonnet, *Class, Ideology*, 99.
- ⁴⁰ Deputy Carra denounced the 'émigré threat' in November 1792 with the hope of placing more pressure on the Crown and to force the King to declare his rejection of the Revolution. Ironically the relations between the King and the émigrés were at their lowest at the time. In Higonnet, *Class, Ideology*, 94 -99.
- ⁴¹ Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 139.
- ⁴² Higonnet, *Class, Ideology*, 288.
- ⁴³ Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 149.
- ⁴⁴ Beach, *Charles X*, 52.
- ⁴⁵ Garrett, "The Myth of the Counterrevolution in 1789," 798-799.
- ⁴⁶ Rice, "The Political Career of Cazalès," 293.

- ⁴⁷ Calonne, along with his brother, arrived in Turin as minister for the émigré court on 10 November 1790. His reputation for procuring money had been one of the qualities that recommended him to Artois. In Beik, "The French Revolution," 46. See also, Beach, *Charles X*, 15 and 57.
- ⁴⁸ Black, "The Anglo-French Relations in the Age of the French Revolution 1787-1793" *Francia*, (1987): 408. See Also Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 142-3.
- ⁴⁹ Blanning, *Revolutionary Wars*, 42-3. Quoted in Francois Furet, *Revolutionary France 1770-1880* (Oxford, 1992), 103, from Joseph II to Count Trauttmansdorff, Laxenburg, 10 August 1789, *Geheime Korrespondenz Josefs II. mit seinem Minister in den österreichischen Niederlanden, Ferdinand Grafen Trauttmansdorff. 1787-1789*. Herausgegeben von Dr. H. Schlitter. Fr. (Vienna, 1902), 345.
- ⁵⁰ Blanning, *Revolutionary Wars*, 43.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 52.
- ⁵² Beach, *Charles X*, 66. Quoted from *Précis de ma position actuelle*, PC 1/126/305, Le comte d'Artois à Calonne. July 1790.
- ⁵³ Vaudreuil to Artois 18 Septembre 1790, *Correspondance intime du Comte de Vaudreuil et du Comte d'Artois pendant l'émigration 1789-1815* Léone Pingaud ed. [electronic resource] (Paris: Plon, 1889), Vol. I, 303.
- ⁵⁴ Blanning, *Revolutionary Wars*, 52.
- ⁵⁵ The opportunity to mete out such punishment never materialized. Beach, *Charles X*, 114.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 60-1.
- ⁵⁷ Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 150. See also Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 68.
- ⁵⁸ Artois's scandalous and amorous liaison with Mme de Polastron did not endear him to the Turin Court either. Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 154. See also Beach, *Charles X*, 56-59.
- ⁵⁹ Blanning, *Revolutionary Wars*, 52.
- ⁶⁰ For ceding to popular demand and weakening royal authority Provence called Louis a 'fool,' using the English word. Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 50 and 52.
- ⁶¹ Mansel, "From Coblenz to Hartwell," 1 and 6-7.
- ⁶² Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 65.
- ⁶³ In this instance Mansel compared the action of Provence to those of General de Gaulle during WWII. Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 76.
- ⁶⁴ Burrows, "The Émigrés and Conspiracy," 151-2.
- ⁶⁵ Beik, "The French Revolution," 49 and 58.
- ⁶⁶ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 56.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 59.
- ⁶⁸ Empress Catherine of Russia was the only monarch to give Louis official recognition as the exiled King of France in 1795. In Elizabeth Sparrow, *Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815* (Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press, 1999), 58 and 60.
- ⁶⁹ Louis's relations with Orleans became relaxed and cordial after the latter submitted to Louis in 1800. Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 109.
- ⁷⁰ Burrows, "The Émigrés and Conspiracy," 164-65.
- ⁷¹ By the summer of 1792 and of the 24,004 men in the princes' army, 1414 were volunteers from the Third and 6268 were regular soldiers, almost all of who would have not belonged to the nobility. In Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 57-58.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, 68.
- ⁷³ Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 150. Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 67.
- ⁷⁴ Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 266.
- ⁷⁵ Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 159.
- ⁷⁶ Beach, *Charles X*, 73.
- ⁷⁷ Burrows, "The Émigrés and Conspiracy," 154.
- ⁷⁸ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 111.
- ⁷⁹ While the Royalist deputy Montlosier also received little welcome upon arriving there, Cazalès served with the émigré cavalry. He eventually made his way to England, where he became friends with many among the elite. Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 268-9. See also, Beik, "The French Revolution," 26 and 34.
- ⁸⁰ Harsanyi, *Lessons from America*, 20.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 3.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*, 53-54.

⁸³ Cazalès and other former deputies were given lowly positions in the émigré army – if any at all. In C Rice, “The Political Career Cazalès,” 294. See also, Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 150 and Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 157.

⁸⁴ Mansel, *The Court of France*, 40.

⁸⁵ He believed this reputation to be the result of the exiled court’s reliance on Alexandre de Calonne. Quoted from Wentworth Woodhouse MSS., 1/1/779-1-2, letter, Cazalès to Edmund Burke, 12 May 1792, in Rice, “The Political Career Cazalès,” 291- 292.

⁸⁶ Chateaubriand made his way to London via Brussels and Jersey after being wounded at Valmy. In Beik, “The French Revolution,” 84-85.

⁸⁷ Griffiths, “Pierre-Victor Malouet,” 320.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 313.

⁸⁹ . Quoted from HRO 38M49/1/79/1 – Mallet du Pan to Wickham. Bod. L Talbot MSS. c.14/40-41 in Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 41

⁹⁰ Quoted from FO 27/43, mémoire of Mallet du Pan, 22 September 1794. As a mémoire intended to help the British government formulate policy and unite the émigrés, it proved useless. Mallet called for unity among the émigrés while heaping praise on the monarchien group only. In Griffiths, “Pierre-Victor Malouet,” 320-22.

⁹¹ Griffiths, “Pierre-Victor Malouet,” 329.

⁹² Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 269.

⁹³ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 112-113.

⁹⁴ Rice, Rice, “The Political Career Cazalès,” 353-55.

⁹⁵ Beik, “The French Revolution,” 111.

⁹⁶ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 120-121.

⁹⁷ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 10.

⁹⁸ Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution*, 148.

⁹⁹ Wilkinson, “French Émigrés,” 1-2.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 193.

¹⁰² Kirsty Carpenter, “London: Capital of the Emigration,” in Philip Mansel and Kirsty Carpenter eds., in *The French Émigrés in Europe and the Struggle Against Revolution, 1789-1814*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), 43.

¹⁰³ Wilkinson, “French Émigrés,” 4.

¹⁰⁴ Carpenter, *Refugees*, xv.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, xv.

Chapter II:
Diplomacy from a Distance

In chapter one, we have seen how the émigrés' counter-revolutionary efforts failed to achieve results on the continent and how republican victories made Europe increasingly dangerous for the French exiles. Their inability and unwillingness to create a united anti-revolutionary front forced the émigrés to turn their hopes to Britain. There, too, their approaches were initially rebuffed. Britain's disinclination to support the Bourbons was to be expected, as France had been Britain's foremost foe throughout the eighteenth century.¹ In London, both King George III and Prime Minister Pitt refused to interfere with French affairs. Their policy of neutrality was and remained genuine, even after the French declaration of war on Austria and Prussia in April 1792.²

Although Britain was relatively slow to abandon neutrality against Revolutionary France, throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, she proved to be France's most 'persistent opponent.' Once war was declared, the two countries enjoyed little more than two years of peace until 1815.³ In this context, the émigrés found a powerful ally in Britain, and as this thesis is an exploration of that alliance, our attention here will shift to examining Britain's reaction to the events leading up to, and resulting from, the Revolution. However, before addressing the socio-diplomatic connection between émigré France and Georgian Britain, we will first briefly examine Franco-British relations during the eighteenth century. Next, we will look at British views regarding the Revolution, with particular attention given to members of the British cabinet, and we will assess the reasons behind London's neutral stance. Finally, we will turn to Britain's reaction to the increasingly radical events on the continent and to the rising number of refugees landing on its shores.

Naval rivalry and struggle over influence in the colonies and the Spanish empire constitute a main theme of Anglo-French relations during the eighteenth century.⁴ Yet, despite being on opposite sides of the Second Hundred Years' War for most of that period, even while at war, the French and the British were both mutually admiring and disdainful of one another. The British admired French fashions, while 'Anglomania' was a recurring theme in French, particularly elite, society.⁵ Indeed, following the Peace of Utrecht in April 1713, Louis XIV declared that France and Britain were two countries "*du même sang et qui ne sont ennemies que par nécessité.*"⁶ In this context, it was the apparent domination of the Bourbons on the continent, combined with the vulnerability of the early Hanoverian monarchy, that convinced the British government to seek a peaceful settlement with France.⁷ The war of the Austrian Succession, however, put an end to Franco-British rapprochement, and the Seven Years' War revived their enmity.

During the early reign of George III, growing tensions in the Thirteen Colonies and instability at home made London's influence on European affairs appear in jeopardy.⁸ Concern mounted as European powers shied away from stronger ties with Britain: Frederick the Great refused to consider an alliance with the Court of St James after 1762; the Austrian Chancellor Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz was known for his anti-British sentiment; Russia did not respond to British overtures; and France's antagonism was taken for granted.⁹

During the American War of Independence, French naval power challenged that of Britain in both American and West Indian waters, and it was thus unsurprising that successive British ministries became rather 'obsessed' with French naval preparedness.¹⁰ French support of the American colonies not only presented France with a military

opportunity following the defeat of the Seven Years' War, but also increased British fears of diplomatic isolation, especially after the United Provinces and Spain eventually allied themselves with the rebels. Moreover, the conflict affected British domestic policies, especially as consecutive governments feared that the revolt in America would inspire another in Ireland. They feared that with Britain pre-occupied with the colonies, it would have made it easy for France to spread her influence in India, over which both countries were competing.¹¹

It was in the shadow of this perceived British isolation that France's weakness in foreign affairs began to manifest itself after 1763. Because London seemed to be vulnerable, France's inability to benefit from this weakness was "galling,"¹² especially given French military superiority on land. French failures to affect results in the Polish election of 1764 or during the first partition of Poland in 1772 were a clear testament to the reduced power of Versailles.¹³ French attempts to improve diplomatic relations across the Channel were launched by the French minister, the Duc d'Aiguillon, in 1772, but were not seriously received in Britain.¹⁴

To avoid continued exclusion, Britain had to forge new alliances in Europe, particularly as King George's sovereignty over Hanover required a British presence on the continent.¹⁵ After signing the Peace of Paris in 1763, and following France's successful disruption of the British navy, Britain embarked on a naval rearmament program with the aim of securing her colonial possessions. Indeed, the reinstatement of Britain's power and the reduction of France's military and diplomatic threats were the main priorities of the British Foreign Office.¹⁶ Following the Revolution, and with the outbreak of war in 1793, securing the colonies in the East and West Indies, as well as

seizing those of France and destroying the French navy, were the main aims of Secretary Henry Dundas.¹⁷

Contemporaneously, France's foreign ministers, the Comte de Vergennes^{§§} included, were determined to maintain France's 'amphibious' position as the guarantor of European balance through the defence of weaker states on the one hand, and strengthening her hold on the colonies on the other. In Europe at least, France's position was a supposedly selfless one that was nevertheless guided by France's self-interest. Nonetheless, even though Vergennes tried to mold a pacific policy, his task was formidable. Vergennes knew that it was "essential to hate the English, preserve Spain, treat the [Holy Roman] Emperor with care, get on well with Prussia, win over the Dutch, protect the Turks, defy Russia, manage Sweden, hold Rome in Respect, maintain the nascent America, pay off the Swiss and keep an eye on the colonies."¹⁸

The Eden Treaty of 1786 signalled the reversal of Franco-British relations. The treaty was an indication that Vergennes, despite objections from French merchants and industrialists, was willing to make commercial concessions for the "sake of peace and *détente*."¹⁹ Vergennes's attempts to enhance France's position in the late 1780s fall into what Gary Savage calls the Crown's "half-hearted attempt" to modernize its foreign policy in the interest of enforcing its own legitimacy on the one hand and increasing its prosperity on the other.²⁰

In influential circles, the treaty's concessions were viewed as an example of France's declining status on the European scene. Such conviction, however, paled when compared to reaction to France's 'humiliating' defeat in the settlement of the United

^{§§} Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes was France's foreign minister during the reign of Louis XVI. He served at Versailles from 1774 until his death in 1787.

Provinces.²¹ Versailles's inability to exert its will and assist the Dutch Patriots during the crisis of 1788 was a severe blow to French diplomacy; the opportunity to gain any prestige through military action was lost due to the Crown's reluctance to engage in a military conflict.²² Frustration with France's defeats during the eighteenth century, especially after the Seven Years' War, led many nobles to demand reform and ally with more radical elements by 1789.²³ Thus France's perceived weakness, both domestic and foreign, mirrored the fears of isolation and vulnerability Britain had experienced a decade earlier, especially as conviction grew that Britain sought to benefit from France's situation by spreading disorder in the French colonies.²⁴ Such beliefs grew stronger with the Revolution.

Following the failed Assembly of Notables in 1787, France became the butt of British criticism. Politicians and writers believed that the French faced their political predicament because they "behaved badly."²⁵ This accusation was aimed particularly at the nobility, whom their British counterparts thought had acted selfishly rather than as a moderating element between the Crown and its subjects, leaving France to descend into violence and anarchy with the Revolution.²⁶ In Britain, most of the public welcomed the French upheaval and believed that the country was long overdue for change. Pitt even declared that Necker's re-appointment in 1788 was the best thing that France did and hoped that the minister would soon set out to establish a French constitution.²⁷ Hence Britain was content to ignore an increasingly unstable France in 1788 and early 1789, preferring instead to focus on Eastern Europe.²⁸

Once France bowed out of international politics due to financial woes after 1787, British ministers breathed a sigh of relief and proceeded to exploit the diplomatic vacuum

created by their rival's withdrawal. British foreign successes then can be ascribed to their efforts to woo France's former allies: Austria, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire.²⁹ In contrast to Britain's success, the results of international failures began to be felt directly in France in terms of a foreign threat accompanied by economic distress. Failed wars, unpopular and useless alliances, defeats in Poland, the East and the Netherlands, a hated foreign queen, and the simultaneous success of their main rival, Britain, produced a violent reaction among Frenchmen.³⁰

As the Revolution loomed, reinforcing Franco-British antagonism was French assumption that the Britons were "barbarians by nature and libertarians on principle."³¹ Versailles and Paris alike viewed English-style liberty as an infectious disease and regarded Anglophiles as "malevolent quacks bent on introducing an alien incubus into a healthy body politic."³² Such liberty, not least of the kind associated with John Wilkes, was denounced as a threat to the French character.³³ This perception shifted after the Revolution. While British conservatives looked on France as a fount of anarchy and lawlessness, France was already seeing herself as ahead of Britain when it came to natural rights. In contrast, supporting the Revolution in Britain meant subversion and rejection of British values on the one hand, and believing that France had something better to offer on the other.³⁴ Similarly, when they tried to promote a constitution based on the British model, politicians and deputies at the Constituent Assembly were met with the response "*Nous ne sommes pas Anglais et nous n'avons pas besoin des Anglais.*"³⁵

The storm erupting in France during the spring and summer of 1789 hardly registered with the British government. For all intents and purposes, it was as if the

“French had temporarily taken leave of their senses and had adjourned to another planet.”³⁶ Lord Grenville, appointed to the Home Office in June 1789, found little relevance in French events and did not think that the situation there would cause any disturbance to domestic or international peace.³⁷ Writing to his brother on 14 July 1789, Grenville noted news from the Duke of Dorset^{***} about the dismissal of Necker and of his replacement with a ministry headed by M. de Breteuil.³⁸ With the exception of one other letter noting Dorset’s return, France did not feature in Grenville’s private correspondence for the remainder of that year.³⁹

Nonetheless, early British reaction was favourable as France was thought to be finally following the path of the Glorious Revolution. In the beginning at least, political developments were seen as a means to bring the two nations closer. In London, theatres re-enacted moments of revolutionary triumph, and observing Bastille Day almost began as a British celebration when the House of Commons proposed a day of “thanksgiving for the French Revolution.”⁴⁰ British reformers rejoiced, especially those who saw the Glorious Revolution as a great work, but not a perfect one.⁴¹ Moreover, the majority of people, Pitt included, believed that Britain was secure from French troubles and continued to view the Revolution favourably.⁴²

At the University of Cambridge, support for developments in France was strong; the Vice-Chancellor’s Latin prize was given to an essay praising the Revolution, while Samuel Coleridge burnt the words ‘Liberty’ and ‘Equality’ with gunpowder on the lawns of St John’s and Trinity colleges.⁴³ Between 1790-92, societies supporting the Revolution were established, with mass membership including shopkeepers, artisans and labourers. These societies held regular correspondence with Jacobin clubs, hosted a number of

*** John Frederick Sackville, 3rd Duke of Dorset, was Britain’s ambassador to Paris between 1784 and 1790.

Revolutionary figures and were a factor in increasing anxiety about the Revolution's impact in Britain. Even as French politics became more radical, British sympathizers celebrated French victories at Valmy and in the Austrian Netherlands, while helping the French effort by collecting clothes, ammunition and money for the Revolutionary troops.⁴⁴

In Britain, the Revolution's greatest enthusiasts were those on the margins of the political system, especially the opposition Whigs and religious Dissenters. They saw the Revolution – much like the American one – as another blow to 'despotism,' represented by George III and Pitt's government. Charles James Fox assumed that the liberal nobility in France would end up leading the country and considered figures such as Robespierre and Saint-Just to be French 'Whigs.'⁴⁵ Being out of office gave them time to write historical treatises exalting popular movements, which in their view were always 'safe' if channelled properly.⁴⁶ The French Revolution changed this view, as Whig association with, and championing of, American and French radicals allowed their adversaries to cast them as irresponsible revolutionaries. The Pittites turned the tables on their opponents by conjuring images of Cromwell and framing reformers as politicians whose "association with the people was nothing but ambition mounted on popularity."⁴⁷

Politically, France was seen as weak due to long-term trends of ministerial instability, corruption and civil disorder, and likely to become even weaker. Britain was thus keen to receive information about France's situation.⁴⁸ King George's new ambassador to the French Court, Earl Gower, kept his government well informed of developments in Paris and of the main divisions among the émigrés. Therefore, London

was aware that despite the émigrés' protestations and pleas, their preparations beyond the Rhine were less 'formidable' than what their leaders hoped for or expected.⁴⁹

Consequently, Britain settled into the notion that with the Revolution successful, she could pursue her objectives of economic expansion based on peace across the continent while clinging to neutrality where French affairs were concerned. Under these circumstances, Britain was undeniably reluctant to interfere in French affairs. Not only was France her traditional foe, but also a strengthening of the royalist cause would have kept the latter as a strong opponent in the colonies. The Nootka Sound dispute provided a very good reason for British unwillingness to support Louis XVI, who was bound by the *Family Compact* of 1761 to fight by Spain's side. Thus, any British support of Louis and his weakening position in France would have proved detrimental to British interests. Pitt's government refused to acknowledge any requests made by the émigrés until Nootka was resolved. However, this position faced multiple obstacles, of which the continued pressure from the émigré princes to provide foreign assistance was one.⁵⁰ Moreover, the prospect of a revived monarchical France, made stronger by constitutional and administrative reform, gave Britain a powerful challenge, especially as France would have become a more attractive ally to European monarchs. Finally, from 1791 onwards, it became clear that short of a chaotic and bloody counter-revolution, the new regime would be radical and, whether purposefully or not, pose a serious threat to European regimes.⁵¹

As politics in France became more polarized, both enthusiasm for and disdain of the Revolution waned, especially as the events that were supposed to weaken France appeared to make her stronger.⁵² The rise of British radicalism was counter-pointed by the arrival of frightened refugees and émigrés, who by 1792 numbered in the thousands.

The Times reported that 4,000 had arrived between August and mid October alone.⁵³

Meanwhile newspapers published tales of revolutionary desecration and anarchy. News of the September Massacres was published in London within a week of its occurrence. Sympathy towards the émigrés was increased by reports that “the mob think no more of killing a fellow creature, who is not even an object of suspicion, than wanton boys would of killing a cat or a dog,”⁵⁴ or that “the mob had made a fire, and before it several men, women, and children were roasted alive,” while condemned priests were ordered to eat the roasting flesh or meet the same end.⁵⁵

By then, however, the monarchy had come to an end, and even if reformers such as Fox found it possible to lay responsibility for the attack on the Tuileries of 10 August on Louis XVI for his unwillingness to work with the Assembly, they could not rationalize the Massacres’ violence. Fox could not find even “the possibility of extenuating it in the smallest degree.”⁵⁶ Still, although alarmed by the violence, Fox saw the excesses of the ancien régime as infinitely more evil than those of the revolutionaries. Moreover, even though he favoured constitutional monarchy, he saw no value in either of Louis XVI’s brothers and ultimately preferred a republican France.⁵⁷

Despite rising alarm, Britain in 1791 was neither in a military nor a diplomatic position to start a crusade against revolutionary developments. Nor did the government have confidence in the émigré princes. The British envoy to Brussels Lord Auckland^{†††} wrote, “I learn from some old Paris acquaintance ... that the French Princes at Coblenz [*sic.*] are little sensible of their situation, and are living in all the old style of *faste*, debauchery, extravagance and idle vanity, which we remember at Versailles and at

^{†††} Sir William Eden, who had negotiated the commercial treaty with France in 1786.

Fontainebleau.”⁵⁸ Additionally, the émigrés-issued Padua Circular^{***} after Varennes failed to illicit the desired support, and when Calonne returned to London to renew the princes’ pleas, he “encountered a hostility which had become Britain’s frozen response in her relations with the princes.”⁵⁹ Officials refused to receive him as Artois’s envoy because neither had been formally accredited to the Court of St James.⁶⁰ Subsequently, London refused to lend its support to the Declaration of Pillnitz in August 1791, which called the fate of Louis XVI an issue of concern for all European sovereigns.⁶¹ Grenville went as far as saying that he had a very bad opinion of any scheme that depended on the prudence, exertion or means of the ‘aristocrats.’⁶²

In a letter to Lord St. Helens, Grenville conveyed his unease about any meddling in French affairs and indicated his fear that the Austrian Emperor was bent on interfering only to further his own interests. Grenville feared that the armies going to France “to prevent this infection from spreading, [would] catch it themselves, and circulate it all over Europe.”⁶³ Suspicions that Austria and Prussia were only interested in territorial gains were echoed by the Home Secretary, Dundas, who observed of the Austro-Prussian coalition that “It [was] perfectly apparent that the Emperor, and of course the King of Prussia, mean to do nothing, and that those exiled Princes are miserably duped and used by them.”⁶⁴ Auckland had also written that although Leopold II of Austria was inclined to rescue his sister, he was vague on how much support he was willing to give the princes. Auckland himself thought that the émigrés’ counter-revolutionary efforts ought to have been “composed of sterner stuff.”⁶⁵

^{***} Issued by Emperor Leopold on 10 July 1791. The circular invited European monarchs to work for the restoration of liberty to the French royal family after the failure of Varennes. Only the king of Prussia responded favourably. William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, 2nd edition (Oxford: University Press, 2002), 156.

From April 1792 until the fall of the monarchy, the British government was content to watch events unfold and believed that the Austro-Prussian alliance would easily defeat the French revolutionary army. French victories created little anxiety in London, even less so than the overthrow of the monarchy and perilous situation of the royal family. On the whole, Pitt's government viewed the radical turn in French politics favourably for both weakening France and dividing the opposition Whigs. Pitt continued to refuse British intervention, even to help save Louis's life.⁶⁶ Calonne's successor, the Comte Edouard Dillon, often referred to Pitt's doors as the 'gates of hell,' for there ended all hope of intervention on behalf the French Crown.⁶⁷

The Court of St James might have felt sympathetic to the plight of the French royal family, but the most that they offered was to instruct Lord Gower on the eve of his departure from Paris to drop hints that the French authorities ought to be made aware that, although George III intended to adhere to a strict principle of neutrality with "respect to the settlement of the internal Government of France, he at the same time [considered] as no deviation from those principles to manifest by all the means in his power, his solicitude for the personal situation of their most Christian majesties and their Royal Family."⁶⁸ Gower was instructed to note that the King was anxious to ensure that the royal family was secure from any acts of violence, which "could not fail to produce one universal sentiment of indignation through every country in Europe."⁶⁹ Beyond that, Britain remained neutral. Such neutrality was however increasingly being tested by events on the continent and pressure from British conservatives.

During the latter part of 1791 the émigrés, along with the Burkes, father and son, placed extra pressure on the British ministry to alter its neutral policy. However

Grenville, Pitt and Dundas refused. The ministers believed the dangers facing the French monarchy to be exaggerated, that the émigrés placed too much faith in foreign willingness and ability to help the French Crown, and that the émigrés and their allies alike underestimated the impact of the eventual bankruptcy facing the Constitutional Assembly.⁷⁰ Yet, while contemporaries initially regarded Edmund Burke's argument in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* as alarmist and extreme, few would have argued against it in view of the Terror and mounting threats of war.⁷¹ Because of his work and belief that only a military intervention would help turn the tide of revolution, Burke became the émigrés' main link to the British government, even if his influence on its inner circles was perhaps "negligible."⁷²

In this regard, domestic demands, especially the need to avoid parliamentary disputes, helped make British ministries wary of any foreign alliances that might entail offensive measures. Lacking interest in European territorial expansion, Britain's "natural interests" appeared different from those of many other powers.⁷³

Britain's reaction to the Revolution, perhaps more so than the other powers, was affected by domestic and colonial interests. Indeed, Jeremy Black argues that, had the Revolution directed its hostilities solely towards the Rhineland or Savoy, the British ministry would not have been overly antagonistic. It was France's invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, along with the real or imagined partnership between French and British radicalism, that alarmed Pitt's government into counter-revolutionary action.⁷⁴

For his part, Pitt was wary of public opinion, which had initially favoured neutrality, especially when his government lost parliamentary support and was forced to

back down over the Ochakov Crisis.^{§§§} Similarly, Pitt believed that the imminent bankruptcy of the French treasury would bring the end of the Revolution rather than armed invasion.⁷⁵ Therefore Pitt, Grenville and Dundas were satisfied with the position of neutrality. Still, such an attitude did not preclude belief in a possible conflict with France, especially given the spread of republican ideas, particularly in Holland, which Britain was bound to defend by the terms of a 1788 treaty.⁷⁶ By offering assistance to republican groups in Europe, France became a threat to both Holland and Britain. Moreover, French advance into the Netherlands demonstrated that the First Republic was not as concerned with attaining 'natural' frontiers as she was with achieving "security via hegemony in western Europe," an aim which placed France again on a collision course with Britain.⁷⁷

The invasion of the Netherlands and the opening of the Scheldt for navigation ended calls for renewed isolation and allowed the British cabinet to garner political support for war against France. In Britain's case, however, even the declaration of war did not eliminate the preference for neutrality. Had the republican government agreed to renounce the 1792 Edict of Friendship to all oppressed peoples and confine itself to France's former frontiers, Britain would have been happy to avoid French affairs. Indeed, Britain wanted to stay out of the European conflict so much that, even following the execution of Louis XVI and the declaration of war, the most that Grenville demanded was the safety of the remainder of the royal family and the removal of anti-émigré laws.⁷⁸

Given developments in France, Grenville, along with the Burkean group surrounding the Duke of Portland, came to the conclusion that Britain could not co-exist

^{§§§} A fortress, which Russia had seized from Turkey and which Britain had demanded be returned in 1791. For more on the subject, See Michael Duffy, "British Policy in the war against Revolutionary France", in Colin Jones, ed. *Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion and Propaganda*, (Exeter, UK: University Press, 1983), 13.

with a Europe dominated by revolutionary forces. He accepted the advantage of a military counter-revolution, although he did not support a Bourbon restoration or believe that war against republican France was solely ideological.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, France had upset the balance of European power by annexing foreign territory. By then, hostility towards the new regime, desire for the maintenance of social stability, and a strong distaste for revolutionary irreligion had become strong enough factors to rally Britons and help sustain them through the war years to come.⁸⁰ Thus, in the weeks leading up to war, while Grenville highly doubted the allies' will to restore the ousted Bourbons, he was aware of the "advantages of linking the government's cause in the eyes of the public with a clear-cut ideological cause that would rally royalists and isolate the radicals."⁸¹

As far as the émigrés were concerned, both ultras and moderate monarchists failed to convince the holders of power in London that the war against France was "first and foremost an ideological struggle."⁸² The change of the British cabinet in 1794 to include William Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 3rd Duke of Portland, Earl Spencer and William Windham brought much welcome news, as the new ministers supported Burke's views and strongly advocated the restoration of the legitimate French monarchy. They believed that Britain's fight with France was one of principle, against a spreading 'evil' with which Britain should not compromise. Windham in particular believed that Jacobin principles were in opposition to everything that was divine or human. Even before he joined the ministry, he had already been involved in émigré relief committees, channelled émigré requests to the government and pressed ministers to 'correct' their stance towards the Revolution. All the princes' agents had made contact with Windham, and it was through him that requests to support the Chouans were delivered in cabinet.⁸³ Having

these apparent friends join the government did not mean that they could change official policy, but it added another layer of pressure to British action.

Militarily, Pitt and Grenville feared neither Revolutionary France nor the First Republic. Not wishing to see a return of Bourbon absolutism, they ‘erroneously’ believed that the Republic was less menacing to British interests and less willing to fight over colonial acquisitions. Moreover, they held that a decided military victory at a time that the Republic was embroiled in war both in the Vendée and with other countries was enough to reverse the revolutionary movement and allow a possible restoration of a constitutional and monarchical regime.⁸⁴ While Britain became embroiled in war, Pitt’s government also faced domestic disturbances caused by rising radicalism and the massive increase in émigré arrivals.

In spite of the initial euphoric response to the Revolution in Britain, the main popular reaction was not radicalism but rather Loyalism. Some two thousand-loyalist societies, such as the Association for the Preservation of Liberty and Property against Republicans and Levellers, argued that, should revolution reach Britain, rich and poor alike would suffer.⁸⁵ A celebration of the fall of the Bastille in Birmingham in 1791 led to three days of rioting in the surrounding area, wherein the churches and businesses of known dissenters were attacked.⁸⁶ By 1792, the *Annual Register* was keeping two separate columns for the loyal addresses sent to the king and for the “counties, cities and towns from whence no addresses have been received.”⁸⁷ Such reaction against radicalism played an important role in Britain’s attitude towards the increased arrival of émigrés.

Four days after the fall of the monarchy, royalists started to ‘pour’ into Britain. Among the arrivals were many constitutionalists, who as champions of reform had hoped

to create “*un état possible*”⁸⁸ between the Crown and the Revolution. Their only course was to join the emigration that they had previously denounced. Their dejection and sense of loss was evident even to their detractors as “these French heroes make indeed a most miserable figure.”⁸⁹ In Britain, the émigrés, especially the clergy, were welcomed even by the humble folk who helped them off the ships, opened their homes and gave them money to continue their journey.⁹⁰ The priests brought to the British public the plight of victims of the Revolution. Those who escaped Paris following the September massacres were the first group to be identified as ‘refugees.’ The image of the destitute émigré, whether lay or clerical, belongs to that period, and charitable groups began offering them assistance.⁹¹

British response to the influx of the French was systematic; after all, Britain had experienced a similar situation a decade earlier with the British Loyalists. Three relief committees were formed in the wake of the September Massacres and in response to the tales of terror arriving from Paris. The largest of them was that of Sir John Wilmot, who raised £12,000 for émigré clergy relief in two months. Among Wilmot’s colleagues was Sir William Pepperell, a prominent loyalist who had for years acted as a spokesman in favour of American and later French refugees.⁹² These committees also included members of Britain’s social and political elite, including the Duke of Portland, the Marquis of Buckingham, fourteen members of parliament and twelve Anglican ministers.

According to Kirsty Carpenter, the ‘clout’ this group wielded was formidable, and the émigrés found their cause in the most conservative and influential hands of the British establishment.⁹³ Wilmot’s fundraising efforts, with Burke’s help, produced almost £400,000.⁹⁴ This is an indication not only of the generosity the British offered to their

traditional enemy, but also of the émigrés' connection to British society. Even Huguenots set aside religious antagonisms and provided their fellow refugees some assistance. The émigré elite, mostly because of their background, were familiar with channels of patronage, and without their personal connections, the British government might not have felt the need to subsidize them for more than two decades.⁹⁵

Nevertheless, while the elite among the emigrants was fêted in British society, the government itself was wary of royalist leaders, whom they found reactionary, unreliable, quarrelsome and anti-British.⁹⁶ Beneath the hospitality shown to emigrants was the lingering anxiety that Britain was being infiltrated by Jacobins bent on propagating their own political agenda. Though accounts were sometimes exaggerated, knowing now that the French foreign office had subsidized secret agents to incite insurrection makes British fears seem more credible.⁹⁷ The quick passage of the Alien Act in 1792-3 was an indication of growing anxiety over French emigrants.⁹⁸ This was especially true as the émigrés not only carried the threat of revolution, they also aired their disagreements in public, revealing that they continued to be socially and politically divided.

Despite their misfortune, deep divisions continued to plague the émigrés, and their mutual relations were often petty and vindictive. Horace Walpole told his friend Joseph Farington that many émigrés 'of high fashion' had made their way to Richmond, and that although they all suffered the "grievance of being expelled from their native country," one should be cautious not to assemble ultra-royalists and liberal constitutionalists together.⁹⁹ Madame de la Tour de Pin took no pleasure in staying in London and after three days found that "émigré society, with its gossip, petty intrigue and scandal-mongering was odious."¹⁰⁰

Although it is easy to find the haughtiness and pretensions of the French elite absurd and disturbing, it can be argued that their lavish life styles were fuelled by the need to present themselves as courtiers and thus strengthen their connection with their British counterparts. Conversely, one can also argue that they were acting out of self-preservation and a need to hold on to a society that had already crumbled in France.¹⁰¹ Politically, however, the British government was faced with the problem of whom to support in the counter-revolutionary struggle. Even before the declaration of war in 1793, London was aware of the animosity among the various émigré groups. Not only were the ultras antagonistic to the *monarchiens* and constitutionalists, they also proved ineffective in supporting the insurrection within France.

Moreover, the British government grew alarmed about the reactionary attitude of the Comte de Provence, which extended even to members of his own exiled court. His dismissal of faithful royalists, such as the Prince de Poix, for favouring the union of the three estates in 1789, or of his chief minister the duc de Castries for noting that the maintenance of a full royal guard in exile was extravagant, were ominous signs about the Pretender's talk of clemency should he be restored.¹⁰² Their extreme intransigence fractured anti-republican opposition and baffled the British, who saw the object of supporting the Bourbons as the defeat of Jacobin France.¹⁰³

Meanwhile, Britain became a *bête noire* for ultra-royalists during the years 1793-6. Their grievances centered on the 'presumed' lack of will amongst the British to restore, or even acknowledge, Provence, first as regent and later as Louis XVIII. The ultras were also angered by British unwillingness to work with 'true' royalists and choosing instead to negotiate with moderates. They believed British attitudes to be formulated specifically

to weaken France diplomatically. A French constitutional monarchy– so they believed – was doomed to be incapable of exerting international influence, unlike the France of the ancien régime.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the ultras felt that Britain should help restore the Bourbons without interfering in émigré or French affairs. For them, British ‘lecturing’ about the necessity of moderation to make the restoration possible was impertinent and proof of the influence the *monarchiens* had on Pitt’s government.¹⁰⁵

Indeed, during the early 1790s, the ultras’ fear that the British government had aligned themselves with the moderates was genuine. With the exception of occasional correspondence with the duc d’Harcourt, Provence’s envoy to London, the British government’s consultation was with the monarchiens during 1793-4. Whereas, from the end of 1793, the British government started receiving detailed political memoranda from the *monarchien* Mallet du Pan, the Foreign Office records contain very few references to ‘policy discussions’ with ultra-royalists.¹⁰⁶

Of course, moderates’ communication with the British government angered ultra-royalists, who were further incensed by the *monarchiens*’ effort to mediate between Provence and London.¹⁰⁷ Hence ultra-royalists, including their vociferous advocate, the Comte d’Antraigues, were convinced that the *monarchiens* in London influenced the official political attitude towards the Revolution.¹⁰⁸ Artois’s friend, the Comte de Vaudreuil, wrote that the British government was “storing up trouble for itself by consorting with *monarchiens*.”¹⁰⁹

Concern about moderate and liberal influence on British circles was not confined to Frenchmen. Edmund Burke echoed Vaudreuil’s concern when he wrote “all our hope of overturning Jacobinism is, it seems, by Jacobins or by men who do not know whether

they are Jacobins or not.”¹¹⁰ Such anxiety about *monarchiens*’ impact was not unfounded, as Malouet and Lally-Tolendal were in contact with many members of Pitt’s cabinet. However, rather than being swayed by Jacobinism as Burke feared, Lally advised the Home Office frequently about the activities of Jacobin agents in London, particularly throughout the fall and winter of 1792-3.¹¹¹

Not only did the *monarchiens* cooperate with the Home Office by forwarding intelligence from France, they also submitted policy statements to the Foreign and Alien Offices.¹¹² To the ire of British conservatives and French ultras alike, the proclamation of George III after the landing of British troops in Toulon****, which was drafted by Malouet, called for the establishment of a stable, hereditary monarchy without any insistence on a return to the ancien régime.¹¹³ That being said, this evidence is not enough to conclude that the *monarchiens* exerted much influence on British policy. Grenville wrote to Pitt that he did not have much faith that revolutionary theorists had profited from the experience of committing themselves hastily to ‘any distinct line.’ Malouet echoed this attitude when he wrote, “Nobody, without exception, has any influence on the English ministry. Their policy is as shrouded as it could be.”¹¹⁴ Because of the extent of the contact and the similarity between British and *monarchien* attitudes towards the Revolution, it was understandable that the ultras should fear *monarchien* influence. However, both groups failed to accept or recognize that British involvement in the war was aimed at “protecting – or better still extending – British interest and power.”¹¹⁵

**** The rebellion in Toulon was one part of the 1793-Federalist Revolt, which erupted in France against the National Convention and policies of conscription and insistence on an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of 1793. The Royalist element was not prevalent in all parts of France, but Toulon actually called in the British navy and declared for the king. Doyle, *French Revolution*, 309.

Although Walter Fryer argues that Britain wanted to see the monarchy restored on a ‘traditional basis,’¹¹⁶ and thus was more partial to ultra-royalism, Grenville did not favour any particular form of government in France for three reasons. First, there was an official refusal to interfere in French internal affairs. Secondly, there was a recognition of the defects of both the ancien régime and its supporters. Last was the fear that any commitment to a particular government would make Britain its trustee once peace was established. Similarly, refusing to encourage continental powers to be more aggressive against France, and thus harm the desired equilibrium, Grenville did not favour a strong indemnification policy. Such a policy would have antagonized royalist forces and ensured that the continental powers lost their drive once their aims were achieved.¹¹⁷

Having explored British political and social views regarding the French Revolution, its refugees and its opponents, we find that, although Britain’s contact with the French Revolution was gradual, once the Court of St James committed itself to war against the Republic, Britain became the Revolution’s enemy and at times the unintentional supporter of émigré activities. However, although socially welcoming and supportive, Britain was slow to warm to the prospect of political cooperation with the emigrants. While Britain maintained a pragmatic attitude, the animosity and bickering among the various émigré groups did them a great disservice and cast them in a negative light with their hosts. Moreover, not only were the French suspicious of each other, they also did not trust the British. These elements of animosity, distrust and need will be further examined in the following chapter.

¹ Jennifer Mori, “The British Government and the Bourbon Restoration: The Occupation of Toulon, 1793,” *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 1997): 702.

- ² The French republican government tested this refusal by sending Talleyrand as envoy in December 1792 to ensure that Britain's position was unchanged. In Hutt, *Chouannerie*, 99.
- ³ Duffy, "British Policy," 11.
- ⁴ Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 2.
- ⁵ Colin Jones, ed., *Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion and Propaganda*, (Exeter, UK: University Press, 1983), 4. See also Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 90.
- ⁶ Charles Bastide, "The Anglo-French Entente under Louis-Philippe," *Economica*, No.19 (March, 1927): 92.
- ⁷ Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 10.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 66.
- ⁹ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 36-7. See also, Jennifer Mori, *William Pitt and the French Revolution, 1785-1795* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 51.
- ¹⁰ Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 74.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 66.
- ¹² Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 36.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 35-37.
- ¹⁴ Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 76.
- ¹⁵ Hampson, *The First European Revolution*, 44.
- ¹⁶ Mori, *William Pitt*, 52.
- ¹⁷ Duffy, "British Policy," 12.
- ¹⁸ Quoted from Claude Carloman de Rulhière, *Le comte de Vergennes: Première cause des états-généraux*, 2 vols. (Paris 1819), 176 in Gary Savage "Foreign Policy and the Political Culture in Later Eighteenth-Century France," in Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms eds., *Cultures of Power in Europe During the Long Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2007): 310.
- ¹⁹ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 40.
- ²⁰ Savage "Foreign Policy and the Political Culture," 306.
- ²¹ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 40.
- ²² Black, "Anglo-French Relations," 411.
- ²³ Munro Price, "Court Nobility," 270.
- ²⁴ Black, "Anglo-French Relations," 417.
- ²⁵ L.G. Mitchell, "The Whigs, the People, and Reform," in Timothy Blanning and Peter Wende, eds., *Reform in Great Britain and Germany, 1750-1850* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999): 26.
- ²⁶ Mitchell, "The Whigs, the People, and Reform," 26.
- ²⁷ Mori, "The Occupation of Toulon," 702.
- ²⁸ Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 80-1.
- ²⁹ Mori, "The Occupation of Toulon," 702.
- ³⁰ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 68.
- ³¹ Paul Langford, "The English as Reformers: Foreign Visitors' Impressions, 1750-1850" in Timothy Blanning and Peter Wende, eds., *Reform in Great Britain and Germany, 1750-1850* (Oxford: University Press, 1999), 104.
- ³² Langford, "The English as Reformers," 104.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, 104.
- ³⁴ Mike Rapport, " "Deux nations malheureusement rivales": les Français en Grande-Bretagne, les Britanniques en France, et la construction des identités nationales pendant la Révolution française," *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, N°342, (2005): 32-33.
- ³⁵ Quoted from A. Goodwin, *The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution*, (London: Hutchinson, 1979), 105 in Rapport, " "Deux nations," 24-26.
- ³⁶ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 13.
- ³⁷ Peter Jupp, *Lord Grenville, 1759-1834* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 88 and 90.
- ³⁸ British Library (BL) Dropmore Papers, Add MS 71588, William Wyndham Grenville to the Marquess of Buckingham, 14 July 1789, f. 82. Rather auspiciously, the first mention of France in his private papers took place as the Bastille fell.
- ³⁹ BL, Add MS 71588, f. 96v. On 15 August Grenville wrote that Dorset has arrived from France, but brought nothing material to what they knew already.
- ⁴⁰ The House of Lords rejected the proposal by 13 votes to 6. In Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 193.

- ⁴¹ Clive Emsley, "The impact of the French Revolution on British Politics and Society," in Ceri Crossley and Ian Small, eds., *The French Revolution and British Culture* (Oxford: University Press, 1989): 33-4.
- ⁴² Hedva Ben-Israel Kidron, *English Historians on the French Revolution* (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), 9.
- ⁴³ Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 195.
- ⁴⁴ The largest of these societies was the London Correspondence Society, which was founded in 1792. In Woodcock, "The Meaning of Revolution in Britain," 18. See also, Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 196 and 202.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 193.
- ⁴⁶ Mitchell, "The Whigs," 27.
- ⁴⁷ Mitchell, "The Whigs," 31 and 34.
- ⁴⁸ Black, "Anglo-French Relations," 419. See also, Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 81.
- ⁴⁹ National Archives (NA), Foreign Office (FO) 95/99, dispatch no. 37, Earl Gower to Grenville, 12 August 1791, f. 24. A camp followed the princes and another followed the Baron de Breteuil; Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette favoured the latter.
- ⁵⁰ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 14 and 16.
- ⁵¹ Black, "Anglo-French Relations," 429.
- ⁵² Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 193.
- ⁵³ Michael Durey, *William Wickham, Master Spy: the Secret War Against the French Revolution* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2009), 26.
- ⁵⁴ *The Times*, Monday, Sep 10, 1792; pg. 1; Issue 2408; col B.
- ⁵⁵ *The Times*, Wednesday, Sep 12, 1792; pg. 2; Issue 2410; col C.
- ⁵⁶ Quoted in Emsley, "The impact of the French Revolution," 39.
- ⁵⁷ Jennifer Mori, *Britain in the Age of the French Revolution* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Ltd, 2000), 8-9.
- ⁵⁸ Lord Auckland to Grenville, 12 August 1791. In *The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue Esq. preserved at Dropmore*, 3 Volumes, (London: Historical Manuscripts Commission, 1894), II, 164. Henceforth *Dropmore Papers*.
- ⁵⁹ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 20.
- ⁶⁰ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 100.
- ⁶¹ Issued on 27 August, Pillnitz declared the situation of Louis XVI to be of common interest to all European monarchs and urged them to provide the possible means to restore Louis's power. For Prussia and Austria in particular, Pillnitz was a means to fulfill their family obligation towards Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. See, Doyle, *History of the French Revolution*, 156-7 and Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 84-5.
- ⁶² Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 20.
- ⁶³ Grenville was appointed Foreign Secretary in 1791. From Grenville to Mr. Fitzherbert, who concluded the Nootka Sound treaty and later became Lord St. Helens, 26 August 1791. In *Dropmore Papers*, II, 176.
- ⁶⁴ Henry Dundas to Grenville, 15 September 1791, in *Dropmore Papers*, II, 193.
- ⁶⁵ Quoted from Auckland to Grenville, 13 June 1791. In *Dropmore Papers*, II, 96-7. In Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 19.
- ⁶⁶ Pitt was much slower to change his attitude than his ministers and even as late as October 1791 Pitt could still be found defending the conduct and principles of Lafayette against the writings of Burke. See Mori, "The Occupation of Toulon, 1793," 702 and Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 113-4.
- ⁶⁷ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 24.
- ⁶⁸ BL, Add MS 59064, Henry Dundas to Lord Gower 17 August 1792, fos. 36 -37. See also Oscar Browning, ed. *The despatches of Earl Gower, English ambassador at Paris from June 1790 to August 1792*, (Cambridge: Univeristy Press, 1885), 210.
- ⁶⁹ BL, Add MS 59064, Henry Dundas to Lord Gower 17 August 1792, f. 37.
- ⁷⁰ Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 145-6.
- ⁷¹ Burke's *Reflections* was an immediate success, selling 7000 copies within weeks and 13,000 in France in one year. Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 199
- ⁷² Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 23.
- ⁷³ Jeremy Black, "British Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century: A Survey," *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1987): 52.
- ⁷⁴ Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 85.
- ⁷⁵ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 23 and Mori, *William Pitt*, 143-44.

- ⁷⁶ Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 142.
- ⁷⁷ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 115-117. See also Savage, "Foreign Policy and the Political Culture," 318
- ⁷⁸ Duffy, "British Policy," 13-15.
- ⁷⁹ Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 187.
- ⁸⁰ Black, *Natural and Necessary Enemies*, 89.
- ⁸¹ Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 148-9.
- ⁸² Griffiths, "Pierre-Victor Malouet," 315.
- ⁸³ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 125-6.
- ⁸⁴ Mori, "The Occupation of Toulon, 1793," 703.
- ⁸⁵ Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 200.
- ⁸⁶ Loyalism did not mean unquestionable support to Pitt's government, but the voicing of grievances through peaceful acts such as petitioning the king over food shortages or boycotting known sympathizers of the Revolution. *Ibid.*, 200-201
- ⁸⁷ Emsley, "The impact of the French Revolution," 39.
- ⁸⁸ Wilkinson, "French Émigrés," 64.
- ⁸⁹ Quoted from A.M. Storer to Lord Auckland, 6 August 1790. Auckland, *Journal and Correspondence*, II, 412. In *ibid.*, 65-6.
- ⁹⁰ French priests had a much easier time leaving France than *ci-devant* aristocrats who had to fend for themselves and pay exorbitant prices, reaching up to 300 guineas for the crossing. *Ibid.*, 78 and 90.
- ⁹¹ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 29.
- ⁹² Jasanoff, "Revolutionary Exiles," 54.
- ⁹³ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 45.
- ⁹⁴ Between 1794-1799, the British government gave the émigré community and its war effort more than £1 million. In Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 216.
- ⁹⁵ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 47-8 and 51.
- ⁹⁶ Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 220.
- ⁹⁷ Some famous French agents: an Italian spy named Rotondo; there was also a Cervantes, Riom and Pilat who all masqueraded as émigrés while boasting of their roles in the riots and massacres that took place in Paris. Wilkinson, "French Émigrés," 358-362.
- ⁹⁸ Grenville presented it on the nineteenth of December; the bill had its second reading on the twenty-first, was discussed in committees on the twenty-second and was finally passed in less than a week on the twenty-sixth. In Wilkinson, "French Émigrés," 369.
- ⁹⁹ Quoted from Horace Walpole, *Correspondence*, Yale edition, ed. W.S. Lewis, 33 Vols. (New Haven, CT, 1937), vol. 15, p.318. In Judith Filson, "French Refugees in Richmond, 1785-1815," *Journal of the Richmond Society History Section*, Vol. 7 (1986), 1.
- ¹⁰⁰ Marquise de La Tour du Pin, *Memoirs*, 318.
- ¹⁰¹ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 65.
- ¹⁰² Meanwhile, the most reactionary of his entourage were allowed, without recrimination, to threaten all measures of revenge against those who approved or welcomed the changes post 1789. For example, Comte Ferrand, later minister in 1814, declared that the restoration should start with 44,000 executions, one for each commune. In Walter Ronald Fryer, *Republic or Restoration in France? 1794-7: the Politics of French Royalism, with Particular Reference to the Activities of A. B. J. d'André*. (Manchester: University Press, 1965), 16.
- ¹⁰³ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 112.
- ¹⁰⁴ Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality," 242.
- ¹⁰⁵ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 112.
- ¹⁰⁶ Griffiths, "Pierre-Victor Malouet," 318.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 319.
- ¹⁰⁸ Beik, "The French Revolution," 11.
- ¹⁰⁹ Griffiths, "Pierre-Victor Malouet," 307.
- ¹¹⁰ Quoted from Burke to Sylvester Douglas, 14 November 1793, in Edmund Burke, *Correspondence of Edmund Burke*, eds. by P.J. Marshall and J.A. Woods, Vol. 7 (Chicago: University Press, 1968). In *ibid.*, Griffiths, "Pierre-Victor Malouet," 308.

¹¹¹ The first monarchiens' 'committee' met at the home of Lord Sheffield with the purpose of drafting a proposal to save Louis XVI through British support. It included three former French ministers: Bertrand, Monciel and Sainte Croix, in addition to Malouet, Lally, Gilliers and M. de Poix. In *ibid.* 308-12.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 311.

¹¹³ Malouet wrote the draft for this proclamation in compliance with Grenville's request. July 1793, (French), F.O. 95/3/2, ff. 241-243, in *ibid.*, 316.

¹¹⁴ Quoted from Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 9 July 1793. In *ibid.* 317.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 324.

¹¹⁶ Fryer, *Republic or Restoration*, 23.

¹¹⁷ Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 152-54.

Chapter III:
Diplomacy in Conflict

The previous chapters explored divisions within the French emigration, as well as British reaction to the unfolding political struggle on the continent. As Europe became increasingly dangerous for the émigrés, and as their diplomacy proved futile in turning the revolutionary tide, it became evident that the realization of a successful counter-revolution depended on cultivating closer ties with Britain. London became a destination as important to the ultra-royalists as it was to the *monarchiens* and most moderates. War against the Revolution forced the émigrés and Britain to rely on each other, as both sides continued to believe that kingship was still rooted in France.¹

Nevertheless, the transition from foes to allies was often cumbersome and fraught with animosity, division and suspicion. Émigré France did not forget that Britain was their country's recent rival, while London was reluctant to work with various émigré factions. In this chapter we will focus on the stumbling blocks to cooperation. Particular attention will be given to policies that caused one or more among the émigré groups to feel slighted by British attitudes, or to believe that Britain intended to weaken France rather than just defeat revolutionary Paris.

Thriving Suspicions

During the early stages of the Revolution, whether émigrés or not, the French were convinced that Britain's gold was used to destabilize the French Crown. British agents were believed to have been active on 14 July, in the *journées* of 5 and 6 October 1789, and during the upheaval of 1791-2. Even high-ranking officials held similar views; Artois was convinced until his death that British guineas were decisive in the 1789 events, a conviction the Jacobins also nourished during the First Republic.² Although

initial French paranoia about British machinations may have been unjustified, Britain's involvement in counterrevolutionary activities grew steadily once she decided to abandon neutrality regarding French affairs.³

Between Varennes and the fall of the French monarchy in 1792, French diplomacy disintegrated under the pressure of competing views and policies. As London was flooded with accredited and unaccredited émigrés advocating conflicting policies, French envoys lost their credibility.⁴ The result was that émigré leaders, whether they were ultras or moderates, came to suspect that Britain's response to the Revolution both lacked coherence and was motivated by a desire to see monarchical France perpetually weakened. Such suspicions were reinforced when, following the executions of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, Britain, much like Austria and Prussia, refused to acknowledge Provence as regent to the minor Louis XVII, or even to accept that Provence had the right to go to Toulon once the city was under British control. Indeed the duc de Castries, the princes' chief military adviser, suggested that Britain was willing to support the émigrés in order to cause trouble for the Republic, but not enough to bring about a successful counter-revolution.⁵

As Revolutionary France and Georgian Britain went to war, it became clear that it was not "a duel in single combat between these two powers, but a struggle over who would control Europe."⁶ Revolutionary France would always try to organize Europe to remain secure, with 'her hands free' from Britain; Britain's aim was exactly the opposite.⁷ This attitude continued to influence British policy and Pitt was reported to have said:

I care not about the internal state or government of France one farthing – whether republic – anarchy – monarchy or what not – it does not signify to

my argument. I only desire you [Canning] to look at the map of Europe – see what France has done – what she is gaining – and of what she is already in possession – and then tell me if there was ever a period in history at which England could reasonably consent to make a peace with France in such a state of power and aggrandisement. Tell me if any statesman that ever lived, on being shewn [*sic.*] that France was mistress of the Netherlands and of Holland – no matter whether with Louis the fourteenth – or with Tallien and the committees at her head – would not exclaim at once, “Then England must be at war with her.”⁸

By the time Provence had issued the Verona Declaration,^{*} wherein he refused to acknowledge the reality of France’s political situation, his intransigence had ruined any hope of reaching a settlement with the men who ruled France and dispelled any notion that the Pretender’s attitude had been moderated by the years of exile.⁹ Thus, the two constants held by the émigré court were the need for France to return to a monarchy that was neither absolute nor constitutional, and the lingering suspicion that even if the British government might have worked for the restoration of a French monarchy, given the history between the two countries, Britain could not have had good intentions.¹⁰

Generosity, Haughtiness and the Alien Act

In Britain, an understandable degree of apprehension accompanied French arrivals. Henry Dundas wrote that “It will become very inconvenient to have the country, especially this metropolis, filled with so many strangers of whom we know nothing except that they are starving...what is at present only an inconvenience will, in short time, become truly dangerous.”¹¹ Lord Auckland in The Hague echoed a similar

^{*} Issued on 25 June 1795 from his exile in Verona, in the Declaration Provence announced that once restored he would bring back the structure of the ancien régime with the exception of unspecified ‘abuses.’ On the subject of taxation, he consented to the approval of the Estates General but did not specify how often they would meet. Finally, he offered amnesty to his ‘errant’ subjects but none to the regicides. Its severity took the country back to the Royal Session of 23 June 1789 and made any agreement on restoration impossible.

sentiment; believing the émigrés to be more dangerous than helpless, he wondered if they should even be allowed to stay in Britain.¹² Then he added:

These crowds of émigrés add greatly to the uncomfortable circumstances of the time. They are, and will be, a severe tax in every sense on those who knew many of them in the prosperous days of France; and, though many of the individuals...are objects highly worthy both of respect and compassion...the levity and dangerous talents of that nation have not been corrected in the school of misfortune. Besides, in the crowds who are come, there are many who are detached and paid by the Jacobin leaders to do mischief, and to prepare and promote revolutions.¹³

Aside from a revolutionary threat, and even though Britain had been very generous towards the French arrivals, Anglo-Émigré social relations were also mutually exasperating. Even their supporters met the emigrants' arrival with mixed results. While the émigrés' unrealistic expectations irritated their friends and made them less inclined to take French schemes seriously, Burke found their "lack of initiative and political ineptitude" shocking and distressful.¹⁴ In contrast, the émigrés found British society, in comparison to their own, rather dull. To their eyes, the English had no *société* worthy of the name. Moreover, émigrés who initially supported the Revolution resented deeply the accusations of treason heaped on them from conservatives and reformers alike.¹⁵

Until the declaration of war in February 1793, the London émigrés, especially the ones in contact with the British ruling elite, proved a valuable source of often-unsolicited information about the situation in France and about the state of France's military power. Men like Lally-Tollendal willingly helped uncover Jacobin spies attached to the French delegation in London. Still, following the fall of the monarchy and the declaration of the First Republic, the Home Office began in September 1792 to keep a 'wary eye' on the émigrés in Britain.¹⁶ Such a change met the approval of the Bourbon princes who from their exile in Dusseldorf, asked George III to grant refuge to the unfortunate refugees,

even though Provence and Artois were interested in the passage of a law monitoring émigré movements.¹⁷

Under these conditions, implementation of the Alien Act was perhaps one of the first measures over which Britain's neutral policy clashed with that of the various émigré groups. The Act indicated an attitude shift regarding the situation in France and was itself a reaction to the increased émigrés' arrival on British shores. Moreover, it added to the émigrés' perception that they were being targeted by British policies.¹⁸

As some émigrés were viewed with valid suspicion, fears of spreading revolution had to be addressed. Passage of the Alien Act in January 1793 was meant to place a measure of control over the swelling number of French refugees and ease fears of growing Jacobinism. Implemented on the advice of the émigré ex-French ministers, it enabled the government to monitor the movement of anyone whom they suspected of seditious activities. The émigrés were required to register at their port of arrival, obtain a passport indicating their destination and obtain a written permit if they wished to relocate their residence.¹⁹

The Alien Office was thus established, and one of its responsibilities was to keep lists of those who settled in metropolitan London. William Huskisson, a Francophile and a supporter of constitutional monarchy, was appointed to head the office in January 1793.²⁰ Although the law was loosely applied and not many more than fifty a year were deported during the 1790s, the Alien Act was a source of resentment in émigré circles even though it was supposed to include all foreigners on British soil.²¹ Émigrés who had remained active in French politics until the fall of the monarchy were deemed suspect and were often asked to leave the country. Talleyrand, for instance, arriving on 28 January

1794, was given five days to leave, while Alexandre Lameth, recuperating in Bath after being in a Prussian prison, was given less than two weeks.²² That said, the British government often paid the passage of various ‘deportees’, whether it was to America or back to the continent.²³

Undeniably, many among the émigrés felt targeted, and having the Act’s instructions published only in French, other than English, added insult to injury. Moreover, those who had served in the French military were offended by the requirement to surrender their weapons upon entry into British territory.²⁴ Still, although the *Monarchiens* and moderate monarchists did not argue against the Act itself, they feared that ultra-royalists might influence London’s reasoning as to who should be considered suspicious. For instance, Lally-Tolendal urged that neither Mme de Staël nor the Marquis de Bouillé ought to be treated with suspicion, especially as many royalists in London viewed de Staël as an accomplice to *l’horrible catastrophe*.²⁵

As the exile lengthened, neither the émigrés nor their hosts fully relinquished their long-held prejudices. The small group of emigrants who remained in the United Kingdom after Napoleon’s amnesty in 1802, though appreciative of British support, resented British interference in émigré affairs. That the British government approved the publication of Puisaye’s memoirs in 1809, for instance, was damaging and humiliating to the Pretender on more than one account. Having the Comte d’Avaray, one of Provence’s closest friends, denounced as a person who intrigued only to line his pockets with British gold was harmful to the Pretender’s prestige. More so, when Provence wished to make his contempt of the memoirs public by declaring d’Avaray a duke, London rejected his

request. The Pretender was reminded that England had allowed the ‘comte de Lille’[†] refuge on the condition that he neither called himself king nor behaved in public in a manner that indicated royal status. Moreover, d’Avaray himself was informed that, should the ‘duke’ stir trouble, he might end up being deported.²⁶ Likewise, it must have been humiliating to the Bourbon princes to have their movements and decisions curtailed while other European emigrants were received graciously. Unlike the French Bourbons, who had to settle away from London initially, the Prince and Princess of Orange were warmly welcomed by George III, who personally arranged for them to stay at Kew Palace until Hampton Court was made ready to accommodate them during their exile.²⁷

Conflicting Visions

Despite appeals from counter-revolutionaries and ideologists alike, the war against France was fought less with the intent of destroying the Revolution than for the destruction of French power. In 1793 Britain entered the war with expectations of success.²⁸ By then, the military position of the Republic in Western Europe was in decline. The allied armies had not only won back most of the territory occupied by the French in 1792, but were pouring into Savoy, Alsace and Flanders. French setbacks only confirmed London’s expectation that war was bound to be brief. At home, support of revolutionary principles was replaced by active loyalism, and when the parliamentary reform motion proposed by Charles Grey was defeated in the Commons in May 1793, Pitt noted that “these [were] indeed prosperous days.”²⁹

Furthermore, it was increasingly apparent by 1793 that the Convention was hated in many French provinces, particularly the Vendée, which had been home to counter-revolutionary opposition since the fall of the monarchy. Having a Federalist insurrection

[†] Provence’s assumed name in exile.

in the south, while the Convention was simultaneously fighting the allied armies of Austria and Prussia and a royalist revolt in the west, added to the allies' conviction that the Revolution was approaching its end.³⁰

Britain was thus optimistic about establishing a stronghold in Toulon after the city leaders and opponents of the Convention surrendered to Admiral Lord Hood on 28 August 1793.³¹ However, the British presence there confounded London's war aims and attitudes towards the various factions of French royalism. While neither Pitt nor Grenville wished to impose a form of government in France, they also did not wish to alienate enemies of the Revolution who opposed the restoration of the ancien régime. This helps explain the caution with which Burke and his émigré friends were treated throughout the 1790s.³² Both ministers thought it strategically vital to work with active royalists, whether they were ultras or moderates, a position further reflected in the drafting of the British proclamation in Toulon, which invited the French "to join the Standard of an hereditary Monarchy."³³

In this context, Pitt insisted that a monarchical government with 'proper limitations' was most likely to unite French royalists. Although Pitt believed that the monarchical system was the only force from which stability could be expected, such belief did not exclude the possibility of negotiating with any other solidly established government. Yet, due to divisions among the émigrés and continuing fighting on the continent, Pitt's pragmatism was not easy to define or apply.³⁴ Moreover, London overestimated the strength of royalism in the French provinces, for while the republican government may have been detested, this did not immediately imply a preference for a Bourbon restoration.³⁵ Also, one must not forget that, apart from how much the

intransigence of the Bourbon princes and their followers was ‘distasteful’ to Pitt and his cabinet, the restoration of a strong monarchy in France was detrimental to British military and commercial interests.³⁶

A further problem developed when Toulon’s leaders surrendered the city to Admiral Hood in the name of France’s hereditary monarchy, as established by the Constituent Assembly of 1789.³⁷ The British authority was aware of the city’s divided loyalties and unsure which constitution to support. Toulon’s federalist leaders decided to recognize the 1789 constitution. That decision however was confusing: in 1789 the Assembly had formed a constitutional committee, issued the Declarations of the Rights of Man, and declared the establishment of a constitutional monarchy; but no actual constitution had been created until 1791.[‡] Even the completed Constitution of 1791 was only reluctantly accepted by Louis XVI and was the subject of numerous modifications over which the British government was uncertain. While Pitt preferred a constitution based on the Royal Session, Grenville supported the version accepted in 1791, which ensured the support of constitutionalists.³⁸

Although the prospect of a reformed monarchy was attractive to the British government, the Bourbon princes regarded such an outcome with horror. Upon learning that Anglo-Spanish forces were in control of Toulon, Provence and Artois proposed to take command of the city for the purpose of leading royalists in the south of France. To their ire, London not only denied the princes access to the city, but applied pressure on Spain to do the same. This was particularly exasperating as the latter, and contrary to British wishes, had instructed the Spanish commander, Admiral Gravina, to support the

[‡] The constitution referred to by the Toulonnais was an informal adoption on the Crown’s declaration during the Royal Session of 23 June 1789. For many among the ultra-royalists, Provence included, the King’s concessions were the most they were willing to offer in terms of compromise with the Revolution.

princes' return. Thus, while Pitt's ministry acknowledged that monarchy was probably France's best option, it refused to accept that the clock could be turned back to the *ancien régime*, which in France was neither acceptable nor practical. They kept the French princes at arms length, instructed Lord Elliot to discourage Provence from travelling to Toulon, and ignored Chouans' requests for a Bourbon prince at their helm.³⁹

Although indicative of British attitude, this opposition was based on pragmatic considerations, especially as the British cabinet was more cognizant of the impossibility of realizing the plans of ultra-royalism and that Provence's reactionary policy was not likely to conciliate the city's inhabitants.⁴⁰ That Britain blocked Provence's plans to travel to Toulon, did not use the white Bourbon flag, and proclaimed the monarchy as that accepted by the late Louis XVI, outraged ultra-royalists. In the view of the latter, Britain was firmly working with *constitutionnels* "not only against the Republic, but 'also' against the Bourbon Princes."⁴¹ Grenville wrote to Lord Malmesbury asking him to impress on Provence's court that the prince should return "to some place where he may be treated with, instead of pursuing his foolish project on Toulon, which will expose him to a public affront, and unavoidably oblige us to caste a slur upon him at the very moment when our interests lead us to endeavour to raise his character."⁴²

Ultra-royalists were also alarmed when, in the spring of 1794, Pitt and Grenville were prepared to allow Corsicans to decide their future. The Bourbons could hardly accept Corsica's separation from France or the notion that Corsicans had the right to change 'masters' or create a constitution. Negotiations with deputies who worked on the constitution were even more offensive, as *constitutionnels* had no place in the princes' plans. In this case, however, it was rather ironic that the negotiations failed because, like

the ultras, this group of *constitutionnels* was also suspicious of London and feared that an alliance with British policies would weaken their appeal at home.⁴³ To ultra-royalists, British rule of Corsica proved that Britain was bent on spreading the ‘disease’ of constitutionalism while capturing more French territory.⁴⁴

To make matters worse, the princes believed that, despite the subsequent Revolutionary victory at Toulon, it was Bourbon France that ultimately suffered the most. For although Britain was forced to abandon the port, British forces destroyed the French arsenal and fourteen ships, while incorporating another ten into their own navy.⁴⁵ Equally annoying to the Bourbons and their immediate court was the belief that the British insisted on keeping Artois out of the Vendée or the Quibéron landing because they planned to establish a foothold there and use it to their own advantage.⁴⁶ The result of such policies was that, even as late as 1798, the Pretender had no affection towards Britain, and his envoys kept instructing their agents not to trust ‘any Englishman.’⁴⁷

Expectation and Disappointment

Despite optimistic expectations, Pitt could not foresee the nature of the war. He believed it was easy to find allies and that the small British army would handle various fronts, including operations in the colonies as well as on France’s Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts. His optimism about the quality of the army and the logistics of its support was largely baseless. Pitt preferred military raids on French sites, but was seldom prepared to concentrate on one. Expecting a short and successful war, he often allowed diplomatic considerations to overshadow military realities in strategic planning.⁴⁸ Also, that Britain entered the war against France in 1793 to guard its continental and colonial interests was not a clear enough objective. The triumvirate of Pitt, Grenville and Dundas

was not united on how best to proceed and which policies to follow; the result was often multifaceted confusion.⁴⁹

This confusion was most manifest in the failed military operations against Revolutionary France, particularly the failure to benefit from the royalist insurrection in the west. For example, both Pitt and the royalist leader Puisaye wanted Artois to head the expeditionary forces prepared for the west, but French and British officers wasted time squabbling on where the forces ought to be: Brittany or the Vendée.⁵⁰ Moreover, after the defeat of émigré forces at Quibéron, Artois, despite protestations that his place was in France, did not join the Vendée forces, choosing instead to believe that they were short of men and supplies and thus had little chance of success. Since Artois “failed to put in an appearance when leaders of the insurrection were risking all for the Bourbons,”⁵¹ his prestige suffered immensely, especially in Britain.

Subsequently, even if Artois wished for a more active military role, London’s cooperation was not forthcoming. Lord Moira’s expedition to Granville, for example, sailed without the Prince, while the admiral was instructed not to relinquish possession of any conquered French territory until indemnification was negotiated. Artois’s declaration “on my word as gentleman, there will never be any rivalry between us” failed to give the Court of St James the desired guarantees.⁵² As Grenville told Lord Malmesbury, the princes were not allies but instruments for achieving Britain’s objectives. It is hardly surprising then that Pitt and Grenville, in private émigrés’ correspondence, were seen as politicians following a Machiavellian scheme designed to weaken France.⁵³ As a result of these failures, by 1795 the princes’ hopes of success in France were faltering.

Yet the émigrés' military failures, the Quibéron fiasco included, were not as much the result of their policies as an evident general lack of support. London detained General Puisaye for too long while considering his Quibéron proposal, wasting valuable time and causing the Royalist forces to disperse in February 1795. Moreover, George III himself led the European example by refusing to allow a depot of émigré recruits to be formed in Hanover, and would only consent to Artois's presence in England if short and *incognito*.⁵⁴ Writing to Grenville, George III noted that even Artois's presence in George's German dominions was not less improper than his being in England."⁵⁵ The King added that, should Artois not be sent to the Vendée, he should join Provence in Italy. For their part, while the émigrés kept asking London for military and financial support, they also blamed Britain for their failures. It was British "meddling" that caused the Quibéron fiasco and put an end to all the insurrectionary schemes in France, not Artois's indecision, reluctance to join the forces, lack of military expertise, or developments within France herself.⁵⁶

Reluctant Reliance

Although Grenville had become convinced that Provence was the rightful choice for the restoration, he withheld such acknowledgment until the Pretender issued some declaration of forgiveness and showed a desire to unite all factions.⁵⁷ Yet as we have seen, Provence did himself the greatest disservice by issuing the Declaration of Verona, which Grenville found to be unacceptable since its vengeful tone of linking the Revolution to the 'hydra-head of anarchy' drove people into the arms of the Republic.⁵⁸

Having the Verona Declaration poorly received in France and around Europe, and being pushed aside by other rulers who were contemplating new relations with republican France, forced Provence, who liked to think of himself as another Henri IV, “fated to overcome adversity and pacify his kingdom,”⁵⁹ to seek closer ties with Britain. Provence and Artois took the necessary steps to place themselves closer to George III. In a letter sent via the duc d’Harcourt, the princes went as far as to “put themselves entirely in His Majesty’s hands, leaving to him the direction of their conduct.”⁶⁰ The princes’ plan formulated at Blankenburg thus was to sell London a restoration scheme, but bring it about through measures that would leave its operation free from British interference.⁶¹

London however could not sanction the Pretender’s policies, especially those requiring British financial and military aid to be sent to various French destinations. For Grenville, as Paris was in control of French affairs, it was much more important to come to an agreement with royalists there. Thus, the largest portion of British assistance was to be directed to the capital rather than to regions that had already been counter-revolutionary. The remainder of that assistance could be given to royalist leaders in the west such as Puisaye and de Frotté.⁶² In contrast to Grenville, Windham supported the Bourbons and felt that the abandonment of royalists in Western France in favour of moderates in Paris and London was a waste of time and resources.⁶³

Assets and Liabilities

Despite the need for mutual cooperation, animosity and mistrust plagued Anglo-émigré relations. On 13 January 1795 Lord Robert Stephen Fitzgerald, Britain’s *Chargé d’Affaires* in Switzerland, expressed his relief at being replaced by William Wickham.⁶⁴ A memoir from Mallet du Pan indicated that the readiness of Thermidorian officials to

negotiate for the purpose of establishing a more stable regime was the reason behind dispatching Wickham to Switzerland towards the end of 1794.⁶⁵ Fitzgerald wrote that his replacement should be fully on his guard against the émigrés. Mounier,⁶⁶ in particular, received the brunt of his ire as “a man in no manner to be trusted, full of pride and deceit, abominated by the Swiss [and] a friend of England only in as far as he, like all his countrymen, considers that as necessary to his personal advantage and secret views.”⁶⁷ Fitzgerald added that the French were a “‘second race on earth’ where there are ‘men and Frenchmen,’ and there can hardly be any distinction between the ‘monsters’ who were exiled and those who remained in France.”⁶⁸

Despite this animosity, Wickham proceeded to establish contact with royalists and *monarchiens* alike. Yet Wickham’s mission, and his contact with Mallet and Mounier, were kept in strict secrecy, as the knowledge that Britain funded constitutionalists or moderates would have caused uproar among ultras and their supporters alike, especially as both blamed the revolutionaries of 1789 for destroying France.⁶⁹ British support of constitutional views, however, was in line with London’s official attitude towards any proposed restoration.

Wickham reported that foreign powers could not affect a counter-revolution in France, since the country was not ready. More importantly, he found that “even amongst the Royalists, there [was] a decided Aversion to His Royal Highness *Monsieur*.”⁷⁰ Fearing that French royalists might turn to Orléans, Wickham hoped that George III had “sufficient influence with the French King and Princes to induce them to relax somewhat of their pretensions – and particularly to recede from the declaration of Verona.”⁷¹ That

being said, the British envoy acknowledged that the émigrés were, and probably would continue to be, incorrigible, but:

some allowances ought to be made them, in consideration of the wretched State of existence in which they have passed these last five years, the mortifying disappointments they have so often experienced, and the *insulting* and humiliating manner in which they have generally been treated by almost every Court and people excepting our own – and we ought to consider them with a greater degree of Charity as Persons really at this moment *not themselves*, and wholly incapable of moderating their own Language and Conduct.⁷²

However, despite the efforts made to unite the émigrés and work with royalists in Paris, no results were achieved, especially when it became apparent that no negotiations were initiated between the *monarchiens* in London and constitutional groups in Paris. With no real plea for cooperation coming from Paris, and convinced that ultra-royalists were the Robespierres and Marats of emigration, the *monarchiens* were helpless observers who had no effect on French or British politics. They did however keep alive a strong note of dissent among émigré ranks by advocating that, since the allied forces of Europe were no more able to defeat France than were the émigrés, compromise with the Revolution was the only option.⁷³ Meanwhile, ultras continued to believe that ‘*les classes inférieures*’ possessed neither political will nor initiative, which only emphasized their lack of appreciation and understanding of what the popular classes wanted.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, that Mallet and Malouet failed to achieve tangible results discredited them, and Malouet was to have no more dealings with the British government other than negotiating the colonial affairs of Santo Domingo.⁷⁵

Wickham too became convinced that the allies had to alter their strategies and accept working with the Directory in an effort to achieve long-term results within France. He insisted that the counter-revolution’s most difficult task was convincing the French

Pretender and ultras alike that royalism as a vibrant force in France was an illusion and that fundamental change in their strategy was required. Such a change necessitated abandoning the efforts to undermine the Republic by working to achieve change through legal means. The exiled court had to accept that any restored monarchy must be, at least in the short term, a constitutional one. Should they fail to comply, Wickham advised the British government to abandon the ultras and pursue a more ‘conciliatory’ policy without them.⁷⁶ Writing to Grenville, Wickham despaired of the way the émigré princes behaved:

The conduct of the French Princes, the Ministers, and agents affects me and afflicts me more than all the rest; when one has seen them so nearly, and so much behind the curtain as I have done, one is really tempted to believe that God has willed this tremendous revolution among other purposes for *their* particular corrections a national example, and that it will not be terminated until they and their wretched system shall have in great measure disappeared... It is neither sense, ability, knowledge (excepting knowledge of the Revolution) that is wanting, and yet they do precisely every thing that they ought not to do.⁷⁷

The émigré court, presented with the option of an alliance with Paris deputies with royalist sentiments, greeted their offers with blank rejection. This rejection baffled the Foreign Office, given the princes’ dire situation and belief that the deputies in Paris were genuine in their wish to restore the monarchy.⁷⁸ That the exiled court was reluctant to accept that such a measure would benefit their cause only created a sense of unease on the British side. Hence Grenville agreed that the princes should welcome with ‘genuine magnanimity’ the men who were eager to turn away from republican France.⁷⁹ Likewise, Pitt proposed that, instead of antagonizing the Pretender, the British government should be willing to offer asylum and rewards to deputies who felt threatened should they agree to the restoration. More importantly, Pitt suggested that rewards and amnesty should be

made part of the conditions placed before Provence to ensure future co-operation from the British government.⁸⁰

Indemnification

After Britain joined the war, it became obvious that, other than waiting for internal strife and bankruptcy to destroy the Revolution, something had to be done. As more than sixty departments were rebelling against the National Convention in 1793, Britain did not demur against the prospect of dismembering France among the allies in the form of indemnifications. This was one of the reasons why Britain refused to recognize Provence as Regent for the minor Louis XVII.⁸¹ George III wrote “the war being once begun, the expense already entertained, France must be greatly circumscribed before we talk of any means of treating with that dangerous and faithless nation.”⁸² After the occupation of Toulon, Buckingham wrote to Grenville that the French in general, the émigrés included, should get used to the idea of indemnity and that the “prospect of losing slices in the Pays Bas, Lorrain, or even Piedmont should become more familiar to their ears.”⁸³

Knowing that indemnification was required, Artois accepted the eventuality of reparation and offered the Ile-de-France and the Ile-de-Bourbon[§] in return for British assistance. Initially however, London was not prepared to deal with the princes as an authority capable of negotiating on behalf of France. London’s refusal to do so, along with the suspicion that her aim was the Caribbean islands, made the princes wary and added to the émigrés’ conviction that Britain supported France’s dismemberment. They rightfully wondered if they should trust that Britain was not after France’s prized colonial

[§] Modern-day islands of Mauritius and Réunion.

possessions when a deal to land British troops in St Domingo, whose terms were withheld from them, was negotiated with the *monarchien* Malouet. Also, how could they trust that, should the British have a successful landing in Dunkirk, it was not to become another British base, as had happened with Calais during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries?⁸⁴ Therefore, while Britain was willing to consider relations with the Republic, the émigrés refused to commit to any indemnity other than what Artois offered, believing instead that, in fighting France, the benefit gained by foreign powers was stopping the Revolution from reaching their doors, rather than increasing their colonial or continental possessions.⁸⁵

Ignoring the émigrés' position on indemnification, the allies, with Britain's encouragement, looked at seizing parts of France: Austria wanted Alsace, Lorraine and Flanders; Sardinia wanted parts of Provence; and Spain was offered parts of the southwest. Britain saved for herself the French colonial empire under the pretext that London did not want to divide the country. However, it quickly became clear that demanding territorial indemnities from France was not going to achieve any stable peace settlement, as no French ruler would accept such humiliating terms.⁸⁶

Peace?

As has been noted, after the fall of the monarchy, and despite the concern for the fate of the Royal family, Britain remained committed to neutrality regarding French affairs. Pitt was even prepared to acknowledge the Republic to achieve his ends: peace meant commercial prosperity.⁸⁷ Following Thermidor, hopes were revived of a possible settlement with Paris. For Grenville, negotiation with the Thermidorian leadership was feasible because, unlike Robespierre, and with few exceptions, they were men for whom

survival was more important than principle. That the *constitutionnels* were believed to be in contact with Paris with the purpose of establishing a monarchist, conservative government appeared possible, as did the prospect of peace.⁸⁸

By 1796-7, the will to fight was seriously undermined. War had been going on for almost four years without any tangible victories, and worse still, the country had plunged into a financial crisis. The navy was in mutiny, republican France had attempted to invade Ireland, and Austria had been defeated by Napoleon. Facing France alone, the government grew gradually uneasy about the bitter opposition in both Houses to the government's counter-subversion measures.⁸⁹ Proposed peace negotiations with the Republic thus had a dual purpose: to appease a British public that was increasingly hostile to continuing the war, and to demonstrate that it was France's intention to continue her aggression by rejecting Britain's reasonable terms.⁹⁰ France's émigrés were horrified that Britain appeared willing to abandon their cause and were relieved when Lord Malmesbury's peace mission failed. Burke joyfully wrote, "this mongrel has been whipped back to the kennel with his tail between his legs."⁹¹

As we have seen, even if the British government had gone to war for geo-strategic rather than ideological reasons, by 1794 Grenville was of the opinion that the monarchy had to be restored in France. The émigrés were to wait two more decades for that to become a reality. In the meantime, the death of imprisoned Louis XVII in 1795 was a blow to restoration possibilities, especially for constitutionalists who hoped to crown the young king on modified principles of 1791. By his actions after the emigration and his declarations against the Revolution, the Pretender did nothing to earn the esteem of his

countrymen.⁹² Moreover, the failure of his policies ensured that many royalists refused to serve his court and chose to return to France.⁹³

By 1796 Provence started to have a change of heart about including ‘moderate’ royalists in his circle. This change was due to several factors: the French Republic appeared more secure in its hold on internal affairs; Prussia had withdrawn from the coalition; and the émigrés’ hope to restore the Bourbons through war was fading. In addition, the British government’s pessimism about the restoration had reinforced émigré anxieties, while the inflexibility of ultra-royalists was becoming increasingly damaging to the moderates’ cause. Finally, the exiled princes feared that royalists in France might negotiate a compromise between the Directory and the Orleanist faction – or even a Spanish claimant – and thus create a “bastard monarchy.”⁹⁴

The exiled court was thus forced to adjust its attitudes towards constitutional options, cooperation with moderate royalists, and working with the allies, particularly, Britain. Provence accepted, however reluctantly and however much to the horror of Artois, the necessity of including moderate constitutionals and even republicans in an overall plan to defeat the Directory; this was already a concession and a major departure from his Hamm** and Verona declarations.⁹⁵ Provence calculated that the addition of previously ignored men like Cazalès, with their contacts in London, would benefit the Bourbon cause. Royalists inside France such as the abbé Brottier, leader of the ultra-royalist group *Agents de Roi* in Paris, and the comte de Puisaye, of the *Agence de Bretagne*, also advised the émigré king to form an alliance with the royalists of 1789.⁹⁶

** Provence’s first declaration following the death of Louis XVI. It was issued from Hamm Prussia, on 28 January 1793. Provence recognized Louis’s son as Louis XVII and declared himself regent of the prisoner in the Temple. He also reaffirmed that should the counter-revolution be victorious, he would bring about a return to the ancien régime. Jacques Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution: Doctrine and Action, 1789-1804*, translated by Salvator Attanasio (New York: H. Fertig, 1971), 168.

Nonetheless, it was largely due to the pressure of the British that the Pretender eventually came to accept the need for moderation, and even lent it minimal support.⁹⁷ Despite this change, Provence's experience in exile did not improve, especially after Napoleon came to power. The Bourbon prince was forced to move around Europe until he settled in England in 1807, during which time Napoleon's dominance on the continent increased, especially after his alliance through marriage with Austria. Provence's woes were due to the deaths of his wife and of his close friend, d'Avaray, losing the émigrés' support as their numbers dwindled, and the initial animosity he encountered from the British government upon arrival. By 1811 he appeared resigned to being in England for a long time; he even looked for a long-term lease of Hartwell House. This initiative, although a simple gesture, was considered a sign of defeatism during the years of exile.⁹⁸

During the years of emigration and counterrevolution, Anglo-Émigré relations, particularly those with the exiled Bourbons, suffered many setbacks. What does analysis of these difficulties establish? First, the differences among the émigré groups provided the British government with options as to with whom they should cooperate. Secondly, cooperation with none of them secured British objectives prior to 1814. Finally, British willingness to cooperate with constitutionals and moderates forced certain former ultras, particularly Provence, to reconsider their policies. Thus, whether they wanted to or not, politicians on both sides had to adjust their views of one another with the hope of creating a better anti-revolutionary alliance. While this chapter has looked at conflict in Anglo-Émigré relations, the following will focus on their points of cooperation and on the very close contact between Émigré France and Britain.

¹ Fryer, *Republic or Restoration*, 3.

- ² Maurice Hutt, "The Myth of 'Perfidious Albion,'" in *Franco-British Studies: Journal of the British Institute in Paris*, ed. Christophe Campos, vol. 2 (1986): 4-5.
- ³ Black, "Anglo-French Relations," 427.
- ⁴ Talleyrand was among the unaccredited agents sent to confirm Britain's neutrality. He was recommended to Grenville as a deputy "well versed in the various political relations of France, especially those which she has with England." The dispatch also mentions that Talleyrand was in London of his personal concern and not in a diplomatic or official capacity. NA, FO 95/99, dispatch # 3, M. de Lessart to Grenville 12 January 1792, fos. 42-3. See also, Black, "Anglo-French Relations," 427.
- ⁵ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 108-9.
- ⁶ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 117.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 117.
- ⁸ Entry of 11 January 1795 in George Canning 1770-1827, *The letter-journal of George Canning, 1793-1795*, edited and introduced by Peter Jupp (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1991), 184.
- ⁹ Doyle, *History of the French Revolution*, 296-97. See also, Fryer, *Republic or Restoration*, 12.
- ¹⁰ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, II, 527-8.
- ¹¹ Dundas to Grenville, 13 September 1792, *Dropmore Papers*, II, 314. George III had already instructed Grenville along the same lines to "present none at Court but such whose characters are known, or are brought by some person who can answer for them." 5 October 1792 in *ibid.*, 320.
- ¹² Auckland to Grenville, 8 December 1792. *Ibid.*, 353.
- ¹³ Auckland to Grenville, 14 December 1792. *Ibid.*, 357-8.
- ¹⁴ Wilkinson, "French Émigrés," 28-29.
- ¹⁵ Harsanyi *Lessons from America*, 50 and 53.
- ¹⁶ Mori, "The Occupation of Toulon, 1793," 709.
- ¹⁷ The princes' letter said *Pour éviter que leur affluence dans les mêmes lieux ne puisse paraître incommode aux sujets de votre Majesté, Nous la prions de régler elle même les lieux ou les Émigrés pourront se retirer et dans quel nombre ils pourront être admis dans chaque Ville, Bourg, ou Village... Cette Mesure pourra servir en même temps, à maintenir l'ordre et à prévenir ce qui pourrait déplaire à Votre Majesté.* December 1792, in FO 90/17, *King's Letter Books* fos.112-3.
- ¹⁸ Jasanoff, "Revolutionary Exiles," 48, See also, Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 19.
- ¹⁹ Carpenter, *Refugees* 36-38, and Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 19.
- ²⁰ Dundas made it known that a position was open for a person with excellent knowledge of French language, political factions and proper *politesse* - conditions all filled by Huskisson. Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 22-23. See also, Michael Durey, "William Wickham, the Christ Church Connection and the Rise and Fall of the Security Service in Britain, 1793-1801," *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 121 No. 492 (June, 2006): 726.
- ²¹ Among those put under surveillance were Governor Morris, the Spanish and Russian ambassadors and the Duc d'Orléans. In Durey, *William Wickham*, 31 and 33.
- ²² Alexandre de Lameth had to resettle in Hamburg, after being expelled from London as a potential troublemaker. Doina Pasca Harsanyi, "The memoirs of Lameth and the Reconciliation of Nobility and Revolution." 279-302. From *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century*, editor Jay M. Smith (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2006), 284.
- ²³ No mention was made of any women being deported. See Wilkinson, "French Émigrés," 420.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 393 and 396.
- ²⁵ BL, Add 59037, Lally-Tolendal to Grenville, late January or early February 1793. f.13. See also Roberta J Forsberg, *Madame de Staël and the English*, (New York: Astra Books, 1967), 11.
- ²⁶ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, II, 579.
- ²⁷ George III to Grenville, 25 January 1795, *Dropmore Papers*, III, 12.
- ²⁸ Michael Duffy, "War, Revolutions and the Crisis of the British Empire" in Mark Philp, ed., *The French Revolution and British Popular Politics* (Cambridge: University Press, 1991): 118-19.
- ²⁹ Mori, "The Occupation of Toulon, 1793," 704.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 705-6.
- ³¹ Mori, *Britain in the Age of the French Revolution*, 202.
- ³² Mori, "The Occupation of Toulon, 1793," 701.

- ³³ Pitt to Grenville, 5 October 1793, *Dropmore Papers*, II, 438–9. See also J. P. W. Ehrman and Smith, ‘Pitt, William (1759–1806)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/view/article/22338, accessed 21 Feb 2013].
- ³⁴ Ehrman and Anthony Smith, ‘Pitt, William (1759–1806)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
- ³⁵ Mori, “The Occupation of Toulon, 1793,” 707.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 701.
- ³⁷ Toulon leaders surrendered to the British more because they feared the Convention’s vengeance than because they wished the return of the ancien régime. Doyle, *History of the French Revolution*, 309.
- ³⁸ Mori, *William Pitt*, 159.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 161–163.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 162.
- ⁴¹ Hutt, “Perfidious Albion,” 9.
- ⁴² Malmesbury was on the continent negotiating an anti-French coalition with Prussia. Grenville to Lord Malmesbury, 9 December 1793, *Dropmore Papers*, II, 476. See also Scott, “Malmesbury.”
- ⁴³ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 113.
- ⁴⁴ Hutt, “Perfidious Albion,” 12.
- ⁴⁵ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 110.
- ⁴⁶ Hutt, “Perfidious Albion,” 9.
- ⁴⁷ Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 181.
- ⁴⁸ J. Debrett, ed., *The parliamentary register, or, History of the proceedings and debates of the House of Commons*, 112 vols. (1775–1813), 35, 675. From J. P. W. Ehrman, Anthony Smith, ‘Pitt, William (1759–1806)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/view/article/22338, accessed 21 Feb 2013]. 26
- ⁴⁹ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 106.
- ⁵⁰ Beach, *Charles X*, 77.
- ⁵¹ Even though Commander Warren urged the return to France and promised to wait should problems arise, Artois insisted that the British government had ordered him to abandon the mission and he returned to England. In *ibid.*, 84–87.
- ⁵² Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 118.
- ⁵³ *Correspondance intime du Comte de Vaudreuil*, I, 315.
- ⁵⁴ *Dropmore Papers*, III, xxxii. See also the letter from George III to Grenville, 2 August 1794, in *ibid.*, II, 609.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, George III to Grenville, 12 June 1795, III, 77–78.
- ⁵⁶ Beach, *Charles X*, 103.
- ⁵⁷ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 158–59.
- ⁵⁸ Durey, *William Wickham*, 63. See also, Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 128 and Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 95–6.
- ⁵⁹ Beik, “The French Revolution,” 91.
- ⁶⁰ Quoted from NA FO 27/45, 10 July 1795. In Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 58. Indeed George III had previously commented on this issue in a letter to Grenville saying: “I return to Lord Grenville the letters of the two French Princes, which are too clearly expressed to require any comment from me. If Edinburg could be hinted as the best place of education for them and equally under the protection applied for, I should think much inconvenience would be avoided.” 30 March 93. *Dropmore Papers*, II, 388.
- ⁶¹ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, II, 529.
- ⁶² BL, Add 37846, Grenville to Windham on 5 February 1797, f 53.
- ⁶³ William Windham, *The Windham papers: the life & correspondence of the Rt. Hon. William Windham: 1750–1810*. Introduction by the Earl of Rosebery (London: Herbert Jenkins Ltd., 1913), II, 66–67.
- ⁶⁴ Before being sent to Switzerland, Wickham was initially given the task of managing complaints about the suspicious activities of the émigré population. Despite the Act’s list of rules, Wickham complained in 1794 that in a twelve-month period, ‘scarcely any’ aliens reported where they had settled, as was required. In Durey, “William Wickham,” 734.
- ⁶⁵ The mémoire of Mallet du Pan was sent to the Foreign Office on 22 September 1794. Durey, *William Wickham*, 48.
- ⁶⁶ Grenville had written earlier that he had “reason to believe M. de Mounier may be by his talents and character, by the influence he formerly possessed in his own province, and by that which he has acquired

during his residence in Switzerland of considerable use to you, and employ himself much to the advantage of the King's service, which I have induced him to consent to engage himself in that view... I need not mention his character to you, since he avowedly stands among the first in that respect who have taken any part in the French affairs since the commencement of the Revolution. His employment is of course to be quite of a private nature...if affairs go on well, he may be of material advantage in the arrangement of affairs in France." In Grenville to Lord Robert Stephen Fitzgerald, 26 September 1793. In *Dropmore Papers*, II, 427.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* III, 6-7.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* III, 6-7.

⁶⁹ Durey, *William Wickham*, 36.

⁷⁰ Trevor to Wickham, 26 May 1795, in *The Correspondence of the Right Hon. William Wickham. From the Year 1794*. Edited, with notes, by his grandson W. Wickham. (London, 1870), I, 58.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, I, 417.

⁷² *Ibid.*, I, 204.

⁷³ Beik, "The French Revolution," 95.

⁷⁴ Indeed d'Antraigue's seventy-eight dispatches offer no other motivation than hunger as the source of constant discontent. See Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality," 246-250.

⁷⁵ Mallet called for unity among the émigrés while heaping praise on the *monarchiens* only. See Robert Howell Griffiths, "Pierre-Victor Malouet," 322-23.

⁷⁶ Durey, *William Wickham*, 89.

⁷⁷ Wickham to Grenville, 19 July 1796. In *Dropmore Papers*, III, 223.

⁷⁸ Fryer, *Republic or Restoration*, 115.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁸⁰ Pitt also suggested placing the duc d'Angoulême under the tutelage of General Moira to keep him away from Ultras' influence and installing him at Hampton Court along with the Prince of Orange if space allowed. Pitt to Grenville, 29 August 1795. In *Dropmore Papers*, III, 129.

⁸¹ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 30-31.

⁸² George III to Grenville, 27 April 1793. In *Dropmore Papers*, II, 393.

⁸³ Marquess of Buckingham to Grenville, 29 September 1793. In *Dropmore Papers*, II, 433.

⁸⁴ The offer was sent to Grenville in May 1793. In Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 109-10.

⁸⁵ Mori, "The Occupation of Toulon, 1793," 704.

⁸⁶ Duffy, "British Policy," 20.

⁸⁷ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 26-7.

⁸⁸ Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality," 243-4.

⁸⁹ Duffy, "Control of British Foreign Policy," 163. See also, Marianne Elliott, "French Subversion of Britain in the French Revolution," in Colin Jones, ed. *Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion and Propaganda* (Exeter, UK: University Press, 1983): 46.

⁹⁰ Duffy, "British Policy," 21.

⁹¹ Quoted from Add. MS 37843 f.125, In Windham, *The Windham papers*, 34

⁹² Fryer, *Republic or Restoration*, 11.

⁹³ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 129.

⁹⁴ Rice, "The Political Career Cazalès," 360-2.

⁹⁵ "The Political Career Cazalès," 376.

⁹⁶ Rice, "The Political Career Cazalès," 362 and 421.

⁹⁷ Fryer, *Republic or Restoration*, 24-25.

⁹⁸ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 154-6. See also, Jean Vidalenc, *Les Émigrés Français, 1789-1825* (Association des publications de la Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l'Université de Caen, 1963), 390.

Chapter IV:
Diplomacy in Harmony

In his article about political culture in pre-Revolutionary France, Julian Swann says that royal power involved more than just the rulers' ability to command obedience; it was also about perception.¹ When considering the fortunes of the exiled Bourbons, one could argue that this statement remained valid despite the Revolution, regicide and years of emigration. It was, after all, the perception among ardent royalists and their British supporters that Bourbon princes, as France's most 'legitimate' choice, were the ones capable of commanding French loyalty in the event of a restoration. As Provence wallowed in exile and was forced to move around Europe, though diminished, this perception did not disappear.

As we have seen, during the early 1790s Britain became a *bête noire* for French royalists. Ultras were angered by Britain's unwillingness to work with 'true' royalists on the one hand, and by Britain's choosing to negotiate with *constitutionnels* on the other. They believed British attitudes to be formulated especially to weaken France permanently. For the ultras, a constitutional monarchy in France was doomed to be incapable of exerting international influence.² This belief found resonance even among émigrés who did not subscribe to ultra-royalist ideals.

Between 1793 and 1795, London issued contradictory statements regarding the war with France. Initially, Pitt's cabinet maintained that the war was one of principle, while concurrently indicating that the existence of the Republic itself was not the obstacle to peace. In January 1794 the ministry declared that the restoration of France's monarchy was its objective, and by December 1795 London had announced its willingness to receive overtures of peace from Paris.³ Yet despite the émigrés' suspicions and the

apparent lack of direction on Britain's part, émigré France drew closer to, and found support in, the British Isles.

While everything about British foreign policy between 1787 and 1792 indicated a lack of enthusiasm for the return of the Bourbons, and the intransigence of early émigrés made them less attractive to British policy-makers, the failure of a stable government to emerge in France was one of the main reasons why Britain decided to support the counter-revolution and back the émigrés.⁴ For their part, Provence and Artois worked to convince European rulers, and the British in particular, that they were the best option to ensure a peaceful settlement on the continent after years of turmoil. The Bourbon court continued to command loyalty, albeit of a smaller following, and more importantly, continued to promote its cause as one with European-wide implications.⁵

In this context, the émigrés' time and connections in Britain were important to keeping this cause alive. Social and political connections established during the emigration played a vital role in shoring up support for the French exiles and ensuring that when the Napoleonic Empire came to an end, Provence was waiting in the wings to be proclaimed Louis XVIII. Indeed, Britain's change of attitude towards the French dates from the émigrés' prolonged stay in England.⁶

As the previous chapters have shown, both emigrants and hosts were often wary of one another, and mutual suspicion did not ease even during times of cordiality. Yet, the Bourbon Restoration was largely due to British support and patronage. Hence, while the previous chapters looked at divisions, this one will focus on points of cooperation. Particular attention will be given to policy makers such as Grenville, Windham,

Castlereagh and Wellington, who effected a diplomatic shift that ultimately made Britain the Bourbons' staunchest supporter.

Even though, on paper at least, anti-émigré laws remained punitive until Napoleon closed the émigré lists in March 1800, many émigrés began to return home following the fall of Robespierre and the end of the Terror in 1794. Prior to 1800, Directory officials adopted a conciliatory attitude, and for the most part turned a blind eye to émigré returns.⁷ The amnesties of 1800 and 1802 then offered the first legal opportunities for dispersed families throughout Europe to return and assess the damage to their properties. Politically, the amnesties also served to detach the émigrés from their hosts – Napoleon's enemies – and to deprive the exiled Bourbons of a base of legitimacy.⁸ These returns weakened the cause of the emigrant court, especially since many émigrés who opposed the Republic, including liberal and constitutional monarchists, found working within the Napoleonic state not only possible but advantageous.⁹ Convincing men like Alexandre de Lameth, Lally-Tolendal and Malouet that, in serving the Empire, they could find fulfillment for both their revolutionary and aristocratic identities, was one of Napoleon's masterful strokes.¹⁰

The Shift?

As we have seen, Britain's attitude towards Revolutionary France changed from neutrality to animosity in 1793. Following the execution of Louis XVI, Pitt declared that the regicide was "the foulest and most atrocious deed which the history of the world has yet had the occasion to attest."¹¹ This rhetoric coincided with that of British conservatives who believed that "France stood for revolution, murder and anarchy," and that Britain

might be heading in a similar direction.¹² Yet as we also have seen, despite the vehemence of Pitt's declarations, Britain was willing to contemplate peace with the French Republic provided that British interests remained secure.¹³ Nonetheless, even while Britain extended France an olive branch in 1797, and again in 1801, support for the exiled monarchy, though weak at times, did not vanish.

As war on the continent continued, British experience with counter-revolutionaries and their failures to achieve tangible results in France left London leery of whom to trust. John Trevor* wrote, "they all wish to get our money, they all affect to load us with compliments... they flatter us with plans of counter-revolution... but I am afraid the fact is that however they hate one another, they all in the bottom detest us."¹⁴ Moreover, despite the work of Pitt and Grenville with *monarchiens* and moderate royalists, Walter Fryer argues that the British government did not intend to follow their recommendations. Indeed, he found Grenville's communication with them to be a veneer behind which London hid her real aims, which were much closer to those of ultra-royalism and often showed distinct partiality to the exiled Bourbon court. Evidence of this could be seen when Provence ascended his "paper throne;"¹⁵ the British government sent Lord MacArtney to his court and addressed the prince, even though French royalists doubted his restoration as "King of France."¹⁶ Lord MacArtney found the Pretender, when unhampered by the prejudices, reaction and inconsistencies of his advisors, to be communicative, intelligent, informed and sensible; eventually, such views helped alter London's opinion of Provence.¹⁷

By 1797 the British cabinet was again divided due to a deep financial crisis, domestic unrest and naval mutiny. Pitt wanted peace with France while George III and

* Britain's envoy to Piedmont.

Grenville were in opposition. Pitt, however, was able to gain the King's acquiescence.¹⁸ Although London was hopeful about the prospects of peace with the Directory, upon his meeting the French representative Charles Delacroix, Lord Malmesbury discovered that France had no intention of ceding any of its European conquests.¹⁹ Thus, as neither country was willing to consider the other's demands, the peace mission of Lord Malmesbury proved fruitless. Following Austria's peace settlement at Campo Formio in 1797, Britain was left alone with the knowledge that France intended to attack England, Ireland or both. Much to the émigrés' relief, the British cabinet's only option was to continue the war, but how was another issue.²⁰

With the fate of the Directory hanging in the balance in 1799, opinion seemed to favour a constitutional monarchy, and several options were proposed for its head. In French circles, the choices seemed to favour Orléans, the successful revolutionary general with legitimate connection to Louis XVI. Even where the Bourbons appeared the favourites, many preferred the Duc d'Angoulême to Louis XVIII.²¹ Royalists believed that once Bonaparte was in power he would recall the Bourbons and become a Lieutenant-General of the king's armies, a condition under which it was believed that Bonaparte had secured British agreement to leaving Egypt. Optimistically, they hailed the *coup de Brumaire* (8 November 1799) as a good change.²² However Napoleon's ambitions destroyed such hopes, especially after he replied to Provence's overture by saying that should the latter return, it would to be over 500,000 bodies.²³

With the advent of the Consulate, the British cabinet was unanimous on the need to continue the war against France until stable monarchical government was established. Once more however, that the ministers were united on this goal did not mean a unity of

strategy. It was then that Grenville began to declare – albeit privately – that the Bourbon restoration “*should* become the object of the Coalition’s military strategy.”²⁴ Bonaparte’s victories ensured that Britain’s relations with the Bourbons and the émigrés remaining on the isles were strengthened. Artois and his entourage, after being confined in Scotland for his debts, moved to London, where they visited with their courtiers as well as the elite of British society, including the Prince of Wales, the Duke and Duchess of York and the Duchess of Devonshire, all of whom sympathized with the emigrants.²⁵ Nevertheless, French victories, Napoleon’s execution of the Duke of Enghien and the achievements of the Consulate, and later of the Empire, made any hope of restoration seem dismal indeed.

From *Brumaire* until about 1810, loyalism to the Bourbons continued to lose ground in France. The ancien régime principles of social order and authority, which had been threatened by the Revolution and the Republic, had been re-established under Napoleon. Indeed, it had not been the first time, as Guillaume de Sauvigny argues, that a ‘worn-out dynasty’ was replaced by another in French history. The difference between ‘usurpation and legitimacy’ was only a matter of time.²⁶

In the meantime, while the Peace of Amiens provided a momentary respite from war, the British government readied itself for another clash with France. With Austerlitz, Jena and Tilsit, the eighteen months following December 1805 were dangerous for the increasingly isolated British. The Ministry of All Talents started devising new plans to weaken Napoleon, and British hopes for a strong ally settled once more on the émigrés. General Puisaye, for example, was once more asked to join Windham’s war council and to formulate plans for restoring connections with royalists in the French interior.²⁷ After Pitt’s death in January 1806, Prime Minister Grenville’s priorities were to secure the land

and sea routes to India, prevent Spanish South American colonies from falling under Napoleon's control and keep alive "the belief that there could still be a royalist coup in Paris."²⁸ Conviction that peace with the Empire was not possible continued to drive London's diverse war plans until Napoleon's final defeat in 1815.

While the realities of war forced London to accept the inclusion of French emigrants in war plans, a shift in policy also occurred in émigré circles. As most of the émigrés returned to France, Provence, from his courts at Blankenburg, Mittau and later Hartwell, had to strengthen remaining ties with the opponents of the French regime. Although he was slow to change policies regarding moderate royalists, he was more open to including them than was Artois. Indeed, the exiled court by 1797 was gradually easing its rigid views and considering working with moderate royalists and *monarchiens* towards achieving a restoration through 'legal' means. This was especially the case after the émigré court began to fear British 'defeatism' following the Directory's anti-royalist coup of 18 Fructidor, year V – 4 September 1797.²⁹ It was around this time that Provence decided to invite the previously shunned Cazalès to join his court.

Cazalès was a friend of Burke, Liverpool, Charles James Fox, Portland and Windham and was begrudgingly admired by Pitt and Grenville. More importantly, he was among the men Provence used to keep Britain committed to the seemingly lost cause of helping the émigrés.³⁰ Cazalès's influence on Wickham and Windham played an important role in securing British funds and support for royalist 'underground' efforts, and according to a friend, "Cazalès was more influential with the English than even the famous Talleyrand."³¹ By including Cazalès in his circle, Provence demonstrated a willingness to appease Britain, even against his own wishes. The Pretender not only

agreed to include a ‘sullied’ royalist, but was also forced to back down on his decision to appoint Cazalès as his ambassador to the Court of St James when Grenville showed a distinct preference to keep working with the Duc d’Harcourt.³²

Although it is difficult to ascertain to what degree the addition of Cazalès to the Pretender’s circle influenced any change of policy, Provence’s need to appear more moderate made such inclusion a symbol of cooperation. Provence “needed to demonstrate his ‘conversion,’ and he required a representative in England who held the respect of the British ministry.”³³ In contrast, Artois’s policies remained intransigent. Convinced that revolutionaries, republicans, *monarchiens* and moderate royalists were not real Frenchmen, he believed that faithful subjects never lost hope of restoring the monarchy.³⁴

However, before proceeding to examine the results of Provence’s political shift, it is instructive to consider further the elements and personalities of this diplomatic connection.

Agents of Support

From its inception, the emigration found enthusiastic supporters among Britain’s political elite; chief among them was Edmund Burke. Burke, who saw the princes’ cause at Coblenz as that of all ‘civilization,’ advocated counter-revolutionary policy as early as 1790 and worked closely with John Wilmot and the émigré relief committees.³⁵ Burke was a great ally to the French exiles: he received requests for help with army and navy commissions; secured passages to the West Indies, settled some émigrés on his land in Canada, and even provided advice on how not to offend the English people. His impassioned appeal on behalf of the French clergy solicited a contribution of £750 from

Pope Pius VI. Finally, under his patronage, Penn School was opened in 1796 for the education of orphaned boys whose fathers had perished in the Quibéron disaster.³⁶

After Burke, the émigrés' most consistent supporter was Britain's Secretary of War, William Windham.[†] Essentially a Burkite and an anti-Jacobin, Windham proved very helpful during the difficult years, not only by being the émigrés' main point of contact, but often by offering small tokens of assistance and encouragement.³⁷ After the execution of Louis XVI, Windham frequently warned Pitt that Britain's refusal to recognize Louis XVII as king or Provence as regent was seen as a direct affront to the Bourbon cause and as a means to prevent the princes from taking control of the insurgency in France's west.³⁸ While Pitt regarded the war as an evil necessity and did not particularly care for the Bourbons, for Windham the war was a 'crusade' to exterminate the Revolution and restore France's rightful rulers.³⁹

As British support for French royalists in the west faded, Windham repeatedly complained that his government did not follow up on its obligations and that it did not show much interest in the royalists' success. 'Nobody,' according to him, took the trouble to understand their affairs and no one willingly heard any mention of them.⁴⁰ The minister's support did not waver, even during the periods when Britain sought peace with France. Referring to the Malmesbury mission in 1796 as the 'despicable embassy', and regarding any peace made with the Republic as a stain on Britain's honour, he continued to feel shame that some in the British elite rebuked the émigrés for their hostility to one another without thinking of how Britons might have reacted had they been in a similar

[†] Windham visited France for a month during the summer of 1789. Staying from mid-August to mid-September, he was alarmed by the revolutionary rhetoric and by the Great Fear. From Windham, *The Windham papers*, I, 89.

position. Rather pessimistically, he wrote, “When England becomes too vile or too dangerous to live in, and we meet in Siberia, we shall at least have the satisfaction of thinking that we are not the authors of our own calamities.”⁴¹ With the resignation of Pitt’s ministry in 1801, the émigrés deeply regretted Windham’s retirement.⁴² Still, despite his efforts, Windham did not hold the levers of British power; in that regard, the émigrés found a more powerful ally in the Grenville family.

Michael Duffy says that the counter-revolutionary attitude of British policy came from a few prominent individuals rather than from a unanimous national mood. According to him, “Burke and Windham were the most vociferous, Grenville the most influential.”⁴³ Duffy even credits Grenville for sustaining the war effort at a time when the ministry faced its darkest moments during the war.⁴⁴ Grenville believed that a secure peace with France depended on the existence of a government which could survive without resorting to international aggression. He did not wish for a return to the ancien régime, a system for which he had no sympathy and held responsible – in part – for the Revolution. However, unable to see how security could come with the French mode of aggressive republicanism, he hoped for the emergence of a limited monarchy that was acceptable to the majority of the French.⁴⁵

Grenville warmed to working with émigrés and counter-revolutionaries as early as October 1793, when he noted the advantages of supporting the royalist army in south France. The turning point came a year later when he received information from Mallet du Pan regarding moderate royalists in Paris. For Grenville this offer was an opportunity to ‘weld’ divergent royalist groups into one effort.⁴⁶ Mallet argued that Thermidorian leaders were the real counter-revolutionaries. Since they were trying to dismantle the

Terror, recognition and assistance should be given to them rather than to the civil war in the Vendée. Moreover, the new assembly included more than 170 deputies who had not voted for Louis XVI's death and ought to be open to negotiating a new constitution.

Finally, according to Mallet and confirming Grenville's opinion, a coalition had to be established among ultras, monarchists and constitutionalists. Only unity was capable of restoring the monarchy and creating a constitution based on the demands of 1789.⁴⁷

Although the foreign secretary, and later prime minister, supported the Bourbons, his approach to dealing with the French Revolution was more nuanced and pragmatic than that of the Burkite group. That being said, his elder brother, the Marquess of Buckingham, was an avid supporter of the Bourbons and enjoyed cordial relations with both Artois and Provence. Buckingham shared Grenville's opposition to any possible negotiations with France and insisted that Britain was to have no peace until it was signed with Louis XVIII. Buckingham also looked after the princes' well-being when he, rather jokingly perhaps, asked Grenville to "not let the Comte D'Artois starve, which is surely near his actual situation...[since] Monsieur has not a farthing; & having received only £1000 for the last three months is not very likely to get fat."⁴⁸

Buckingham and many of the British aristocracy were well disposed to receiving their French counterparts and helping advance the royalist cause, a subject that remained alive due to the excesses of the Revolution and the Empire. This support was increased particularly by the publication of the books of Cléry and Hué[‡] about the last days of Louis XVI; these accounts were indeed popular with the British royal family and with the British elite.⁴⁹ Moreover, Artois and Grenville were close enough for the latter to send

[‡] Jean Baptiste Cléry, *Journal de Cléry pendant la captivité de Louis XVI à la prison du Temple du 10 août, 1792, au 21 janvier, 1793* (London, 1798) and François Hué, *Dernières années du règne et de la vie de Louis XVI* (London, 1806).

the prince a special missive announcing his resignation from office, asking Artois to believe that Grenville would always cherish the signs of esteem and confidence with which the prince had honoured him, and assuring him that he would “*faire les vœux les plus ardents pour tout ce qui peut contribuer à Son Bonheur.*”⁵⁰

It was not however only the princes and ultra-royalists who enjoyed the support of the British elite. Watching the success with which the Revolutionary armies met the combined Austro-Prussian force at Jemappes, young Castlereagh was so impressed with Dumouriez that when he was eventually allowed to stay in Britain Dumouriez became a military advisor to the government during Castlereagh’s time at the war office thereafter. His views on partisan warfare proved important in the Peninsular War, helping Wellington exploit the military potential of Spanish guerrillas against the French army.⁵¹ London’s willingness to work with the various groups of French emigrants, including a republican and revolutionary general like Dumouriez, indicate a desire on Britain’s part to keep all feasible options for cooperation available in the event of a restoration.

Diplomatic Courtship

Optimism helped the émigré court survive its exile. In their view, if the Revolution had brought anarchy, terror, war and religious schism, surely the monarchy had to be restored at some point. Even the death of Louis XVI was treated with some relief because of his relative acceptance of the Revolution. The subject of the destructive struggle between Louis XVI and his brothers in 1791-2 was pushed aside as the now acclaimed Louis XVIII amassed around him loyal members of the ‘martyred’ king’s entourage, including Hué, abbé Edgeworth and most importantly, Madame Royale, the duchess of Angoulême. For the ultra-royalists, it was easy to blame the Revolution on the

weakness and “misconceived humanity” of Louis XVI and on the wickedness of many, particularly the elite of the Third Estate, who coveted the nobility’s privileges.⁵²

Yet the peace of Amiens in 1801 and France’s Concordat with Rome in 1802 marked a period of despair for the Pretender, especially when, at Napoleon’s request, the King of Prussia denied Provence’s request to return to Warsaw. Unable to rely on the support of his previous allies, he also feared that his dynastic base was losing its force: the duke and duchess of Angoulême had failed to produce an heir, while Provence could not find a suitable bride for the duc de Berri, Artois’s second son.⁵³ Thus, even if Provence was slow to accept the need for compromise, by 1805 he had acknowledged that, in the event of a restoration, France’s revolutionary administration and institutions should remain in place. Provence’s changes in policy however went neither far nor fast enough to make him a strong candidate prior to 1814. By then, he had to accept the allies’ wish to grant France a liberal constitution as a measure of ensuring stability in Europe.⁵⁴ Still, before he could reach a point of having a Bourbon restoration supported by other monarchies, the French Pretender had to ensure his own safety in a Europe increasingly dominated by Napoleon and strengthen his connection with the one power that seemed immune from French attacks: Britain.

Provence decided to relocate his court from Mittau to England in 1807. Being in Britain, the centre for anti-Napoleonic activity, allowed Provence the opportunity to control royalist agents and work with the British government instead of leaving the leading role to Artois, whom he feared to have been monopolizing British subsidies.⁵⁵ Yet, due to Artois’s popularity and strong connections in Britain, and knowing how much damage the brothers’ animosity did to the cause of Louis XVI in 1792-3, Provence could

not afford an open rupture with Artois, despite efforts by the latter to promote himself as the more viable option for leading the counter-revolution.⁵⁶ Provence, according to Mansel, portrayed himself as a monarch whose interests were inseparable from those of Britain. European by lineage, experience and outlook, the Pretender ensured that he was well-read in Britain's history and system of government and presented himself as 'English' in outlook.⁵⁷

Having British opinion shift more favourably toward the Bourbons did not mean that London was willing to welcome the exiled court of Louis XVIII. The French Pretender arrived in Yarmouth on 2 November 1807 against the wishes, and to the considerable embarrassment, of the British cabinet and George III. He was refused permission to land and was asked instead to go to Holyrood House in Scotland. After holding out at sea for five days, he was finally permitted to disembark provided he used the title the Comte de Lisle. Foreign Minister Canning even sent him a letter saying that his continued presence in England was 'prejudicial' to his cause and asking him to return to Mittau, from whence the prince had not been asked to leave. Adding insult to injury, Henry Brook, chief clerk at the Alien Office, was the only British official sent to meet him. London's effort to remedy the offense caused by such lack of courtesy was too late to erase the initial insult.⁵⁸ Provence's wish to remain in Britain despite this reception is an indication of his reliance on, and acceptance of, London's leading role in the war.

Despite British diplomatic fumbling, Provence was a popular success; from his emotional disembarkation at Yarmouth to his trip to Hartwell House, he was well received by the British elite, starting with Buckingham. The latter offered him the use of Gosfield, his country house, even before the British government gave consent for

Provence's arrival. After being allowed to stay, so long as he resided fifty miles from London and did not negotiate with British ministers, Provence's situation improved. At Hartwell House, he was able to receive the many émigrés who congregated there. Moreover Provence received £16,000 a year, while Artois was granted £6,000 – this at a time when English princes like the Duke of Kent had difficulty convincing the British parliament to release their annual income of £18,000.⁵⁹ Providing support to all members of France's former ruling family, the British government also settled Orléans' debts when he asked for help in meeting the obligations he had incurred during his emigration.⁶⁰

Until Napoleon's defeat in Russia, the émigré princes could not negotiate directly with the British government. Nevertheless, they were well received by the British elite and royal family. That the Prince Regent held the exiled brothers in high regard was a sentiment that transferred to his ministers, who began to show more favour towards the Bourbons.⁶¹ Although much like his deceased brother, Provence had previously been *peu parlant*, paying no visits and receiving only those who dealt with political matters, in Britain he led a life wherein he enjoyed visiting and socializing. He visited Warwick Castle and the factories at Birmingham, met the Deans of Cambridge and Oxford, and invited visitors to join him for dinners often. Although Mansel says that Provence's social activity was an indication of boredom, it could have also been because the Pretender saw more value in his British connections than his Polish, Russian or German ones.⁶²

Outlasting Napoleon

Although the years in exile left their mark on the émigrés, their cause was never truly defeated. They were continuously encouraged by reports such as that of Bertrand de Molleville, who wrote:

*le désir de la Royauté existe certainement dans le cœur de Presque tous les français, mais il y est profondément enseveli par la terreur qu'inspire Bonaparte. En un mot, les Royalistes sans le Roi, ne sont, et ne seront jamais qu'un corps sans âme. La Présence de sa Majesté peut seule les tirer de l'état de découragement et d'apathie dans lequel ils sont tombés.*⁶³

Even if such a statement was exaggerated, French royalism was revived in part due to Napoleon's persecution of the Pope.[§] Many French Catholics equated the fate of the spiritual leader with that of the exiled monarch. Another factor in reviving royalism was that many among France's liberal elite still favoured constitutional monarchy and remembered that Provence had shown similar sympathies prior to his emigration. Likewise, disaffection with the direction of the Empire and the uncertainties of Napoleon's unending wars permeated all sectors of society, from the peasants, exhausted by conscription and demands to feed the army, to the new nobility who, although well compensated for their allegiance, were unsure about the longevity of their status.⁶⁴

Hope began to surface for the émigrés when a request from Spanish nobles arrived in June 1808 asking for British help to resist Napoleon; it was warmly greeted by both Parliament and the British press. This reception was a marked change in attitude from the émigré requests in the 1790s and it indicated a shift in war realities. It was as if London was waiting for internal resistance to begin on the continent or recognition that Britain had missed an earlier opportunity in France.⁶⁵ Britain's assistance of Spain raised émigré hopes. Further lifting Provence's spirit was a visit made by Comte Alexis de

[§] Since 1809, Pope Pius VII had been taken from Rome to Savona and then imprisoned in Fontainebleau. Cardinals, bishops and priests who showed more attachment to the pope than to Napoleon were also sent to prison. When Napoleon freed the pope in January 1814, this act came too late to atone for the injury and wipe away the memory of past insults. In Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, [La Restoration, 1963] translated from the French by Lynn M. Case (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), 8.

Noailles during the summer of 1812, when the latter informed Louis of the secret society the *Chevaliers de la Foi* and the resurgence of royalist sentiment in France.⁶⁶

Consequently, the émigrés drew strength from the knowledge that royalism was not dead; the Empire had kept it alive. As well, the continued war on the continent ensured the defection of many imperial officials, headed by Talleyrand himself. Joining the anti-Napoleonic efforts, the émigrés were offered collaboration from former revolutionaries who were sidelined by the Empire. Finally, the remaining émigrés were encouraged that, even if the allies were hostile to Bourbon presence in their armies, as late as 1813 Britain remained a major source of support and that Wellington was willing to take the princes into his camp.⁶⁷

For Provence, with Napoleon's failed attack on Russia in 1812, the end of the empire seemed in sight, but his hopes for a Bourbon restoration were far from secure. It was known that Tsar Alexander did not prefer the Bourbons. Moreover, while the British in general preferred the Bourbons, they also seemed to favour the Duc d'Orléans, a personal friend of both the Duke of Kent and General Dumouriez. Lord Liverpool's government was even more inclined to appease its continental allies by permitting the succession of the King of Rome, under a regency supported by Britain. One way or another, the belief was that a strong and spontaneous 'national movement' had to demand the Bourbons' return for it to receive the allies' approval.⁶⁸

After the Russian Campaign, émigré meetings with British ministers became regular, with the aim of reiterating that the Pretender was to support 'the present order of things' in France along with renouncing foreign territories. In contrast to previous declarations concerning French policy once restored, Provence issued the Declaration of

Hartwell on 1 March 1813 to confirm this position. Supported and published by the British government, the declaration promised union, peace and even the maintenance of “*le Code dit Napoléon.*”⁶⁹ Still, the British were determined to withhold official aid to the Bourbons until French public opinion welcomed their return, a prospect eventually made easier by Napoleon’s refusal to accept any peace terms imposed by the allies.⁷⁰

Once Foreign Minister Castlereagh became committed to the idea of a grand alliance aimed at Napoleon’s defeat, a scheme that he had worked on with Pitt in 1805, the émigrés’ prospects improved exponentially.⁷¹ By 1813 British public opinion was against peace with Napoleon and behind the restoration of Louis XVIII. What the Pretender had called the ‘vicious circle’ of royalist fears and allied inactivity was finally broken.⁷² Britain however was alone among the major powers in supporting the Bourbons, and the restoration’s prospects were uncertain until the moment of Napoleon’s abdication.

Restoration?

The France of 1814, then, was no longer like the France of 1804. Yet Frenchmen still followed their leader, impelled by fear or habit, but not with enthusiasm or confidence...what did the people want? Just one thing: peace, immediate peace, peace at any price.⁷³

Although France, and Europe in general, was not ready for a regime change, the continent was weary of the unending wars; just as France wanted peace, the allies also sought peace with Napoleon, but only if he accepted their terms. In 1813 Metternich wanted to keep Napoleon and his Empire as a counterweight to British power, while Russia and Prussia were willing to unite forces to keep France in check. Metternich, believing Europe’s future to be in the hands of France and Russia, offered to mediate on three different occasions between December 1812 and June 1813, and only Napoleon’s

refusal to negotiate forced the Austrian foreign minister to ally his policy with France's enemies.⁷⁴ Since the hopes for immediate peace on France's part and a longer-term settlement on the part of the allies did not come to fruition with Napoleon, Provence emerged as the one legitimate and solid hope among the other options offered: Napoleon's heir, Orléans, or even Jean-Baptist Bernadotte, prince of Sweden and former marshal of France.⁷⁵

Although the allies had not forgotten the Bourbons, the émigré king's cause was unpopular, and the ousted dynasty seemed too foreign after two decades of exile. The allies were afraid of arousing public animosity should they appear to favour the Bourbons. Indeed, as expressed by Tsar Alexander on 18 January 1814, the allies would neither prevent the Bourbons and their supporters from acting within France, nor would they encourage them or give the appearance of showing preference to a specific result. The initiative in this action had to be left to the French themselves.⁷⁶

That being said, each of the powers had their own designs regarding the seemingly soon-to-be conquered empire. Austria wanted to keep France under her influence through Marie Louise acting as regent to Napoleon's son, the King of Rome. Tsar Alexander saw himself as liberator of France and hoped that once a French representative body was convened they would choose his own protégé, Bernadotte. The King of Prussia, Frederick William III, wanting revenge on Napoleon, was ready to follow the tsar's plans.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, since he was never totally forgotten, especially in the south where the *Chevaliers de la Foi* were working for his cause, Provence emerged as the only plausible choice. More importantly, the Bourbons were ready to make

concessions, and any other option for a restoration required the allies' active participation, which all were determined to avoid.⁷⁸

As for the British, their policy was defined as early as 1800, when Pitt declared that he considered the restoration of the French monarchy to be a 'most desirable goal' for his country. This policy would guarantee Britain and Europe the best security, provided that, after the success of the allies, "a strong and prevailing disposition for the return of the Monarch appear in France itself."⁷⁹ Setting out to join other European diplomats in early 1814, Castlereagh wrote that it was up to the Bourbons to achieve such a result and that Britain would not oppose them. On the contrary, Castlereagh worked in their favour when he kept trying to side-track the plans of Austria and Russia.⁸⁰ Castlereagh's aim was to achieve peace on terms acceptable to Britain before leaving Europe to its own devices. In this effort, he was supported by the British cabinet, the Prince Regent and the public, all of whom pushed for French defeat, a restoration of the Bourbons, and a return to a balance of power.⁸¹ With a France weary of war and not unanimously behind the Emperor, Bourbon hopes were finally revived, and according to de Sauvigny, the "hour of retribution had struck."⁸²

As the armies of the Allied Powers entered France in January 1814, a Bourbon movement had already started in the south. That Bordeaux royalists convinced Wellington, who entered the city accompanied by the Duc d'Angoulême on 12 March 1814, that the 'whole' city was in favour of the Bourbons, provided the support the royalist cause had been previously lacking. Indeed, Bordeaux's position was even more decisive to the prospects of restoration than the change that later took place in Paris. Without an outward display of sentiment in favour of the deposed branch, Paris

politicians and allied ministers, whose initial reception of Artois, Angoulême and their agents was cool, would not have been as welcoming of the Bourbons.⁸³

While in Paris, as in Bordeaux, the success of the Restoration was dependant on the complicity of local authorities, it was Napoleon's unwillingness to compromise that decided the course of events. Until March 16 the Parisian political elite – Talleyrand included – was in favour of a regency under Marie-Louise.⁸⁴ Entering Paris on 30 March, Tsar Alexander, the King of Prussia, Nesselrode and Schwartzenberg, the allies' supreme commander, gathered at Talleyrand's house. The Tsar believed that the allies were left with three possible options: make peace with Napoleon, establish a regency under the Empress, or restore the Bourbons. Talleyrand dismissed the first two as impossible and insisted that the Bourbons represented "the principle of Legitimate Sovereignty."⁸⁵ With the Bourbons, according to Talleyrand, "France would cease to be gigantic, but would become great."⁸⁶ He reiterated that the Bourbons were the allies' best option to find a 'durable' solution, and he offered to call the senate to debate the issue of restoration. Once Alexander agreed, the King of Prussia followed suit.⁸⁷

Even as late as 5 April, after Napoleon had agreed to abdicate in favour of his son, Alexander still favoured the regency option to the Bourbons. However, when he conferred with members of the French provisional government, that option was rejected; after the events in Bordeaux and Paris, too many people had relied on the allies' declarations and compromised themselves should the Bourbon restoration not take place. Thus, on 6 April the senate declared unanimously that the French government was monarchical and recalled, of 'their free will,' Louis Stanislas Xavier to the French throne. The provisional government then worked with the senate to draft a Charter acceptable to

the monarch and the representative assembly.⁸⁸ Upon receiving the news, Louis XVIII, accompanied by the duchess d'Angoulême, Condé and his son the duc de Bourbon, left Hartwell House on 19 April and started a two-week journey that saw him back in Paris on 2 May. Before Louis's departure, the Prince Regent, desiring to make amends for the slights his ministry had shown his royal guest, gave the French monarch a lavish reception, while the people of London "deliriously acclaimed Louis XVIII as the symbol of restored peace."⁸⁹

In France, anti-Bonapartists worked to convince the public and the allies that welcoming the Bourbons back was their best choice. Chateaubriand published *De Buonaparte et des Bourbons, et de la nécessité de se rallier à nos princes légitimes, pour le bonheur de la France et celui de l'Europe*, in which he told the French that the recall of the king was the first step to correct the sins of the Revolution. For Chateaubriand, the choice was simple: France could choose between Bonaparte, whose character and 'malice' were only revealed gradually, or they could recall Louis XVIII, the embodiment of legitimate authority, order, peace and liberty.⁹⁰ Chateaubriand presented the French with a king who not only belonged to the legitimate line and was brother to the martyred king, but who also had the temperament, education and moderation to rule justly.⁹¹

As Louis XVIII and his court returned to Paris after more than twenty years of exile, France seemed poised to start a period of stability, and the country welcomed Artois on 15 April with jubilation. The prince's "charming manners, which retained all the grace of the old Court, won the hearts of the Parisians."⁹² Although the reception Louis XVIII received two weeks later was more reserved, people pinned their hopes on the regime, and initial indications were favourable, especially as the First Treaty of Paris

was relatively lenient. France was reduced to her 1792 borders but did not have to pay reparations. Castlereagh further softened the loss of the Empire by returning most of France's pre-war colonial possessions, with the exception of St Lucia, Tobago and Mauritius.⁹³ Cordial relations between the French and the British courts continued, and relations between the Prince Regent and Louis XVIII were close enough for the latter to write in July of 1814 to complain about his gout and receive a very sympathetic letter in response.⁹⁴

Britain used this cordiality to push for a French commitment to stop the slave trade. The Prince Regent wrote to Louis personally about his government's wish that France formally abolish the slave trade, reminding him that his "long Residence in this country has enabled [him] to appreciate the sentiments of the British Nation on the subject."⁹⁵ Even during the subsequent Hundred Days, this policy was important enough for Britain that Castlereagh asked his envoy, Sir Charles Stuart, to take the opportunity of being close to Louis XVIII in Ghent to reintroduce the notion of abolition once the war was over.⁹⁶ Even if the Bourbons were not as committed to abolition as Britain, the issue continued to be one by which France tried to maintain cordial relations with Britain. After Waterloo and during the years of allied occupation (1815-18), the letters of France's Prime Minister, the Duc de Richelieu, to the French ambassador in London, the Marquis d'Osmond, reiterated France's commitment to British requests and tried to assuage British suspicions about any French activities related to the subject.⁹⁷

Success and Failure

The Restoration itself may not have been a great change in France, as Napoleon had already re-established and enlarged the aristocracy and bound the various

revolutionary elements with monarchical bonds; even regicides such as Carnot** were eager to be accepted and received at Court. Under Louis XVIII in 1814, fifteen of forty-five ministers were émigrés, while the rest had served both the Republic and the Empire.⁹⁸ Having been restored, Louis fully intended to hold on to his throne and was ready to make some concessions. However, he remained part of the old regime, and there is no evidence that his years in Britain had improved his opinion of constitutional monarchy. Thus while Louis was relatively “realistic and prudent in wanting to reassure the new France and to adjust himself to her, at heart he could not really understand her or love her.”⁹⁹ Artois, in contrast, did not even try to show slight acceptance of the Revolution, and his disdain of anything connected to it was obvious.¹⁰⁰

France’s adjustment to Bourbon return thus proved uneasy, and London’s fears that a reactionary regime of White Jacobins, who were just as dangerous as the Red ones of the Terror, quickly materialized. Of the First Restoration, Schroeder said, “it suffered from the political immaturity, illusions, and injured self-view of the political nation, and [it] failed to confront the problem.”¹⁰¹ Too many Frenchmen refused to accept that it was France that had waged war for over two decades, lost and now had to face the consequences. Instead, they continued to see France as *la grande nation*.¹⁰² French patriots were further inflamed when 12,000 officers of *la grande armée* were placed on half pay while returning émigrés were rewarded with coveted positions. Added to this, the Restoration demanded expiatory ceremonies to atone for the ‘sins’ of the Revolution; censorship of publications continued, and the émigrés who had remained in exile until the end were openly praised at court. The promises of the Royal Charter of forgiveness and

** Lazare Nicolas Marguerite, Comte Carnot was a member of the Legislative Assembly, the National Convention and the Committee of Public Safety. During the Terror, he was appointed as minister of war.

freedom of expression fell very short, while uncertainty about the nature of the returning regime increased.¹⁰³

Artois's ultra-royalist reactionary policies, along with what London referred to as 'lack of political sense,' allowed Napoleon the opportunity to escape from Elba and return to Paris in 1815. Once again the Bourbons were forced to flee Paris.¹⁰⁴ Napoleon, aware of the growing apprehension in France, decided to gamble on the allies' willingness to accept him as France's returning ruler once he declared his intention was to abide by the terms of the Paris Treaty and save France from the threatening clutches of the ancien régime. In France, this message found a willing ear, especially in the disgruntled army.¹⁰⁵ The one thing that could have saved him, according to Schroeder, was Britain's refusal to subsidize the war; instead they pledged £9 million for his overthrow.¹⁰⁶

Napoleon's Flight of the Eagle once more put the fate of the Bourbons in serious jeopardy. In a dispatch from Sir Charles Stuart to Castlereagh, the British ambassador reported that Tsar Alexander was undecided as to whether Russia should back an alliance with a Bourbon cause. According to him, the Tsar preferred an agreement with a different French ruler: Orléans.¹⁰⁷ Despite Russian objection to restoring Louis XVIII, British preference remained with the king because the crown was his by right of succession. Indeed, when asked about Orléans' candidacy, Wellington said that if he were made king, the duke would have been a 'usurper of good family.'¹⁰⁸

After Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, the Bourbons once more returned to Paris, and France was made to pay dearly. The Second Restoration and Louis XVIII's dependence on a military occupation to regain his abandoned throne were more

debilitating to his rule than even the anxiety over the first one.¹⁰⁹ Yet his return in ‘the baggage train of the allies’ ensured that his relationship with Britain, and by extension that of France, continued to be on conciliatory terms. The problems of the settlement for France were now magnified: the Bourbons were discredited, and the question of the French regime was reopened. France was punished with a harsh peace and the earlier treaty considered null. Public opinion was strongly anti-French in Britain and violently so in Germany, Piedmont, Spain and the Low Countries. The Hundred Days damaged nascent Franco-British relations and reopened old wounds; Liverpool, a supporter of an *entente* and closer ties with Bourbon France prior to Napoleon’s return, now wanted major reductions in French territory, and Castlereagh believed that the French had to pay for their mistakes.¹¹⁰

Aware that his authority had suffered immensely due to Napoleon’s return and his own flight, Louis XVIII had to ensure that at least his connection to London was not severely damaged. Repairing France’s relations with Britain was thus crucial, as Liverpool blamed the French for not heeding the allies’ call to oust Napoleon; had they not welcomed him, the 1814 terms would have been upheld.¹¹¹ Nonetheless, Wellington and Castlereagh agreed that the vital issue was to settle Europe and France as quickly as possible, and in that light Louis XVIII remained a better option than the proffered ones of Napoleon II, Orléans or some choice made by the French assembly.¹¹²

Moreover, the prospects of Louis XVIII improved when the duc de Richelieu became the head of a new French government in September 1815. Although the duke was largely unknown in his own country, in 1815 his role in the settlement of French affairs was second only to that of Wellington. Having been appointed after Talleyrand resigned

‘protesting’^{††} the terms of the Second Treaty of Paris, Richelieu’s term as the chief French minister began with a renegotiation of the Treaty terms^{‡‡} and ended with the departure of the occupation troops in 1818. During his tenure, Richelieu embarked on a methodical and successful plan to reduce the occupation and meet France’s treaty commitments.¹¹³ Although he was initially thought to be an ultra-royalist, the moderate temperament of Richelieu allowed him to work with various French factions as well as the occupying allies.¹¹⁴ His relationship with Wellington was an important factor to this success, as was the determined support he gained from Louis XVIII.

Thus, although the relationship between the émigrés and Britain was based largely on pragmatic considerations, Britain was the one country that consistently opposed Revolutionary France while being not completely indifferent to the fate of the Bourbons.¹¹⁵ Britain was also the country with whose royal family the émigrés enjoyed the closest connection and friendship, and whose military commander welcomed French royalists into his service. Wellington was one of the many “members of the European elites for whom the magic of French royalty never failed.”¹¹⁶ As a young student, he had studied at the military academy in Angers during the reign of Louis XVI; he had many friends among the émigrés, and viewed the Bourbons as a genuine dynasty in a world of “upstarts, usurpers and fakes.”¹¹⁷

This view was not unique, and it was perhaps to their credit that the émigrés were able to harness such sentiments to their benefit and ensure not only their eventual return, but also the advantage of having their previous enemy for a friend. Britain was invested

^{††} Having been signatory to the First Treaty, Talleyrand refused to have his name attached to the more punitive one and resigned on 24 September 1815, even though Metternich, Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stuart ‘begged’ him not to do so. *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand*. Edited, with a pref. and notes, by the duc de Broglie. (New York: AMS Press, 1973), III, 203.

^{‡‡} The Second Treaty of Paris was signed on 20 November 1815.

in the Restoration's eventual well-being, regarding France as a potential ally in maintaining the European balance of power and in containing other continental rivals.¹¹⁸

The journey of French emigrants from 1789 until the Second Restoration was one fraught with animosity, suspicion, fear and division. Despite such obstacles, French emigrants used their connections with European powers for the purpose of defeating Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, as well as increasing their chances of establishing a stable regime capable of maintaining a vision of '1789.' Whether that vision pertained to the country before or after the Revolution remained a contested issue. The Bourbon return in 1814 was thus due in great part to the connections the émigrés had established in exile, especially while in Britain.

After all, it was British support of the Bourbons that ensured their return to power in 1814 and again in 1815. This support, however, was hard-won by the émigré court and never unconditionally granted by the British. Domestically, as the Empire came to an end, the Bourbons had to prove that their claim to represent French sentiment was valid. The efforts of royalists and the *Chevaliers de la Foi* to demonstrate that the country wanted a restoration of Bourbon authority were enough to convince the allied powers that France's stability was best guaranteed in their hands. Other choices, whether they were Orléans, Bernadotte or Napoleon II, would have required active participation by the allied powers. Furthermore, the Bourbons' commitment to renouncing war made them a more appealing choice, especially after decades of strife. Finally, in cultivating ties with Britain's elite, Provence demonstrated a willingness, albeit gradually, to moderate his

former opinions and cooperate with other émigré groups as well as with Britain. This cooperation made the Restoration possible in 1814 and again after Waterloo.

In this case, it was the émigré connection to Georgian Britain that ultimately proved crucial in keeping the French monarchy alive and creating closer ties between the two countries. Whereas France and Britain suffered a weakness of personal links at senior levels prior to 1789, the years of emigration provided the opportunity for both sides to gain better knowledge of each other. The contacts made by émigré groups or individuals of various political persuasions with members of the British elite were crucial in cultivating potential ties during the years of allied occupation and the first half of the nineteenth century.

¹ Julian Swann, "Political Culture in Louis XV's France," in Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms eds., *Cultures of Power in Europe During the Long Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2007): 227.

² Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality," 242.

³ Mori, *William Pitt*, 150.

⁴ Mori, *Britain in the Age of the French Revolution*, 201-2.

⁵ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 85.

⁶ Jasanoff, "Revolutionary Exiles," 49.

⁷ Sutherland, *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, 344, and Greer, *Incidence of the Emigration*, 97.

⁸ Doyle, *Aristocracy*, 310.

⁹ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 178.

¹⁰ Malouet frequently wrote to Mallet du Pan about his homesickness. In Griffiths, "Pierre-Victor Malouet," 362. See also, Harsanyi, "Resilient Elite," 291.

¹¹ Munro Price, *The Road from Versailles: Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and the Fall of the French Monarchy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003), 328.

¹² Quoted from Philip Ziegler, *Addington: Life of Henry Addington, First Viscount Sidmouth*. (London: Collins, 1965), 77. In Stuart Andrews, *The British periodical press and the French Revolution, 1789-99*, (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000), 216.

¹³ Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 98.

- ¹⁴ Original underline, NA, FO 67/16, Trevor to Grenville 11 April 1795. Quoted in Duffy, "British Policy," 22-3. Diplomats such as John Trevor in Turin and Francis Drake in Genoa created networks that penetrated southern France and Paris, while Philippe d'Auvergne, Prince de Bouillon, focused on western France from his base on the Channel Islands. In Durey, "William Wickham," 731.
- ¹⁵ Fryer, *Republic or Restoration*, 22-4.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 22-24.
- ¹⁷ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 95-6.
- ¹⁸ Duffy, "Control of British Foreign Policy," 167. See also, Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 121.
- ¹⁹ Jennifer Mori, *The Culture of Diplomacy: Britain in Europe, c. 1750-1830* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010), 97.
- ²⁰ Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 209.
- ²¹ Although fears of British backing Orleans were dispelled by 1790, suspicion of a strong Orleans faction bent on changing the ruling dynasty persisted throughout the Revolution and was rekindled during the Restoration. See, Cobban, "British Secret Service in France," 260 and Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 199.
- ²² Sparrow, *Secret*, 203.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 215-7.
- ²⁴ Until 1799 Grenville "had advised caution on the question of restoring the Bourbons, believing that it was imperative that Britain's war aims remained unfettered by any formal commitment to such a goal. Over the next six months [the latter part of 1799] however, he became more outspoken, albeit privately, that the restoration of monarchy not only *could* but also *should* become the object of the Coalition's military strategy." Italics are original. In Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 223.
- ²⁵ Beach, *Charles X*, 116-7.
- ²⁶ De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 12.
- ²⁷ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, 575.
- ²⁸ Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 314.
- ²⁹ Rice, "The Political Career of Cazalès," 423.
- ³⁰ Cazalès tried to bridge the divide between royalists and monarchiens, although he admitted that while he was friendly to Malouet and Montlosier, he could not bear the company of Lally-Tolendal. Rice, "The Political Career Cazalès," 347 and 421.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 421-2.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 391.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, 423.
- ³⁴ BL, Windham Papers, Add MS, 37864, Artois to de Frotté, 12 Dec 1797, f. 261.
- ³⁵ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 69.
- ³⁶ Colin Lucas, "Edmund Burke and the Émigrés," in Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., *The French Revolution and Modern Political Culture: 1789-1848* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1990), III, 110-1.
- ³⁷ Wilkinson, "French Émigrés," 494.
- ³⁸ Hutt, *Chouannerie*, I, 108-9.
- ³⁹ Windham, *The Windham Papers*, I, vii- ix.
- ⁴⁰ BL, Add MS, 37846, Windham to Grenville, 24 Oct 1797, fos. 55-58. See also, Windham, *The Windham Papers*, II, 9-10.
- ⁴¹ Windham, *The Windham Papers*, 1. Windham spoke more candidly of the 'despicable embassy,' saying "To what depths of meanness we have sunk...I feel, with you, perfectly restless and miserable, under the sense, of dishonor which I carry about with me." Quoted from Windham to Mrs. Crewe, 31 October 1796, in *The Crewe Papers*: Windham Section, P.39. In Windham, *The Windham Papers*, II, 23-5.
- ⁴² BL, Add MS, 37867, Artois to Windham – 12 February 180, f. 176.
- ⁴³ Duffy, "Control of British Foreign Policy," 21.
- ⁴⁴ Grenville provided the core of the British war effort and Pitt, because of his oratorical skills and political acumen, the public face. In *Ibid.*, 21-2.
- ⁴⁵ Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 286.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 177.
- ⁴⁷ Mitchell, *The Underground War*, 41-2.
- ⁴⁸ BL, Add 71589, George Grenville Nugent Temple, Marquis of Buckingham to Grenville, 4 September 1797, f.19.
- ⁴⁹ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 140.

- ⁵⁰ BL, Add 58872, Grenville to Artois, 13 February 1801, f 45.
- ⁵¹ Castlereagh even named one of his horses after the general. John Bew, *Castlereagh: Enlightenment, War and Tyranny* (London: Quercus, 2011), 64. See also, Price, *Road from Versailles*, 363.
- ⁵² Mansel, *The Court of France* 45-6.
- ⁵³ Mansel, "From Coblenz to Hartwell," 10-11.
- ⁵⁴ Munro Price, *The Perilous Crown: France between Revolutions* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009) 52.
- ⁵⁵ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 137-8. See also, Mansel, "From Coblenz to Hartwell," 12.
- ⁵⁶ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 103.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, viii.
- ⁵⁸ Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 349-51.
- ⁵⁹ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 140-6.
- ⁶⁰ In the same letter, Orléans even took the time to compare his British allowance with that awarded to the princes of Condé, who did not rank as high as he did. In BL, Add 58872 Orléans to Grenville, 6 May 1806. fos. 1-6.
- ⁶¹ Mansel, "From Coblenz to Hartwell," 14.
- ⁶² Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 90 and 142.
- ⁶³ Bertrand de Molleville to the British Foreign Office. 'Note sur la situation Actuelle de l' Angleterre et de la France, et sur les moyens encore possibles de [sic] terminer la guerre par une paix solide et honorable'. BL, Add MS 71592, 17 March 1806, f13.
- ⁶⁴ Only among the elite corps of the army did devotion to the emperor have no bounds. In de Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 6-13.
- ⁶⁵ Bew, *Castlereagh*, 229.
- ⁶⁶ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 157.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.
- ⁶⁸ Sparrow, *Secret Service*, 347.
- ⁶⁹ Mansel, "From Coblenz to Hartwell," 14-5.
- ⁷⁰ Mori, *Britain in the Age of the French Revolution*, 212.
- ⁷¹ Bew, *Castlereagh*, 323 and 325.
- ⁷² Mansel, "From Coblenz to Hartwell," 19.
- ⁷³ De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 9.
- ⁷⁴ Mori, *Britain in the Age of the French Revolution*, 210.
- ⁷⁵ De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 18.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.
- ⁷⁸ Although Metternich still favoured Napoleon, Bernadotte and Orléans were taken seriously only by Tsar Alexander and themselves. In Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 507.
- ⁷⁹ De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 19.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.
- ⁸¹ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 487
- ⁸² De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 4-5.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*, 24-28. See also, Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 505.
- ⁸⁴ De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 29-31.
- ⁸⁵ John Richard Hall, *The Bourbon Restoration* (London: Rivers, 1909), 2. [Electronic resource] Record derived from Internet Archive. Part of the University of Toronto collection. <http://ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/login?url=http://www.archive.org/details/bourbonrestorati00halluoft>
- ⁸⁶ Talleyrand, *Memoirs*, II, 117.
- ⁸⁷ De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 33.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 36-7.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 51-53.
- ⁹⁰ François-René vicomte de Chateaubriand, *De Buonaparte et des Bourbons, et de la nécessité de se rallier à nos princes légitimes, pour le bonheur de la France et celui de l'Europe*. Seconde édition (Londres, Chez Colburn, 1814), 13-15 and 59. [Electronic resource]
- ⁹¹ Chateaubriand, *De Buonaparte et des Bourbons*, 64.
- ⁹² Hall, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 4.

- ⁹³ Robert Alexander, *Re-Writing The French Revolutionary Tradition* (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 2003), 30. See also, Bew, *Castlereagh*, 360.
- ⁹⁴ NA, FO 90/18, f 88.
- ⁹⁵ NA, FO 90/18, Prince Regent to Louis XVIII, 9 August 1814, f 86.
- ⁹⁶ NA, FO 95/106, dispatch # 6, Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart, 11 May 1815, fos. 148-9. The Prince Regent and Castlereagh felt that Louis XVIII may have not been as committed to the issue. In *ibid.*, dispatch # 9, Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart, 7 June 1815, f 152.
- ⁹⁷ *Lettres du duc de Richelieu au marquis d'Osmond*, 1816-1818. Publiées par Sébastien Charléty, deuxième édition. (Gallimard: Paris, 1939), 34.
- ⁹⁸ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 171 and 187.
- ⁹⁹ De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 58.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 58.
- ¹⁰¹ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 522.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 522.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 30-1.
- ¹⁰⁴ Bew, *Castlereagh*, 348 and 397.
- ¹⁰⁵ Alexander, *Revolutionary Tradition*, 32.
- ¹⁰⁶ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 551.
- ¹⁰⁷ Louis XVIII was pleased that Orléans rejected the notion as one intended to weaken the French monarchic cause. NA, FO 95/103, dispatch # 23, Sir Charles Stuart to Castlereagh, 18 April 1815, f. 108.
- ¹⁰⁸ Price, *The Perilous Crown*, 83.
- ¹⁰⁹ Alexander, *Revolutionary Tradition*, 33.
- ¹¹⁰ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 552.
- ¹¹¹ Castlereagh was confident that any terms could be imposed on the French nation as long as the allies kept their troops in French territory. Thomas Dwight Veve, *The Duke of Wellington and the British army of occupation in France, 1815-1818* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), 12.
- ¹¹² Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 553.
- ¹¹³ Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 7.
- ¹¹⁴ Alexander, *Revolutionary Tradition*, 34.
- ¹¹⁵ Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 266.
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 163.
- ¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.
- ¹¹⁸ Mori, *Britain in the Age of the French Revolution*, 213.

Conclusion:

Diplomacy in Retrospect

Diplomatic history, according to Jeremy Black, reminds us that, diplomacy operated against a “background of tensions emanating from power and interest.”¹ In many ways, this is the story of the unlikely alliance between the émigrés and Britain. Having explored divisions among the émigrés, British reaction to the events in France, and the initial conflict and later cooperation between Émigré France and Georgian Britain, we find that the time in exile and the demands of war gave both sides knowledge of each other that was lacking prior to 1789.

During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the émigrés’ failures forced them to seek help from their former enemy. Correspondingly, the British government, aware of divisions among the emigrants but determined to stop the spread of French hegemony, worked with the various émigré factions to defeat the Revolution and help bring about a stable regime. Thus, while political and social divisions among the émigrés weakened their cause in exile and ensured continued suspicion of their motives in France, such divisions presented Britain with various options for collaboration and gradually changed British attitudes towards the Revolution and its opponents from neutrality and ambivalence, on the one hand, to opposition and support on the other.

In France, terms such as counter-revolution and émigré were not simply words added to vocabularies in 1790. Their emergence changed Revolutionary rhetoric, and, just as the experience of 1789 helped generate the notions of emigration and counter-revolution, thereafter these concepts also helped define what was revolutionary and what was not.² Labelling enemies of the Revolution as traitors, aristocrats and émigrés dehumanized them, and semantics also played a part in connecting the word ‘émigré’ with the royal princes, placing all émigrés in a royalist camp. However, as we have seen,

the émigré experience was varied. The emigration influenced historical development within France, and was an integral part of France's collective experience of the Revolution.³

In Britain, the judgment of Pitt's cabinet on the Revolution was not entirely negative. The events of 1787 to 1792 had seemingly neutralized the long-term military, political, economic and colonial threats that Bourbon France had posed. Having not shared in the Portland Whigs' veneration of the French monarchy, the British government did not see the Revolution in "Burkeian terms."⁴ However, although the cabinet was inclined to remain neutral, increased radicalism in Britain, a spreading war on the continent and the arrival of French emigrants fanned anti-Revolutionary propaganda and "turned supporters of the new régime into uneasy doubters or even into declared opponents."⁵

Pitt's war effort and indemnification scheme thus provided a broad yet ambiguous appeal to unite the British elite in fighting the Revolutionary forces.⁶ Much like the émigré leaders, however, London repeatedly underestimated the strength of French republicanism and overestimated the influence of its opponents.⁷ Britain was no more successful in promoting counter-revolution in France than the Republic was in promoting subversion schemes in the United Kingdom.⁸ The French retaliated against intervention in the Vendée by intervening in Ireland, the result of which was that "both sides ended up helping Catholic peasants abroad and slaughtering them at home."⁹

British support of the Counter-revolution led France to focus her subversive efforts on Britain more than any other of her rivals. Judging by the scale of the Irish Rebellion of 1797 and the extremes to which London went to control events there, British

fear of French sedition was well grounded.¹⁰ Still, Britain remained France's most determined enemy. In the years between 1793 and 1815, Britain constructed and financed six coalitions against the French Republic and Empire. All the same, successive British cabinets found it difficult to exercise any control over their allies, especially as the ultimate objectives of war, indemnification, strategy and settlement were difficult to agree upon.¹¹

By the time the emigration came to an end with the Restoration of 1814, the years of exile had created lasting and unprecedented political and social connections. Britain provided the émigrés with refuge and assistance, and without British support the restoration of a monarchy would have been very difficult, if not impossible. These connections, however, were not one-sided but mutually beneficial. French emigrants, from republicans to ultra-royalists, found a welcoming and willing ear in Britain, and there can be little doubt that the years of exile softened the animosity between the two nations and created lasting links well into the nineteenth century.¹²

Britain witnessed the émigrés' disunity, bitter denunciations of each other, undignified feuds and inability to formulate a common program, which made even their most sympathetic supporters despair.¹³ Because there were other options for a restoration, Provence had to walk "a tight diplomatic rope" to avoid offending his hosts.¹⁴ For its part, the British government was aware of the political advantage of supporting the refugees, and the rhetoric surrounding émigré issues in the House was charged with allusions to British victories over the French, since the members of Britain's Parliament believed that "nothing [cut] so severely into the feeling of the French rebels, as the noble

and liberal manner in which the English have relieved those Loyalists whom they have expatriated.”¹⁵

Given that France’s last three kings spent lengthy periods during the emigration creating connections with the political elite in British society, Napoleon’s argument that the restored Bourbons had learned nothing and forgotten nothing during their exile was not entirely true. While both Louis XVIII and later Charles X were determined to assure the financial crisis of 1787-88 was not repeated; in diplomatic terms, the émigrés’ connections around Europe were much more solidly established. Louis XVIII’s concern with foreign relations was genuine; not only was he closely related to half of Europe’s sovereigns, he also knew some of them, such as the Prince Regent and Tsar Alexander, very well.¹⁶

Socially, while the British government and aristocracy gave generously to émigré relief funds, the bulk of donations came from the streets where the more destitute émigrés were most visible. The émigré relief lists generated enormous goodwill and inspired deep gratitude towards the British hosts, which was reflected in correspondence and memoirs. If there was a point upon which all the émigrés agreed, it was that Britain, of all the countries wherein they sought refuge, was the one that offered the most generous and constant hospitality.¹⁷ Considering the financial burden placed on Britain by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, aid to the émigrés was indicative not only of the generosity offered to traditional rivals, but also of the close French connection to British society. This connection encouraged Britain to subsidise the émigrés for almost two decades and bolstered London’s position as the principal party in the lengthy war.¹⁸

The final peace settlement of 1815 reflected the war aims developed by Pitt and his cabinet between 1793 and the fall of his ministry in 1801.¹⁹ Between 1800 and 1812, almost every statesman and government in Europe tried to appease Napoleon. Only Britain, which Napoleon could neither invade nor destroy, continued to fight, and that was only because they concluded that peace with Napoleon would be humiliating after the failure of Amiens in 1803 and impossible once Napoleon concluded the Treaties of Tilsit and imposed a continental blockade in 1806-7.²⁰ The émigré court capitalized on the resultant animosity and persistently tried to demonstrate that, when restored, France would become a stable and peaceful partner in Europe.

That the emigration was a “colossal mistake” in terms of domestic politics, as Cazalès affirmed in 1794, does not mean that it failed internationally; the monarchy did return to France in 1814 and the efforts of moderate men such as Cazalès, d’André, Mounier and Mallet du Pan, rather than the pretensions of d’Avaray, Artois or even initially Louis XVIII himself, were responsible for the outcome.²¹ Although, initially, Britain was not the émigrés’ main destination, French emigrants sought to build connections with the British by providing information to the government and cooperating with its agents.

This cooperation was readily offered by the *monarchiens*, moderate royalists and constitutionalists who were actively in contact with British policy-makers with the hope of creating a constitutional monarchy. In contrast to moderates and constitutionalists, ultra-royalists only sought British support when their continental options appeared exhausted. While ultras remained intransigent about French policies, they reluctantly came to realize the importance of allying themselves with Britain, if only as a means of

defeating the Republic and later the Empire. Indeed for the Pretender, having a stronger connection with Britain was vital to keeping the royalist cause alive.

By contrast, Provence, who was capable of adapting to various viewpoints,²² allied himself with ultras after emigrating and only gradually accepted the need for moderating his views. His willingness to receive the councils of Wickham and Lord McCartney while on the continent, and his efforts to show moderation where British opinions were concerned, reveal the degree to which he was willing to appease London. By 1797 Provence was open to including moderate royalists in his court such as Cazalès, and by 1807 had accepted that a return to ancien régime France was not possible. Provence's ties with Britain's royal family and ruling elite, his Declaration of Hartwell, and his reliance on British magnanimity ensured that the Bourbons' cause remained alive in Britain and on the continent. For their part, the British also accepted that restoring the Bourbon monarchy provided the best guarantee to ending years of conflict. London worked accordingly to impress on Provence the importance of moderation and to dismiss the options preferred by continental powers.

Such ties, created by a variety of groups, strengthened the émigrés' cause and endured beyond the Restoration. Even those previously shunned during the early stages of the emigration were part of Louis XVIII's restored regime. Much to the chagrin of the ultras, the contact between moderate émigrés and Britain ensured British support of the Bourbon Restoration and the 1814 Charter. As Michael Rapport argues, "*l'adoption du constitutionalisme par certains émigrés fournit un autre exemple de l'entrecroisement des cultures politiques française et britannique.*"²³

The twenty-five years of exile gave the émigrés time to reflect on their misfortune. While reactionary ultras such as de Maistre saw the Revolution as an act of God inflicting his wrath on a dissipated France, the more practical thinkers accepted that most of the upheaval was due to ancien régime policies.²⁴ Still, while France tried to reconcile the legacies of the Revolution and the Empire with those of the monarchy, the emigration continued to present a '*moment privilégié*' in the history of relations between France and Britain. Prejudices that had divided the two nations were broken down by the force of their own absurdity and by the discovery that the peoples had much in common.²⁵

Given the uncertain path of the Bourbon Restoration, the allies' intervention and occupation of Paris was decisive in dismantling the Napoleonic regime. Equally crucial was their acceptance of the succession of Louis XVIII. Although the allied powers did not enter France with the intention of imposing a particular regime, their consent to the Bourbons was finally given because a regime under Louis XVIII was deemed to be the one most likely to guarantee an end to the years of Revolutionary and imperial conquest. The same could be said of France, which by the beginning of 1814 had not shown a great desire for change. The Restoration was thus dependant on the allies and on France herself. It was the force of circumstance, the persistent urging of a determined minority, and above all Napoleon's stubbornness, that eventually made the French "recognize that there was no other way to achieve, with independence and dignity, their supreme desire of the moment – peace."²⁶ For Britain, France prior to 1815 was a necessary and natural enemy that had to be constrained and reduced as much as possible. After Waterloo, France, although still a source of suspicion, became Britain's "normal partner in

European affairs, to be restrained through watchful partnership.”²⁷ This partnership was due in large part to the émigré efforts to secure closer ties with Britain.

¹ Black and Schweizer, “The Value of Diplomatic History,” 625.

² Garrett, “The Myth of the Counterrevolution in 1789,” 800.

³ Heuer, “Liberty and Death,” 183 and Carpenter, *Refugees*, 180.

⁴ Mori, “The Occupation of Toulon, 1793,” 718.

⁵ Wilkinson, “French Émigrés,” 601.

⁶ See Mori, “The Occupation of Toulon, 1793,” 719.

⁷ Jupp, *Lord Grenville*, 183.

⁸ Duffy, “British Policy,” 23.

⁹ Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 217.

¹⁰ The British cabinet sent in 140,000 troops, considerably more than they ever thought necessary to fight Napoleon. In Elliott, “French Subversion,” 51 and Hampson, *The First European Revolution*, 131.

¹¹ Mori, *Britain in the Age of the French Revolution*, 195.

¹² Carpenter, *Refugees*, 155.

¹³ Wilkinson, “French Émigrés,” 602.

¹⁴ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 122-23.

¹⁵ Quoted from *The Times*, 10 October 1792. In Carpenter, *Refugees*, 161.

¹⁶ Jasanoff, “Revolutionary Exiles,” 48 and Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 190-5. As a testament to continued fear of revolution and trust in British security and governing systems, Louis XVIII kept about £200,000 and 300,000 Francs in British banks. Charles X chose to go there first after being overthrown during the July Revolution in 1830. In Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 270.

¹⁷ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 160 - 61.

¹⁸ Charles John Fedorak, “In Search of a Necessary Ally: Addington, Hawkesbury, and Russia, 1801-1804,” *International History Review*, 13 (1991): 224, and Carpenter, *Refugees*, 47-50.

¹⁹ Duffy, “British Policy,” 11.

²⁰ Paul W. Schroeder, “Napoleon’s Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise,” in David Wetzel, Robert Jervis, and Jack S. Levy eds., *Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 27-28.

²¹ Rice, “The Political Career of Cazalès,” 424.

²² Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, 52.

²³ Rapport, ““Deux nations,”” 43.

²⁴ Beach, *Charles X*, 118.

²⁵ Carpenter, *Refugees*, 170-71.

²⁶ De Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 38.

²⁷ Schroeder, “Napoleon’s Foreign Policy,” 53.

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